Rinehart v. State

• Decision Date: 04 June 1974
• Docket Number: No. S,S
• Citation: 63 Wis.2d 760,218 N.W.2d 323
• Parties: Glen Mitchel RINEHART, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. tate 192.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 323

218 N.W.2d 323

63 Wis.2d 760

Glen Mitchel RINEHART, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error.

No. State 192.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 4, 1974.

Howard B. Eisenberg, State Public Defender, Richard M. Sals, Asst. State Public Defender, Madison, for plaintiff in error.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., Robert D. Martinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for defendant in error.

BEILFUSS, Justice.

The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence nor the sentence imposed. He does present several issues that blend into two contentions: (1) The officer did not have probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crimes, and (2) that an arrest without a warrant was illegal.

'Probable cause' has been defined in many cases in this court and elsewhere. A recent definition appears in State v. Paszek (1971), 50 Wis.2d 619, 624, 625, 184 N.W.2d 836, 839 as follows:

'Probable cause to arrest refers to that quantum of evidence which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably committed a crime. Henry v. United States (1959), 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134. It is not necessary that the evidence giving rise to such probable cause be sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, nor must it be sufficient to prove that guilt is more probable than not. It is only necessary that the information lead a reasonable officer to believe that guilt is more than a possibility, Browne v. State, supra, and it is well established that the belief may be predicated in part upon hearsay information. Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327. The quantum of information which constitutes probable cause to arrest must be measured by the facts of the particular case. Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. . . .'

The entire quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause need not be within the personal knowledge of the individual arresting officer. In United States v. Stratton (8th Cir. 1972), 453 F.2d 36, 37, certiorari denied, 405 U.S. 1069, 92 S.Ct. 1515, 31 L.Ed.2d 800, the court stated:

'. . . probable cause is to be determined upon the objective facts available for consideration by the agencies or officers participating in the arrest; otherwise each individual officer would have to be fully briefed or informed of all of the essential factors in each case before proceeding to make an arrest upon probable cause. . . .

'The defendant does not dispute the sufficiency of the collective information available to the Secret Service agents (the Milwaukee Police Department in this case) to establish probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a felony . . . but claims that the arresting agents were not personally possessed of this knowledge.

'We think the knowledge of one officer is the knowledge of all and that in the operation of an investigative or police agency the collective knowledge and the available objective facts are the criteria to be used in assessing probable cause. The arresting officer himself need not possess all of the available information. As stated in Stassi v. United States, 410 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1969), 'The officers involved were working in close concert with each other, and the knowledge of one of them was the knowledge of all. United States v. Romero, 2d Cir., 249 F.2d 371, 374' Id. at 952, n. 7.'

In State v. Paszek, supra, at page 624, we further stated:

'. . . 'Probable cause' to arrest is a requirement of the Fourth amendment of the United States constitution, binding upon the individual states through the Fourteenth amendment. Giordenello v. United States (1958), 357 U.S. 480, 485, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503. This court has recognized that sec. 11, art. I, of the Wisconsin Constitution is substantially like the Fourth amendment of the United States constitution, and that the standards and principles surrounding the Fourth amendment are generally applicable to the construction of sec. 11, art. I. Therefore a finding of probable cause under federal standards will normally result in a finding of probable cause under state standards. Browne v. State (1964), 24 Wis.2d 491, 503, 129 N.W.2d 175, 131 N.W.2d 169. . . .'

The state contends that the defendant waived his right to object to challenge the arrest when he failed to object prior to his appearance in court at his arraignment, citing Hanson v. State (1971), 52 Wis.2d 396, 402, 190 N.W.2d 129, and Lampkins v. State (1971), 51 Wis.2d 564, 570, 571, 187 N.W.2d 164. This would be correct if the defendant was seeking to challenge the personal jurisdiction of the trial court. However, in his reply brief the defendant made clear that he is not asking that the action be dismissed but rather that the statements of the defendant obtained subsequent to and as the result of an allegedly improper arrest be suppressed.

Sec. 971.31(5)(b), Stats., provides:

'In felony actions, motions to suppress evidence or motions under ss. 971.23 to 971.25 or objections to the admissibility of statements of a defendant shall not be made at a preliminary examination and not until and information has been filed.'

Thus defendant's motion to suppress was timely.

The defendant also contends that his arrest without a warrant was a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides:

'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'

The same issue was presented in a case before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in United States v. Millen (E.D.Wis.1972), 338 F.Supp. 747, 750, 751. We approve and adopt the rationale and the rule of that decision as follows:

'The defendant challenges the validity of the arrest because no warrant was obtained even though allegedly it would have been practicable to do so. Therefore, under the theory of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), defendant continues any statements be made and any evidence seized subsequent to his arrest are fruits of an unlawful arrest and must be suppressed. I find this argument to be without merit.

'It has long been held that as long as probable cause for an arrest exists, arrest warrants are unnecessary, even when there is time to obtain them. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). As stated in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice White in Crimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 778--779, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2048, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969):

'The judgment of Congress is that federal law enforcement officers may reasonably make warrantless arrests upon probable cause, and no judicial experience suggests that this judgment is infirm. *...