Hanus v. State

• Decision Date: 10 February 1926
• Docket Number: (No. 9633.)
• Citation: 286 S.W. 218
• Parties: HANUS v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

286 S.W. 218

HANUS v. STATE.

(No. 9633.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

February 10, 1926.

Rehearing Granted June 25, 1926.

Appeal from District Court, Lavaca County; Lester Holt, Judge.

Albert Hanus was convicted of arson, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

H. S. Paulus, of Yoakum, and C. L. Stavinoha, of Hallettsville, for appellant.

Sam D. Stinson, State's Atty., of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., of Tyler, for the State.

BERRY, J.

The offense is arson. The punishment is two years in the penitentiary.

The only serious complaint made by the appellant is at the action of the court in permitting the state to introduce in evidence the voluntary statement made by the accused. The confession sufficiently complies with the statute as to form, and, if it was voluntarily made, it was admissible. There seems to be no controversy but that appellant was duly warned by the county attorney, the officer who took the confession. The objection to its voluntary character is based on the proposition that the Rev. G. Karutko, a Catholic priest, the party whose house was burned, told the defendant while he was under arrest that Karutko believed that defendant had burned the barn, and, if he did burn it, to go ahead and tell the truth about it, and he (Karutko) would help him all he could. Appellant admitted signing the confession before the county attorney, and does not claim that the county attorney made any representations causing him to sign the said statement. He contends, however, that the statement was not true, and that, by reason of the representations made to him by the injured party, Karutko, "that he would help him all he could," he was thereby induced to sign same, and that same was not such a voluntary statement as the law contemplates. For the above reasons, appellant objected to the introduction of the voluntary statement. It is a well-settled rule in this state that, to render a confession inadmissible upon the ground that it was induced by the promise of some benefit to defendant, such promise must be made or sanctioned by a person in authority. As sustaining this rule, Mr. Branch, on page 41 of his Ann. Penal Code, cites the following cases: Thompson v. State, 19 Tex. App. 616; Rice v. State, 22 Tex. App. 654, 3 S. W. 791; Carr v. State, 24 Tex. App. 562, 7 S. W. 328, 5 Am. St. Rep. 905; Neeley v. State, 27 Tex. App. 329, 11 S. W. 376; Cannada v. State, 29 Tex. App. 537, 16 S. W. 341; Thomas v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 178, 32 S. W. 771; Carlisle v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 108, 38 S. W. 991; Anderson v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 54 S. W. 581; Williams v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S. W. 1059; Brown v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 139, 75 S. W. 33.

The case of Rice v. State, supra, seems to be clearly in point. The witness Karutko was not a person in authority, as that term is construed by the decisions of this court, nor do we think any reversible error is shown in the court's failure to submit this issue to the jury.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment is in all things affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, P. J.

Appellant insists that we reconsider the complaint of the refusal to submit to the jury the question whether the confession made by the appellant was voluntary.

From the testimony of Karutko, it appears that he was the owner of the barn that was burned; that on the day it was burned the appellant was brought to the witness by officers, and in the presence of the officers a conversation took place. From the testimony of Karutko we quote:

"I do not remember the exact words I said to him in regard to the burning of the barn, but, anyway, I told him I heard he had burned it. He was all scared up, or, at least, he looked that way. He was handcuffed, and I told him, `Now you are in it, and you had just as well go and tell the whole thing.' I told him, `You are in it. I am sure you burned it, and if you tell the whole thing I will try to help you out,' because I had suspicions that there were others in it. I told him to tell the whole thing. I told him to tell them that he did it, and acknowledge it, and that if I could help him I would. I told him I would help him."

Appellant testified, and denied the offense. He was arrested by Jaresh and Hermes. They came to his home, exhibited a pistol, ordered him to "stick 'em up," put handcuffs on him, and directed that he get into their automobile. From the appellant's testimony we quote:

"After they put the handcuffs on me, they put me in the car, and took me to Father Karutko's barn, and when I got there Emil Jalufka and Father Karutko was there. Emil Jalufka is a brother-in-law of mine. * * * Father Karutko came to the car. He is a Catholic priest, and I am a member of his church. I know him. He married me. Father Karutko asked me whether I did it — I mean, whether I set the barn on fire, and I told him I didn't. I told him, `No.' Then he said I did it, and that I might as well admit it, and that he was going to help me. He said if I would say I did it he would help me like he helped Emil Jalufka. He told me to say that I did it, and he would help me out of it. Emil Jalufka was charged with a felony in this court. At first I told him that I had not burned the barn, but he told me if I would say I burned it he would help me like he helped Jalufka. I knew that Emil Jalufka had been charged with a felony. After that they took me to Hallettsville, but they did not take the handcuffs off me.

"After Father Karutko said he would help me if I would say I did it, I told him, `All right. I will say it.' I told him I was going to say I did it.

"They brought me to Hallettsville, and I signed the paper you show me (Exhibit No. 1). I was in the county attorney's office when I signed it. Tom Jaresh, O. E. Hermes, and Father Karutko and myself were present when I signed it.

"That statement is not true. The reason I made the statement was because Father Karutko told me to say I burned the barn and he would help me. In other words, I signed it because Father Karutko told me he would help me out."

Appellant reiterated a number of times the statement that he did not burn the barn; that the written statement prepared in the county attorney's office and signed by him was not true; that he made it upon the faith of being helped by Father Karutko, as his brother-in-law had been helped by the priest. His brother-in-law had been charged with a felony, but with the aid of Father Karutko it had been reduced to a misdemeanor. Karutko also testified that, while in the county attorney's office, and while the statement was in the course of preparation through questions propounded to the appellant, the witness promised to help the appellant. Karutko said:

"During the time he was telling this story to the county attorney, he asked me if I would help him, and I told him I would."

In the statute it is said:

"The confession of a defendant may be used in evidence against him if it appear that the same was freely made without compulsion or persuasion." 2 Vernon's Tex. Crim. Stat. (Code Cr. Proc.) art. 809.

Article 810, 2 Vernon's Tex. Crim. Stat., naming the conditions upon which a confession may be received, declares that it must be voluntary, unless it be one which results in disclosing facts or circumstances found to be true which conduce to establish his guilt. There is no suggestion that the present confession comes within the exceptions.

"The burden of proof showing that no improper inducement existed when the confession was made falls upon the state." 2 Wharton's Crim. Ev. (10th Ed.) p. 1295, § 622j.

See, also, section 218.

Texas precedents to the same point will be found in Williams v. State, 37 Tex. 474; Binkley v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 55, 100 S. W. 780, and other cases collated in Branch's Ann. Tex. P. C. § 66. In the same section it is said:

"To render a confession inadmissible upon the ground that it was induced by the promise of some benefit to defendant, such promise must be positive, and must be made or sanctioned by a person in authority and it must also be of such character as would be likely to influence the defendant...