Hanrahan v. O'Toole
| Decision Date | 22 September 1908 |
| Parties | W. F. HANRAHAN, Executor of the Will of THOMAS O'TOOLE, SENIOR, Appellee, v. THOMAS O'TOOLE, JUNIOR, AND OTHERS, Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Clinton District Court.-- HON. J. W. BOLLINGER, Judge.
PROCEEDINGS for probate of will. Verdict for proponent, and will admitted to probate. Contestants appeal. Affirmed.
Affirmed.
Ellis & McCoy, Skinner & Co., and M. V. Gannon, for appellants.
S. C Scott and Wolfe & Wolfe, for appellee.
The contestants, who are children of the deceased, contest the admission of his will to probate on the ground that said testator was mentally incompetent to make a valid disposition of his property, and that the instrument was procured by fraud, duress, and undue influence exercised by W. F. Hanrahan, the executor named therein, and by his wife and children. Other grounds are alleged, but those we have named are alone material for our consideration.
I. At the close of the evidence, the trial court withdrew from the jury the issue of fraud and undue influence on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify a verdict for the contestants thereon. The error assigned upon this ruling will be considered in another paragraph of this opinion. Referring now to the claim made by the contestants that Thomas O'Toole, Sr., was mentally incapacitated to make a valid will, it may be said that the evidence fairly tends to show the testator to have been a man of at least average ability and intelligence, and, while having but limited education, had proved himself a good business man, and had accumulated a considerable amount of property. He had six children who had reached maturity, and were all married, with families and homes of their own. His wife had been dead for several years. Prior to the date of his will, he had given a farm to each of his four sons, Lawrence, John, Thomas, and James, also to his daughter Mary, wife of W. F. Hanrahan, and had given $ 1,500 each to his daughters Christie Rosenberg and Margaret Dunn. The estate remaining at his death amounted in value to perhaps $ 25,000. In the spring of 1906 the testator was about eighty-three years of age, and there is evidence to the effect that his mind had in some degree yielded to the weaknesses usually attendant upon old age. He was at times depressed, was easily moved to tears, would dwell unduly upon trivial matters, showed childish interest in horses, dogs, chickens, and birds, was forgetful, and at times had unfounded fears that there were intruders in or about his house at night. At one time he proposed to marry a woman of his acquaintance, but through the interposition of his relatives, including the Hanrahans, the engagement was broken off. But there is little or no evidence that he failed in ordinary business sagacity, or became incompetent to manage his own business affairs. His son-in-law, W. F. Hanrahan, was a merchant and man of business experience, and the testator doubtless held him in esteem and respected his judgment, and sometimes consulted him in business matters. In April, 1906, he was in failing health, and on the 26th day of that month executed the will in controversy, and on May 20, 1906, he died. The will appears to have been drawn by Hanrahan, but there is nothing in evidence to show the particular circumstances under which it came to be written. The instrument is very informal, but not difficult of interpretation. Its provisions are in substance as follows: First. He gives to the children whom he had already provided with farms the sum of $ 50 each. Second. To his daughter Christine, to whom he had already given $ 1,500, he bequeaths $ 500, and the sum of $ 1,000 to his daughter Margaret, who had received a like advancement. Third. To his son James O'Toole he authorizes his executor upon certain conditions to surrender an indebtedness secured by a mortgage. Fourth. To a daughter of one of his sons he gives $ 500, and to the son of another his horse harness, and carriage, and to a daughter of Margaret Dunn $ 1,000. Fifth. To the local Catholic Church he gives $ 500 for the purchase of a bell, and to the parish priest $ 100 for masses for the repose of his soul. To the children of his daughter Mary Hanrahan he makes various bequests aggregating $ 13,200, and, in addition thereto, leaves his homestead to be equally divided between Mrs. Hanrahan's three daughters. For the payment of the legacies provided by the will, he directs or requests the sale of certain lands, concerning a part of which the title had been placed in W. F. Hanrahan "for certain reasons," the nature of which is not stated. The will contains no residuary clause. There is ample evidence in the record to sustain the finding of the jury that at the date of this instrument Thomas O'Toole, Sr., was of sufficiently sound mind to make a valid will.
While, as we have already seen, it may be true that his mental powers had become somewhat weakened, it is shown quite conclusively that he was still capable of intelligent comprehension of his business, and knew the nature of the instrument executed by him. The will itself affords strong evidence of his knowledge and memory of the natural objects of his bounty, and all are mentioned and remembered therein with varying degrees of liberality. It gives also evidence of his general comprehension of the nature and extent of his estate; and the minuteness with which he directs its distribution among his children and grandchildren is not the characteristic of a mind far gone in senility. He attended to his own business, looked after his own bank account, and, so far as is disclosed in the record, was no more dependent upon the advice or assistance of agents or counselors than is the average man of his education, experience, and station in life. That a man is not rendered incapable of making a good will by mental weakness merely, so long as he retains reasonable comprehension of the act in which he is engaged, and of the extent of his estate, and the claims, if any, which his family or friends have upon him, has been too often decided to call for discussion or illustration at this time. See Perkins v. Perkins, 116 Iowa 253, 90 N.W. 55, and cases there cited. Applying the rule of these authorities, there is no reason for interfering with the verdict of the jury upon the question of the testator's mental capacity, unless there be merit in some of the exceptions taken to rulings made by the court upon the trial.
One of the contestants having testified that a few years before his decease his father contemplated marriage, and that some trouble arose because of opposition thereto by the family, the witness was asked by his counsel, "State whether or not that marriage was consummated," and an objection to the question for immateriality was sustained. We presume that by this question counsel meant to inquire whether the proposed marriage ever took place. As there was no claim by any one that Mr. O'Toole did remarry, we think the inquiry was clearly immaterial. This offer was followed by the further questions: "Didn't your father during October, 1905, contemplate marriage with Mrs. Dillon?" Again: "State whether or not he was engaged to Mrs. Dillon." To both of these questions objection was sustained. Counsel do not claim in argument that the matters sought to be elicited by these questions would have any tendency to show unsoundness of mind, but they suggest that if the engagement existed, and was broken off under the influence of Hanrahan, that fact would have a tendency to show confidential relations between him and the testator. Even if that be correct, which we do not concede, the questions asked the witness did not indicate to the trial court any purpose on part of counsel to connect Hanrahan with that episode in the career of the testator, and counsel made no explanation or offer to show such state of facts. Under such circumstances, there was no error in sustaining the objection. Though not in answer to these questions, witness did say that "Mrs. Hanrahan and most all of us opposed the marriage"; thus indicating that at that time in face of the common danger that their father might marry, and thus divert a fraction of his estate from themselves, the children all united to defeat his purpose, and apparently succeeded. Such a circumstance tends to negative, rather than support, the theory that any one of them was then enjoying his special confidence.
The same witness, after stating his knowledge and observation of his father's condition, conduct, and conversation during the latter part of his life, was asked: "From the facts you have seen and detailed, would you say your father was of sound mind, meaning whether he was of sound or unsound mind or otherwise during this period?" Objection to the question was sustained, and the answer was excluded. In our opinion the answer could well have been admitted, though strictly speaking the question was open to objection, and technically there was perhaps no error in the ruling. As will be observed, the witness was asked for his opinion of the soundness of the testator's mind "during that period," and not as to his mental condition at or about the time the will was executed, or even as to a time prior to its execution, and the court could without abuse of discretion refuse to admit the answer. But even if there was error in the ruling, we would not be inclined to reverse on that account. There was a large number of witnesses for the contestant whose knowledge of the testator was as intimate and whose opportunities to note his condition were as good who testified freely on the subject, and gave their opinion of his mental soundness or unsoundness, and we think it very clear that...
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