Hanson v. State
| Decision Date | 05 October 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. S,S |
| Citation | 190 N.W.2d 129,52 Wis.2d 396 |
| Parties | Wayne T. HANSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. tate 15. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
This case is before us on writs of error to review a judgment of conviction and an order denying a motion to withdraw pleas of guilty.
On November 28, 1969, the defendant, Wayne T. Hanson, together with an accomplice, was apprehended in the vicinity of a bar which had been burglarized in the village of Wyeville. Late on that same day, the defendant gave a statement in which he admitted various burglaries in the vicinity. The preliminary examination was waived and, at the request of defendant's appointed counsel, the county judge, acting as a magistrate, bound the defendant over for trial in the circuit court for Monroe county.
Defendant was originally charged with six separate counts of burglary, but after pleading guilty to three counts, the remaining charges were dismissed. The pleas were entered on May 15, 1970, and, following a presentence investigation, the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of thirty months on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.
At the defendant's request, this court appointed the Public Defender to represent the defendant, and on December 8, 1970, a motion was filed in the circuit court for Monroe county captioned, 'Motion for Order Vacating Pleas of Guilty or Authorizing Their Withdrawal, and for Order Vacating Sentences.' The motion was heard on January 22, 1971, and was denied by an order of the circuit court filed on February 24, 1971.
Writs of error have been issued by this court to review the judgment of May 15, 1970, and the order of February 24, 1971.
James H. McDermott, State Public Defender, Madison, for plaintiff in error.
Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., William A. Platz and George L. Frederick, Asst. Attys. Gen., Madison, Ralph E. Osborne, Dist. Atty. of Monroe Co., Sparta, for defendant in error.
The state's initial contention is that this court is without jurisdiction to review the action of the trial court because defendant's motion was not timely brought. It bases this contention upon the premise that defendant's motion was one to modify the sentence and, relying upon Hayes v. State (1970), 46 Wis.2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625, asserts that such motion was required to be made within ninety days of the imposition of sentence. We construe defendant's motion as one to withdraw a plea of guilty and find the time limit set in Pulaski v. State (1964), 23 Wis.2d 138, 126 N.W.2d 625, to be applicable. Accordingly, the motion in the trial court was timely, and the trial court's order is reviewable in this court.
We said in State v. Reppin (1967), 35 Wis.2d 377, 384, 151 N.W.2d 9, that a defendant who seeks to withdraw his guilty plea has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence adequate grounds for the withdrawal. In Ernst v. State (1969), 43 Wis.2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713, we summarized the standards to be used by a trial court and the procedures to be employed by the trial judge in accepting pleas of guilty. Where the defendant sustains his burden of proof, as required by Reppin, and shows noncompliance with these standards, a 'manifest injustice' is shown, which will result in the vacation of the judgment of conviction and which will permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty.
Defendant argues that the trial judge, prior to accepting the pleas of guilty, failed to comply with the second standard of Ernst, supra, page 674, 170 N.W.2d page 719. That standard requires that the trial judge "establish the accused's understanding of the nature of the crime with which he is charged and the range of punishments which it carries." Defendant's argument is based on the reply he made when the trial judge asked if he understood the charges to which he was pleading guilty. The defendant answered, 'Entering a building without consent of the owner--stealing.'
Section 943.10(1)(a), Stats., provides:
'Whoever intentionally enters (any building) * * * without the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to steal * * * may be imprisoned not more than 10 years.'
The Public Defender takes the position that defendant's reply should not have satisfied the judge that the defendant understood the crime with which he was charged, since defendant failed to state that he knew that the entry was with the intent to steal. Rather, the Public Defender argues, the defendant's reply indicated only that he understood that the elements of the crime were limited to the entry of a building and the commission of an actual theft therein. The Public Defender also argues that theft is no element of burglary and thus the defendant's plea, if it is given any meaning at all, can merely mean that the defendant acknowledged guilt in respect to a crime with which he was not charged.
We cannot agree from this record that there has been a sufficient showing that the defendant failed to understand the elements of burglary. The statement made in open court was an acknowledgment of what the defendant had in fact done. He entered the building and committed a theft therein. This statement was in accord with his confession given to the sheriff and entered into evidence. The mere fact that he did not recite precisely all of the elements of the crime of burglary does not indicate that he did not understand the nature of the crime with which he was charged.
On the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty, the trial judge pointed out that the response was an 'intellectually honest' one in that the defendant stated precisely what had happened. The trial judge properly stated that the admission of the actual theft carries with it the inference that the entry was made with the intent to steal. In his findings of fact following the hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas the trial judge pointed out that the defendant had, on an earlier occasion, been sentenced on 10 separate counts of burglary. Under these circumstances, it is impossible without further proof to conclude that there is any merit to defendant's argument that he failed to understand the nature of the crime with which he was charged. Although the defendant was made available at the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty and was present, he made no assertion that he did not understand the nature of the crime. Defendant's proof is limited to the barebones assertion that the single statement of the defendant as cited above failed to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Bartelt
...State v. Jackson, 69 Wis.2d 266, 230 N.W.2d 832 (1975); McAllister v. State, 54 Wis.2d 224, 194 N.W.2d 639 (1972); Hanson v. State, 52 Wis.2d 396, 190 N.W.2d 129 (1971); Jacobs v. State, 50 Wis.2d 355, 184 N.W.2d 110 These cases are significant in that they are subsequent to Carlson, which ......
-
People v. Helms
...or she had consent or that he or she purported to be acting under legal authority” (12A CJS, Burglary § 32, citing Hanson v. Wisconsin, 52 Wis.2d 396, 402, 190 N.W.2d 129, 133 ). The difference the majority tries to identify between New York law and Georgia law is immaterial because the men......
-
Rinehart v. State
...object to challenge the arrest when he failed to object prior to his appearance in court at his arraignment, citing Hanson v. State (1971), 52 Wis.2d 396, 402, 190 N.W.2d 129, and Lampkins v. State (1971), 51 Wis.2d 564, 570, 571, 187 N.W.2d 164. This would be correct if the defendant was s......
-
Armstrong v. State, 202
...jurisdiction is waived by pleading to the information. Belcher v. State (1969), 42 Wis.2d 299, 166 N.W.2d 211; Hanson v. State (1971), 52 Wis.2d 396, 190 N.W.2d 129. If the objection made prior to the commencement of the preliminary examination was to be preserved, it should have been reass......