Hapney v. Rheem Manufacturing

• Decision Date: 08 June 2000
• Docket Number: 99-732
• Citation: 26 S.W.3d 771
• Parties: Renate HAPNEY v. RHEEM MANUFACTURING COMPANY 99-732 ___ S.W.3d ___ Opinion delivered
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Renate HAPNEY v RHEEM MANUFACTURING COMPANY

99-732 ___ S.W.3d ___

Opinion delivered June 8, 2000

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Appeal from the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission; reversed & remanded; Court of Appeals; reversed.

1. Workers' compensation -- standard of review -- substantial evidence defined. -- In appeals involving claims for workers' compensation, the supreme court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision and affirms the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence; substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; there may be substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision even though the court might have reached a different conclusion if it had sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo; the supreme court will not reverse the Commission's decision unless it is convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission.

2. Statutes -- construction -- ascertaining legislative intent. -- A cardinal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature; in considering the meaning of a statute, the supreme court considers it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning; in ascertaining legislative intent, the court may examine statutory history as well as conditions contemporaneous with the time of the enactment, the consequences of interpretation, and all other matters of common knowledge within the court's, and in this case the Workers' Compensation Commission's, jurisdiction.

3. Workers' compensation -- statutes strictly construed. -- The supreme court has a duty to strictly construe workers' compensation statutes pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 1996); strict construction means narrow construction and requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed; the doctrine of strict construction requires the court to use the plain meaning of the language employed.

4. Workers' compensation -- medical association guide used in assessment of anatomical impairments -- back injuries treated as injuries to spine. -- Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-519 (Supp. 1999), the Workers' Compensation Commission has adopted the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th ed. 1993) to be used in the assessment of anatomical impairments; in assessing impairments, there is no specific set of guidelines for back injuries, instead, the Guides addresses such impairments in the context of the spine; in describing the musculoskeletal system, the Guides states that the upper extremity, the lower extremity, the spine, and the pelvis are each to be considered a unit of the whole person; the spine normally consists of twenty-four vertebrae, which are divided into three regions, the cervical region, the thoracic region, and the lumbar region.

5. Workers' compensation -- terms "back," "spine," and "neck" are commonly used interchangeably -- back encompasses that region of body beginning at neck. -- A review of both general and medical dictionaries revealed that the terms "back," "spine," and "neck" are commonly used interchangeably; Webster's New World Dictionary 99 (3d college ed. 1988) defines back in relevant part as: 1. the part of the body opposite to the front; in humans and many other animals, the part to the rear or top reaching from the nape of the neck to the end of the spine; 2. the backbone or spine; "neck" is defined as "that part of a human or animal joining the head to the body, including the part of the backbone between the skull and the shoulders"; finally, "spine" is defined as "the spinal column; backbone; the Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 74 (1987) defines "back" as "the posterior part of the trunk from the neck to the pelvis; called also dorsum; see also spine; and vertebra"; clearly, these definitions indicate that the back encompasses that region of the body beginning at the neck.

6. Workers' compensation -- gradual-onset exception for back injuries does encompass injuries to cervical spine -- reversed & remanded. -- Where the medical evidence diagnosed appellant in terms of an injury to her cervical spine, not her neck, even in light of the strict-construction requirement, fair-minded persons would not have reached the same conclusion as the Workers' Compensation Commission that the gradual-onset exception for back injuries does not encompass injuries to the cervical spine; reversed and remanded to the Commission to determine whether appellant has met her burden of proof with regard to the other elements of compensability set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (Repl. 1966). [cme]

Sexton & Fields, P.L.L.C., by: William J. Kropp III, for appellant.

Warner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: Wayne Harris, for appellee.

Donald L. Corbin, Justice.

Appellant Renate Hapney appeals the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying her claim for benefits for a ruptured cervical disc from her employer, Appellee Rheem Manufacturing Company. The Commission found that Mrs. Hapney had failed to meet her burden of proof that she suffered a compensable injury. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's decision, by a tie vote, in Hapney v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 67 Ark. App. 8, 992 S.W.2d 151 (1999). We granted Mrs. Hapney's petition for review of that decision pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(e)(i). When we grant review following a decision by the court of appeals, we review the case as though it had been originally filed with this court. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999).

Standard of Review

In appeals involving claims for workers' compensation, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission's decision and affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id.; Burlington Indus. v. Pickett, 336 Ark. 515, 988 S.W.2d 3 (1999). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Williams v. Prostaff Temps., 336 Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999). There may be substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we had sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. Brower Mfc. Co. v. Willis, 252 Ark. 755, 480 S.W.2d 950 (1972). We will not reverse the Commission's decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. White, 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98.

Facts

The record reflects that Mrs. Hapney has been employed by Rheem since 1984, where she primarily worked as a press operator. On Friday, February 2, 1996, Mrs. Hapney was transferred to an assembly line and given new job duties that required her to attach two metal plates to air conditioning units. Specifically, these duties consisted of using an orr to line up the screw holes and then using a screw gun to place six screws in each unit. In order to complete her assigned task, Mrs. Hapney stated that she had to bend down six times and turn her neck a little when attaching the plates to each unit. Mrs. Hapney worked a nine- hour shift on that day and assembled a total of 316 units. According to her calculations, Mrs. Hapney would have bent down over 1,800 times that day.

Mrs. Hapney testified that while performing her job duties, her neck and right arm began to hurt, but that she was able to complete her shift. According to Mrs. Hapney, the pain progressively worsened, and eventually she was unable to move her head. She also reported experiencing numbness in her right arm. Mrs. Hapney reported to Dr. Carson, Rheem's company doctor, on Monday February 5, 1996: Dr. Carson put her on restriction or light work, but then completely took her off work on February 13. Mrs. Hapney remained off work until September 3, 1996.

Mrs. Hapney was referred to the Holt Krock Clinic on February 15 where she was examined by Dr. William Sherrill. Dr. Sherrill ordered a cervical MRI on March 29, and it revealed disc herniation at C5-6 and some protrusion at C6-7 resulting in spinal stenosis. Thereafter, Dr. Sherrill arranged for Mrs. Hapney to see a neurosurgeon, Dr. Luis Cesar. Dr. Cesar recommended that Mrs. Hapney undergo an anterior cervical fusion at C5-6. In a letter dated October 11, 1996, Dr. Cesar reported that to the best of his knowledge the major cause of Mrs. Hapney's problem was the February 2 injury. This opinion refuted Dr. Cesar's earlier opinion that Mrs. Hapney's disability may have been related to a previous shoulder injury sustained on April 19, 1993.

Mrs. Hapney admitted that she had previously suffered an injury in April 1993, which resulted in shoulder surgery, and that she had experienced neck pain on occasion ever since. She further stated, however, that the pain she began experiencing on February 2 was different and more severe than any other pain she had previously experienced. Moreover, none of Mrs. Hapney's medical records from the 1993 injury indicate that she suffered from any problems with her cervical spine.

A hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on October 29, 1996. In a January 31, 1997 opinion, the ALJ found that Mrs. Hapney had proven that her neck injury was compensable under the gradual-onset exception for both rapid repetitive motion injuries and back injuries, as codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(a) or (b) (Supp. 1999).(FN1) Rheem appealed the ALJ's decision to the Commission.

After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, the Commission concluded that Mrs. Hapney had failed to prove that she sustained a compensable injury because the gradual-onset exception for back injuries does not extend to injuries of the...