Hanson Buick Inc. v. Chatham, 63801

• Decision Date: 16 July 1982
• Docket Number: No. 63801,63801
• Parties: HANSON BUICK INC. et al. v. CHATHAM.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 846

295 S.E.2d 846

163 Ga.App. 127

HANSON BUICK INC. et al. v. CHATHAM.

No. 63801.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 16, 1982.

For opinion of the court, see 163 Ga.App. 127, 292 S.E.2d 428.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

On motion for rehearing, appellee Chatham argues stridently that we (1) misconstrued the cases cited in the opinion; (2) failed to recognize the trend and the logical result of these cases which would permit compensation for psychic injury arising out of psychic cause; (3) misinterpreted Code Ann. § 114-102 in holding that an injury must arise "naturally and unavoidably" from some discernible physical occurrence, in contradiction to Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga.App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 and to the broad definition of "accident" in Home Ins. Co. v. McEachin, 151 Ga.App. 567, 568, 260 S.E.2d 560, where we said "if the employment contributes to the aggravation of the pre-existing injury, it is an accident under our compensation law"; (4) created illogic in denying such claims while permitting compensation for heart attack victims; (5) erred in failing to follow the clear majority rule in other jurisdictions; (6) based our decision on unfounded fears of spurious claims and other potential mischief inherent in permitting such compensation; (7) erred in failing to distinguish this case from Brady, supra, "which was decided at a time when psychiatry had far less powers of diagnosis."

To these contentions we say: (1) the cases were correctly construed on their facts and in not one of them did we evince any inclination to compensate emotional or mental disability caused by emotional or mental impetus. Wherever language was used from which appellee infers such inclination (except Sawyer v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 141 Ga.App. 298, 233 S.E.2d 227 where we approved compensation only for an "occupational disease"), there was in fact some physical occurrence or manifestation. See, e.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, 103 Ga.App. 749, 120 S.E.2d 655 at pp. 749, 751. (2) Inasmuch as we have never approved compensation for mental or emotional injury arising from mental or emotional cause, but have repeatedly required some physical impetus or cause (see Sawyer, supra, 141 Ga.App. at p. 301, 233 S.E.2d 227; Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, supra, 103 Ga.App. p. 752, 120 S.E.2d 655), the trend and logic of these cases and the effect of Brady, supra, and the actual holding of Sawyer, supra, is to deny such compensation in this state. (3) Our holding that to be compensable a psychic trauma must arise naturally and unavoidably from some discernible physical occurrence is in keeping with Code Ann. § 114-102 and with all Georgia cases we have seen. It will be noticed that we deliberately refrained from defining "accident" as a physical blow or impact, because of cases like McEachin, supra, where the aggravation of a pre-existing...