Hanson v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, No. A05-1783 (Minn. App. 6/27/2006)

• Decision Date: 27 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. A05-1783.,A05-1783.
• Parties: Shelley Hanson, Appellant, v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia d/b/a Minnesota Sinfonia, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

Shelley Hanson, Appellant, v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia d/b/a Minnesota Sinfonia, et al., Respondents.

No. A05-1783.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed June 27, 2006.

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 05-005552.

Jill Clark, Jill Clark, P.A., (for appellant).

Frederick E. Finch, Matthew J. Franken, Bassford Remele, P.A., (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge; Wright, Judge; and Ross, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

ROSS, Judge.

Appellant Shelley Hanson challenges the district court's dismissal of her negligence suit against respondents Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia and Jay Fishman. Because the district court correctly concluded that Hanson's claim is barred under the doctrine of res judicata, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Shelley Hanson is a professional clarinet player. Respondent Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia is a non-profit corporation that hires musicians to perform concerts. Hanson contracted to perform with Sinfonia. Respondent Jay Fishman is a co-founder of Sinfonia and serves as its executive director, artistic director, and conductor.

At a Sinfonia rehearsal on March 16, 1999, a light fixture that Fishman placed on a utility table fell on Hanson, injuring her. Hanson participated in a few Sinfonia concerts after the incident but then took a medical leave, claiming that the effects of the accident impaired her judgment and her performing ability. In May 1999, while she was on leave, Hanson received a letter from Fishman rescinding Sinfonia's offer of summer work and suggesting that she contact Sinfonia when her recovery was complete.

In August 2000, Hanson filed a lawsuit in federal court against Fishman and Sinfonia alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). Hanson also asserted other state-law claims, including negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, defamation, interference with prospective business relations, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel. The court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents on the ADA and MHRA claims and dismissed the remaining state-law claims without prejudice. Hanson v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (D. Minn. 2002), aff'd sub. nom. Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 983 (2003).

Hanson then brought suit in February 2002 against respondents in state court, asserting state-law claims for disability discrimination under the MHRA, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, defamation, interference with prospective business relations, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel. The complaint's factual allegations—describing the March 16, 1999 rehearsal and appellant's injury—were lifted verbatim from Hanson's earlier federal complaint. Respondents moved for summary judgment on all claims. Hanson's memorandum in opposition to summary judgment argued, with respect to her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, that she "was physically injured by the light pole as a result of the negligence of Fishman . . . ." The district court granted respondents' motion, and we affirmed. Hanson v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, No. A03-1061, 2004 WL 1244229 (Minn. App. June 8, 2004).

In March 2005, Hanson brought a suit in negligence against respondents again in state district court. The complaint's factual allegations—describing the March 16, 1999 rehearsal and Hanson's injury—were taken verbatim from the complaints filed in Hanson's prior federal and state suits against respondents. The complaint asserted that because of respondents' negligence, Hanson "suffered damages, including but not limited to the loss of income, physical injury, emotional distress and mental anguish, pain and suffering, medical bills, and other harm." Respondents moved to dismiss Hanson's claim pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted), arguing that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The district court granted the motion. This appeal follows.

DECISION

Hanson challenges the district court's decision to dismiss her third lawsuit for failure to state a claim. In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), we consider de novo whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997). "A complaint should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears to a certainty that no facts consistent with the pleading exist that support granting the relief demanded." Stead-Bowers v. Langley, 636 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2002).

The district court dismissed Hanson's claim after concluding that it was barred by res judicata. "The doctrine of res judicata bars a claim where litigation on a prior claim involved the same cause of action, where there was a judgment on the merits, and where the claim involved the same parties or their privies." Wilson v. Comm'r of Revenue, 619 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn. 2000). "In addition, the party against whom res judicata is applied must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in the prior proceeding." Id. Res judicata is also an equitable doctrine that must be applied fairly in light of the facts of each individual case. R.W. v. T.F., 528 N.W.2d 869, 872 n.3 (Minn. 1995). The court must focus on whether applying res judicata would work an injustice on the party against whom it is applied. Id. Whether res judicata should apply is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn. 2001).

Under res judicata, "[a] judgment on the merits constitutes an absolute bar to a second suit for the same cause of action, and is conclusive between parties and privies, not only as to every matter which was actually litigated, but also as to every matter which might have been litigated therein." Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 466, 124 N.W.2d 328, 340 (1963) (quoting Veline v. Dahlquist, 64 Minn. 119, 121, 66 N.W. 141, 142 (1896)). The doctrine requires parties to "assert all alternative theories of recovery in the initial action." Dorso Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Am. Body & Trailer, Inc., 482 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. 1992); see Anderson v. Werner Continental, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Minn. App. 1985) ("To the extent that a given state of facts is susceptible to alternative interpretation and analysis, plaintiff must seek and exhaust all alternative grounds or theories for recovery in one action." (quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. June 24, 1985). We will consider Hanson's appeal in this framework.

1. Did the earlier claim involve the same cause of action?

Hanson maintains that her earlier lawsuit did not involve the same cause of action as her present suit. We cannot agree. This prong of the res-judicata test derives from the principle that "a plaintiff may not split his cause of action and bring successive suits involving the same set of factual circumstances." Hauser v. Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Minn. 1978); see also Liimatainen v. St. Louis River Dam & Imp. Co., 119 Minn. 238, 242, 137 N.W. 1099, 1100 (1912) (observing that a party "is not at liberty to split up his demand, and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion of the grounds upon which special relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second suit, if the first fail"). A "claim" or "cause of action" is defined as "a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing." Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 214 (7th ed. 1999)); see Jenson v. R.L.K. & Co., 534 N.W.2d 719, 724 (Minn. App. 1995) (defining "cause of action" as "a situation or state of facts that entitle a party to bring an action and to seek judicial relief"), review denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 1995). The focus of res judicata is therefore whether the second claim "arise[s] out of the same set of factual circumstances." Hauser, 263 N.W.2d at 807; see also Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2004) (stating that "the facts surrounding the occurrence which constitutes the cause of action—not the legal theory upon which [plaintiff] chose to frame his complaint—must be identical in both actions to trigger res judicata" (quotation omitted)).

The "common test for determining whether a former judgment is a bar to a subsequent action is to inquire whether the same evidence will sustain both actions." McMenomy v. Ryden, 276 Minn. 55, 58, 148 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1967). Claims cannot be considered the same cause of action if "the right to assert the second claim did not arise at the same time as the right to assert the first claim." Care Inst., Inc.-Roseville v. County of Ramsey, 612 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. 2000).

The record before us establishes clearly that Hanson's February 2002 state-court complaint (asserting, among other things, negligent infliction of emotional distress) involved the same cause of action as her current negligence claim (filed in March 2005). The factual allegations of the earlier claims concerning the circumstances of Hanson's injury are repeated verbatim in the 2005 negligence claim. The operative facts giving rise to the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress are plainly identical to those giving rise to the negligence claim. Hanson conceded as much in her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment in her earlier case when she claimed damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress because she "was physically injured by the light pole as a result of the...