Hanson v. Hanson

• Decision Date: 29 June 1934
• Parties: HANSON v. HANSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

287 Mass. 154

191 N.E. 673

HANSON

v.HANSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

June 29, 1934.

Appeal from Probate Court, Norfolk County; McCoole, Judge.

Libel by Pauline E. Maier Hanson against Edwin H. Hanson for annulment of a marriage. From a decree annulling the marriage, Edwin H. Hanson appeals.

Reversed.

H. J. Smith, of Wellesley, for libellant.

M. J. Segal and S. L. Segal, both of Boston, for libellee.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

This is a petition for the annulment of a marriage. There is no report of the evidence. A decree was entered annulling the marriage ‘on account of duress practiced upon said libellant.’ The libellee appealed and at his request the probate judge reported the material facts found by him. (G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 215, §§ 9, 11.

These findings of fact made upon unreported oral testimony must be accepted as true unless mutually inconsistent or plainly wrong. Glover v. Waltham Laundry Co., 235 Mass. 330, 334, 127 N. E. 420. The conclusion and the decree must stand unless not supported by the facts reported. Ripley v. Ripley, 259 Mass. 26, 155 N. E. 658;Slavinsky v. Slavinsky (Mass.) 190 N. E. 826.

The facts thus displayed are that the libellant, a resident of Wellesley in this commonwealth, had known the libellee for about eight months and was in love with him, but her love for him ceased on March 17, 1933, when informed that he had a venereal disease. She thereupon told him that she wanted nothing further to do with him and requested him to go away. Their meeting occurred on March 18, 1933, at the school where she was a pupil. He asked her to sit in his automobile and talk it over. When they were seated he started his automobile, saying that he was going to Somerville. After riding some time, she observed that they were in Lexington. When his attention was directed to that fact, he told her that they were going to Nashua, New Hampshire, to be married, where earlier in the day he had secured a marriage license. He said to her that he would lose his position if she did not marry him, that his salary had been raised on the strength of his approaching marriage, and that he would go through the form of marriage and give her an annulment the next day. She was deceived and believed that this could and would be done. On arriving at Nashua, New Hampshire, they were married. She reached home at four o'clock in the afternoon of the same day and told her parents of the marriage. The libellee was sent for and, arriving the next day, was asked to explain, and was forbidden to come to the house again. The libellee had a veneral disease at one time and there is grave doubt whether he was cured. Her father and uncle knew of this and warned her not to marry him. When told of this she was justified in being apprehensive for her personal safety. She was deceived as to both his physical condition and his promise of annulment. There were between them ‘no sexual relations after the ceremony.’ The libellee is alleged to be a resident of Boston in this commonwealth, and his answer admits this allegation.

The trial court had jurisdiction of the libel. Both parties were domiciled in this commonwealth. Jurisdiction in these circumstances is conferred by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 207, § 14, upon our courts to entertain a libel for the annulment of a marriage even though solemnized out of the commonwealth. The state of the domicile of parties can refuse to recognize the married status of its citizens who, barred from marriage within its boundaries, attempt to avail themselves of less stringent requirements of another state and there go through the form of marriage in accordance with its laws. Murphy v. Murphy, 249 Mass. 552, 144 N. E. 394. In that case a Massachusetts resident, divorced by his wife in this commonwealth and before another marriage by him was permitted by G. L. c. 208, § 24, married in Rhode Island and returned to live in this commonwealth. A petition for separate support was dismissed on the ground that the marriage would not be recognized as valid in Massachusetts and hence the probate court was without jurisdiction to enter a decree for separate support. On the other hand, it has been held that the courts of this commonwealth have no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a New Hampshire marriage of parties at all times domiciled in this commonwealth, where the validity of the marriage was attacked on the grounds that the parties were of such a youthful age that under a New Hampshire statute (Laws 1907, c. 80, § 2) the marriage ‘may in the discretion of the superior court be annulled.’ Levy v. Downing, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N. E. 638, 639. In that case it was said: ‘Under that law this marriage was solemnized, and by that law must the question of its validity be determined. It is plain that under it the marriage is not void, but must stand until and unless the superior court of that state in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to annul it.’ The validity of the marriage in the case at bar does not depend upon the discretion of any foreign court. It is attacked not upon grounds of public policy declared in a statute of either state, but upon the general ground of coercion and fraud exercised over the libellant. In determiningwhether the marriage has ever existed, which is the issue upon a petition for annulment, our courts must be governed by the principles of law prevailing in the state where the ceremony took place, but may exercise jurisdiction over the marriage status of persons at all times domiciled within this commonwealth. A sovereign state has authority in general to decide what marriages between its own citizens it will recognize. It is vested with power to exercise through its courts, with respect to cases where both spouses are domiciled within its borders, jurisdiction to nullify a marriage from its beginning or to dissolve a valid marriage. Whippen v. Whippen, 171 Mass. 560, 51 N. E. 174;Wright v. Wright, 264 Mass. 453, 162 N. E. 894;Witherington v. Eldredge, 264 Mass. 166, 174, 162 N. E. 300;Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341, 99 N. E. 845,43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 355. The wisdom of a uniform rule of this nature is apparent, because parties would be without a forum to decide their cause if the courts of this commonwealth do not have jurisdiction, since the courts of New Hampshire decline to entertain a petition for annulment of a marriage solemnized within that state between parties at all times domiciled outside that state. Turner v. Turner, 85 N. H. 249, 157 A. 532.

Our attention has not been drawn to any statute or decision of the state of New Hampshire touching the subject of duress as affecting the validity of a marriage. Therefore parties have not put themselves in a position to invoke G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 233, § 70, as to taking judicial notice of foreign laws. See Rodriguos v. Rodrigues (Mass.) 190 N. E. 20, and cases cited. The case is considered as presented by the parties. It is presumed, therefore, that the law of New Hampshire on that subject is the same as that of this commonwealth. Park & Pollard Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 238 Mass. 187, 192, 130 N. E. 208. A careful...