Hanson v. Kynast, 85-1126

• Decision Date: 02 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1126,85-1126
• Parties: , 33 Ed. Law Rep. 455, 24 O.B.R. 403 HANSON, Appellee, v. KYNAST et al.; Ashland University, Inc., Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 171

24 Ohio St.3d 171

494 N.E.2d 1091, 33 Ed. Law Rep. 455, 24 O.B.R. 403

HANSON, Appellee, v. KYNAST et al.; Ashland University, Inc., Appellant.

No. 85-1126.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 2, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The relationship of principal and agent or master and servant exists only when one party exercises the right of control over the actions of another, and those actions are directed toward the attainment of an objective which the former seeks. (Councell v. Douglas [1955], 163 Ohio St. 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 ; Baird v. Sickler [1982], 69 Ohio St.2d 652, 433 N.E.2d 593 , approved and followed.)

2. A student who attends a university of his choice, receives no scholarships or compensation, voluntarily becomes a member of the university lacrosse team which engages in intercollegiate contests with other universities for which games no attendance fee is charged, who purchases his own equipment and who receives instructions from a coach while preparing for and playing such games, but is not otherwise controlled by the coach, and who participates in the game as a part of his total educational experience while attending school, is not the agent of the university at the time he is playing the game of lacrosse. Where in the course of a game of lacrosse such student injures a player of the opposing team, the relation of principal-agent does not exist between the student who inflicts the injury and his university, and the university is not responsible to the injured player under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

3. Under these circumstances a contractual relationship exists between the student and his university. The university is selling and the student is buying an education, and the formation of a principal-agent relationship is not intended nor is one established between the parties.

On May 1, 1982, appellee, Brian K. Hanson, sustained a paralyzing injury while playing in a lacrosse game between Ohio State University ("OSU") and Ashland University, Inc. ("Ashland") at the Ashland lacrosse field. During the game Roger Allen, an OSU player, intercepted an Ashland player's pass and scored a goal. As Allen was scoring the goal he was body-checked from behind by Ashland defender William D. Kynast. Allen fell and Kynast allegedly stood over Allen taunting him. Brian Hanson saw the contact and Kynast's subsequent behavior. Concerned for Allen's welfare, Hanson grabbed Kynast from the side or back and held him in a bear hug. Kynast immediately twisted and threw Hanson off his back. Hanson's head struck the ground and he sustained serious injuries.

The trainers for both teams came onto the field to attend Hanson. After discovering the seriousness of his injury (Hanson was numb and could not move), an assistant trainer for Ashland was sent to telephone the fire department for an ambulance.

Upon arriving on the scene, the ambulance driver discovered that the main entrance to the playing field was blocked by an illegally parked automobile. As a result, the ambulance driver had to find another entrance.

After immobilizing Hanson, the attendants transported him to Ashland Samaritan Hospital where he remained for almost an hour. He was then transferred to Mansfield General Hospital for surgery. ¹ The operation took place at approximately 11:00 p.m., more than five hours after he was taken from the first hospital. The surgery successfully relieved vascular compression thus preventing possible brain damage. Hanson, however, had sustained a serious spinal cord injury on impact. It was determined that he had suffered a compression fracture of his sixth vertebra and, as a result, Hanson is now an incomplete quadriplegic.

On December 13, 1983, Brian Hanson filed an amended complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County against William Kynast and Ashland University, Inc. ² Hanson maintained, in relevant part, that because Kynast was acting as the agent of Ashland, the university was therefore liable for Kynast's alleged wrongful acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Hanson also alleged that Ashland was directly liable for negligently failing to have an ambulance or emergency vehicle present at the site of the game, and in permitting a motor vehicle to be parked in such a manner that the main entrance to the playing field was blocked. Ashland filed a timely answer denying the material allegations of the complaint.

On April 11, 1984, Ashland filed a motion for summary judgment. After obtaining a ninety-day continuance to complete discovery, Hanson filed a brief in opposition to Ashland's motion for summary judgment. Ashland attached documentary evidence to support its position. The trial court granted Ashland's motion on November 16, 1984. The court held that no agency relationship existed between Kynast and Ashland, and that Ashland did not have a legal duty to have an ambulance at the game. ³ In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that genuine issues of fact existed on the question of agency and upon Ashland's duty to provide medical personnel at the game.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Brown, Bemiller, Murray & McIntyre and Jeffrey L. Molyet, Mansfield, for appellee.

Gongwer, Shafer & Auten and Philip H. Shafer, Ashland, for appellant.

PARRINO, Justice.

The first issue to be decided is whether the relationship of principal and agent existed between Kynast and Ashland. Because of the absence of proof as to the existence of a principal-agent relationship, the trial court essentially found as a matter of law that Ashland was not bound by Kynast's conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. ⁴ We agree.

This court has held that the relationship of principal and agent or master and servant exists only when one party exercises the right of control over the actions of another, and those actions are directed toward the attainment of an objective which the former seeks. Baird v. Sickler (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 652, 654, 433 N.E.2d 593 ; Councell v. Douglas (1955), 163 Ohio St. 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 ; Bobik v. Indus. Comm. (1946), 146 Ohio St. 187, 191-192, 64 N.E.2d 829 ; see, also, Restatement of the Law 2d, Agency (1958) 7, Section 1. Therefore, a principal-agent relationship can be found in the instant case only if Kynast was under the control of Ashland, and if he took some action directed toward the attainment of Ashland's objective.

In order to make this determination we must examine the relevant documentary evidence produced before the trial court. A review of the evidence reveals that William Kynast expressed an interest in Ashland when he was in high school. He requested and received written information from the university and he spoke with Ashland lacrosse coach Dick Fahrney. In his deposition Kynast testified that he chose Ashland because it had a good business school, he could live away from home, and he would be able to play lacrosse. He also testified that no promises were made to him by any Ashland official to induce him to attend the university.

Kynast attended Ashland for three semesters, starting in August 1981. He financed his education through bank loans and with the assistance of his parents. While at Ashland, Kynast decided to play lacrosse; however, he was never obligated to play lacrosse for the university. In addition, Kynast did not receive a scholarship, he used his own equipment while playing, and he was not compensated for his participation.

Lacrosse was instituted at Ashland in an effort to meet the needs of students, especially those coming from the East Coast where lacrosse is a popular sport. Ashland provides a coach and the players are each given a game shirt which displays the university's name. The players also received free transportation to games at other schools, and on one occasion while Kynast played for Ashland, they received overnight lodging on a road trip. No admission fee is charged at the home games.

This court is of the opinion that this relationship between Kynast and Ashland is a relationship common to many students attending universities. A university offers a diversified educational experience which includes classroom instruction in a great variety of subjects as well as optional participation in events such as school clubs, and intramural and intercollegiate sports. All of these offerings are designed to expand and enrich a student's overall educational experience. Students evaluate and determine which university best meets their needs, and then pay a fee to attend that university. The relationship formed under these conditions has previously been characterized as contractual. Zumbrun v. U.C.L.A. (1972), 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 10, 101 Cal.Rptr. 499, 502. The student pays a fee and agrees to abide by the university rules. In exchange, the university provides the student with a worthwhile education.

This relationship does not constitute a principal-agent relationship. The student is a buyer of education rather than an agent. Restatement of the Law 2d, Agency (1958) 73, Section 14 J, states that a buyer retains goods primarily for his own benefit, while an agent is one who retains goods primarily for the benefit of the one who delivers those goods. In the instant case, the "goods" to be delivered is an education and the university delivers that education to the student for a fee. It is clear that a student retains the benefit of that education for himself rather than for the university.

Our conclusion that a student is not an agent of a university is supported by Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp. (1951), 103 Cal.App.2d 102, 229 P.2d 114. In Johnson, defendant Bruce Gross contracted for a course of instruction in the theory and practice of airplane flight from Central Aviation Corp. The plaintiffs suffered damages when Gross, while taxiing a plane for inspection, collided with the plaintiffs' airplane. The plaintiffs...