Hanson v. Hearn

• Decision Date: 12 February 1988
• Citation: 521 So.2d 953
• Parties: 45 Ed. Law Rep. 1304 Roger HANSON v. Thomas K. HEARN, et al. 86-925.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 953

521 So.2d 953

45 Ed. Law Rep. 1304

Roger HANSON v. Thomas K. HEARN, et al.

86-925.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 12, 1988.

Edward Still and Susan Williams Reeves, Birmingham, for appellant.

Ina B. Leonard, Birmingham, and Robert L. Potts and C. Glenn Powell, Tuscaloosa, for appellees.

JONES, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment construing a 1980 consent judgment to which Dr. Roger Hanson and Thomas K. Hearn and other agents and employees of the University of Alabama at Birmingham were parties.

Hanson sued the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB), alleging that his removal as dean of the School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics (NSM) deprived him of due process of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Constitution of the State of Alabama. A consent judgment, effecting a settlement of the parties, provided in pertinent part:

"2. The plaintiff will be transferred to a senior academic position with administrative responsibilities. The position shall be equal in prestige, pay, and responsibility to that of the dean of Natural Sciences and Mathematics. The parties will mutually consult and decide upon an appropriate position for the plaintiff not later than September 1, 1980. This position shall be outside the University College. ...

"3. The plaintiff's salary shall be increased from time to time comparably to that of persons of similar rank, status and responsibility.

"...

"7. Other than as provided in this decree, the status and position of the plaintiff shall be governed by the same rules, regulations, handbooks, practices, and procedures as other persons holding academic administrative appointments."

After the entry of the consent judgment, Dr. Hanson was transferred to an administrative position in the Medical Center, with the title of director of coordinated curricula for the basic allied health sciences. ¹ As director, Dr. Hanson was initially paid the same salary he had been paid as dean; his salary each year after the transfer, however, was set by the senior vice president for health affairs, Dr. C.A. McCallum. ²

In determining the salary of an individual, Dr. McCallum reviewed the salary history of the individual and the salary range for the position, if a range existed and was applicable. Additionally, Dr. McCallum considered the "productivity of the individual" and "his accomplishments as they relate to other individuals." In sum, he followed university policy, which was that salary evaluations were to be based on individual performance. Although no administrator in the University College participated in Dr. Hanson's salary decisions, the University College made a lump sum transfer each year to the Medical Center to fund his position.

After his retirement in 1985, Dr. Hanson learned that his salary as director of coordinated curricula during his tenure in the position had been less than that of the deans of natural sciences and mathematics, business, engineering, and social and behavioral sciences in the University College; it had been more, however, than the deans of humanities and education in the University College.

Dr. Hanson's suit complained that the consent judgment required UAB to pay him equally with the dean of NSM, or comparably with other deans in the University College if there was no current dean in NSM, and that UAB had ignored the judgment's "special procedure and standard" for setting his salary. He sought a retroactive revision of his salary and retirement benefits, or, alternatively, an award of the difference between his salary and retirement benefits as paid and his salary and retirement benefits as alleged.

The trial court found that, in his position as director of coordinated curricula, the "Plaintiff's salary was regularly and routinely reviewed and he received salary increases on a regular basis. All of this was done in accordance with the standard policies and procedures of the University." The court further found that the percentages of Dr. Hanson's salary increases were consistent with those given to other UAB employees in positions of similar status. ³ The issue now before this Court is whether the trial court properly construed the provisions of the 1980 consent judgment.

Judgments are to be construed like other written instruments. Schwab v. Schwab, 255 Ala. 218, 50 So.2d 435 (1951). Specifically, a consent judgment is in the nature of a contract or a binding obligation between parties and can be set aside only upon a showing of fraud or mistake. Price v. American National Bank of Gadsden, 350 So.2d 328 (Ala.1977). Rules applicable to the construction and interpretation of contracts are applicable to the construction and interpretation of judgments. Thus, in construing a consent judgment, the intention of the parties derived from the judgment itself controls if its language is plain and unambiguous. See Southern Housing Partnerships, Inc. v. Stowers Management Co., 494 So.2d 44 (Ala.1986).

The general principle of interpretation is that the court is free to look to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the judgment. In other words, the entire judgment--all provisions considered--should be read as a whole in the light of all the circumstances as well as of the conduct of the parties. See Quick v. Campbell, 412 So.2d 264 (Ala.1982). The court is thus able to better determine the intent of the parties; and "if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable, it is given great weight." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(1) (1981).

Considering the facts of the...