Hanrahan v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 27 October 1919
• Docket Number: No. 12186.,12186.
• Parties: HANRAHAN v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

289 Ill. 400

124 N.E. 547

HANRAHAN

v.CITY OF CHICAGO et al.

No. 12186.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 27, 1919.

Error to First Branch Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Theodore Brentano, Judge.

Action by John J. Hanrahan, Jr., against the City of Chicago and another. Judgment for plaintiff against named defendant affirmed by Appellate Court (209 Ill. App. 630), and named defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Samuel A. Ettelson, Corp. Counsel, William H. Devenish, and Charles R. Francis, all of Chicago (Robert H. Farrell and Edward J. Kelley, both of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Earl J. Walker and James D. Power, both of Chicago, for defendant in error.

DUNCAN, J.

This writ of error is prosecuted to review the judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District affirming a judgment of the superior court of Cook county in the sum of $5,000 in favor of John J. Hanrahan, Jr., against the city of Chicago. The recovery is for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by defendant in error through the negligence of the city in permitting a wooden awning on a building located at the southwest corner of Stony Island avenue and Sixty-Seventh street to be and remain in a defective condition. The suit was brought against the city of Chicago and F. Salter & Co., a corporation, jointly. At the close of the plaintiff in error's evidence the jury was instructed to find the defendant F. Salter & Co. not guilty. The city of Chicago will be hereafter referred to as plaintiff in error.

The declaration consisted of two counts, and in substance charged that on and prior to December 12, 1903, F. Salter & Co. was the owner of and in possession and control of a certain building situated on the west side of Stony Island avenue, immediately south of Sixty-Seventh street; that there was an awning attached to and connected with and constituting a part of said building, which extended out from the building and above and over the sidewalk on Stony Island avenue, under which pedestrians were accustomed to walk in passing upon and along said walk; that plaintiff in error is a municipal corporation, and as such was in possession and control of said streets at said times, and that they were public streets, and was also in possession and control of such sidewalk; that long prior to and up to December 12, 1903, the city of Chicago and F. Salter & Co. wrongfully and negligently permitted said awning to be and remain in such a defective, old, rotten, weak, and dilapidated condition that it was liable to fall upon pedestrians walking upon the sidewalk, which condition rendered the awning a nuisance; that plaintiff in error knew, or by exercise of ordinary care in that behalf would have known, of the defective and dangerous condition of the awning on and prior to and at the time of the injuries to defendant in error; that defendant in error, an employé of plaintiff in error, while in the course of his employment and while walking southward upon said sidewalk under said awning, in the exercise of due care and caution for his safety, was injured by the awning falling upon him in consequence of its defective and dangerous condition, whereby he sustained permanent injuries, etc. Plaintiff in error demurred to the declaration, and the cause was tried upon the issues formed on a plea of the general issue to the declaration.

The evidence disclosed that at the time of his injuries the defendant in error was about 18 years of age. He was in the employ of the plaintiff in error, working on an intercepting sewer then in the course of construction along Stony Island avenue. The awning referred to in the declaration was constructed of pine, extending the full length of the building and out over the sidewalk a distance of about 10 feet and about 10 feet above the sidewalk. It had been constructed 10 years or more, and at the time of the injury was rotten and decayed, and the proof tended to show that that condition had existed since the spring of 1903, several months prior to the injuries, which occurred December 12, 1903. On the day of the injuries it was snowy and windy. Defendant in error and his father were both struck and knocked down upon the sidewalk by the falling of the awning. When it was removed from their persons by others who came to their assistance defendant in error was apparently not seriously injured, but he had suffered a bruise thereby on the top of his head. He was afterwards on three occasions adjudged insane, the first time being about 2 1/2 years after his injury, and at the time of the trial he had been home about 2 years, having been discharged from the hospital as incurable. The evidence for plaintiff in error tended to show that his injuries were not the cause of his insanity, but that the form of his insanity was what is known as dementia praecox, a form of insanity usually caused by toxemia or poisoning of the system, and is described by some of the experts as a disease known as precocious dementia, which the plaintiff in error's expert witnesses testified was never caused by traumatism. The expert testimony of defendant in error was to the effect that traumatism sometimes produces dementia praecox, that blows on the head often produce insanity, and that defendant in error's insanity was caused by his injuries aforesaid. As the evidence of defendant in error fairly tended to show that his insanity was a result of his injuries, whether or not his insanity resulted from such injuries was a question of fact for the jury to finally determine on proper instructions, and not a question of law, and this court is therefore concluded by the judgments and findings of the superior and Appellate Courts.

The first contention of plaintiff in error is that the declaration does not state a cause of action, and that the Appellate and superior courts both erred in holding that it...