Haraguchi v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 12 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. S148207.,S148207.
• Citation: 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 250,182 P.3d 579,43 Cal.4th 706
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Massey Harushi HARAGUCHI, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Santa Barbara County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

182 P.3d 579

43 Cal.4th 706

76 Cal.Rptr.3d 250

Massey Harushi HARAGUCHI, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Santa Barbara County, Respondent The People, Real Party in Interest.

No. S148207.

Supreme Court of California.

May 12, 2008.

Sanger & Swysen, Robert M. Sanger and Stephen K. Dunkle, Santa Barbara, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Mary Jo Graves and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Kristofer Jorstad and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General; Thomas W. Sneddon, Jr., and Christie Stanley, District Attorneys, and Gerald McC. Franklin, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.

Michael A. Ramos, District Attorney (San Bernardino) and Grover D. Merritt, Lead Deputy District Attorney, for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

WERDEGAR, J.

Prosecutors are public fiduciaries. They are servants of the People, obliged to pursue impartially in each case the interests of justice and of the community as a whole.¹ When conflicts arise that compromise their ability to do so, they can and should be recused. But defendants bear the burden of demonstrating a genuine conflict; in the absence of any such conflict, a trial court should not interfere with the People's prerogative to select who is to represent them.

In this and a companion case, Hollywood v. Superior Court (May 12, 2008, S147954) ___ Cal.4th ___, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 182 P.3d 590, 2008 WL 2003387 we consider the extent to which involvement in literary and cinematic endeavors may give rise to conflicts requiring recusal. Here, the lead prosecutor moonlighted as a novelist, writing a fictional account of a heroine prosecutor's decision whether to try a rape case involving an intoxicated victim. The novel was published shortly before her scheduled prosecution of petitioner Massey Harushi Haraguchi for the rape of an intoxicated victim. In this case, as in Hollywood, the trial court found no conflict. In opinions issued the same day, the same Court of Appeal — relying in part on the unusual and distinctive facts of these cases — exercised its independent judgment and in both cases reversed and ordered recusal. Thus, we must also consider the standard for reviewing a trial court's decision finding, or rejecting, the existence of a disqualifying conflict.

We reaffirm our long-standing rule that recusal motions are reviewed under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Furthermore, we reverse the Court of Appeal here based on its failure to grant appropriate deference and based on the presence in the record of evidence sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that no disqualifying conflict existed and no unlikelihood of a fair trial had been proven.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 14, 2005, an information was filed charging Haraguchi, inter alia, with rape of an intoxicated person. (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. (a)(3).)²

On April 25, 2006, Haraguchi moved for recusal of Deputy District Attorney Joyce Dudley and the Santa Barbara County District Attorney's Office based on Dudley's publication of a novel, Intoxicating Agent, in January 2006, as well as her subsequent promotion of the book. Haraguchi alleged, inter alia, that (1) the book contained a lengthy fictional account of the rape of an intoxicated person; (2) the fictional trial, like Haraguchi's, was to begin around April 2006; (3) a character in Dudley's novel bore a resemblance to Haraguchi; and (4) the facts of the fictional rape in other respects mirrored another unrelated case in which Dudley had obtained only a hung jury. Haraguchi further contended that Dudley was marketing the book locally, selling it in at least two local bookstores, conducting a book signing at one of the bookstores and at the Women's Center of the University of California at Santa Barbara, and doing an April 4, 2006, interview with a Santa Barbara television station about the book. In addition, the Santa Barbara Independent published a favorable review of the novel.

Haraguchi contended Dudley's publication and promotion of her book was influencing how she handled his case. According to Haraguchi's counsel, "[w]hen I took over the Haraguchi case from prior counsel, Ms. Dudley's first unsolicited remarks to me were . . . that no other prosecutor at the DA's office would take a case like Haraguchi, but that she could win it." Counsel argued that Dudley's remarks were similar to views in the novel expressed by the protagonist, Santa Barbara County District Attorney Jordon Danner: "Jordon was positive another D.A. wouldn't want this case; and, she knew the victim would feel betrayed if she handed it off." (Dudley, Intoxicating Agent (2006) p. 57 (Intoxicating Agent).) Counsel further declared: "From the first time the undersigned talked to Ms. Dudley about this case, she said it would not settle. She has refused to enter into any settlement negotiations and has summarily informed the court that the case will go to trial." Based on this, Haraguchi contended Dudley's interest in promoting her book was compromising her willingness to seek justice impartially.

In opposition, Dudley disputed these allegations. She submitted a declaration denying that Intoxicating Agent was based in any way on the Haraguchi case, that its publication or publicity were in any way coordinated with the Haraguchi case, that Haraguchi's counsel had accurately represented her remarks, or that her decisions had in any way been shaped by the book's publication.

The trial court denied Haraguchi's motion, finding there was no conflict warranting recusal. It concluded publication of the book around the same time as Haraguchi's trial was coincidental; the rape case described in the book was unrelated to Haraguchi's case; the alleged physical resemblance of a character (not the fictional rapist) to Haraguchi was not prejudicial; and, to the extent there might be any conflict, it was not so grave as to render it unlikely Haraguchi would receive a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal granted Haraguchi's petition for a writ of mandate. Declining to defer to the trial court because the trial court "had no precedent to guide it," the Court of Appeal held recusal was required as a matter of law. It concluded Dudley's views of the justice system, as reflected in the novel, were so one-sided as to raise a reasonable possibility she would not exercise her discretion evenhandedly, and her interest in promoting her book presented a conflict so great it was unlikely Haraguchi could receive a fair trial. However, the Court of Appeal declined Haraguchi's further request to recuse the entire office.

We granted review to consider both the standard of review and its application to a prosecutorial recusal motion in these circumstances.

DISCUSSION

I. Standards for a Motion to Recuse

Section 1424 sets out the standard governing motions to recuse a prosecutor: such a motion "may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial." (Id., subd. (a)(1).) The statute "articulates a two-part test: `(i) is there a conflict of interest?; and (ii) is the conflict so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting?'" (Hambarian v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 826, 833, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 725, 44 P.3d 102, quoting People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 594, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310.)

We uniformly have held that a motion to recuse is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision to grant or deny the motion is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Vasquez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 47, 56, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 372, 137 P.3d 199; Hambarian v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 834, 118 Cal. Rptr.2d 725, 44 P.3d 102; People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 594, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310; People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 269, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164.) The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court's ruling under review. The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence,³ its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,⁴ and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.⁵

The Court of Appeal in this case gave no deference to the trial court's findings of fact or its application of the law to those facts.⁶ It offered two justifications for this departure: (1) this case involved novel circumstances and was thus a matter of first impression; and (2) the Court of Appeal had an independent interest in eliminating errors before trial. Neither persuades us to create an exception to the choice of the abuse of discretion standard.

With respect to this case being a matter of first impression, we note that virtually every case is, to a greater or lesser degree, a matter of first impression. The difference between each new set of facts and those that previously have been ruled upon may be small and immaterial or large and momentous. Where on the continuum a new set of facts lies is to some extent in the eye of the beholder; a court of a mind to reverse may always point to those elements of a case that it views as distinguishing and on that basis assert the issue is a matter of first impression. The Court of Appeal's proposal that cases of "first impression" should receive independent review thus offers no meaningful boundaries and wholly undermines the trial court's role in evaluating recusal motions in the first instance.

As an alternative ground for exercising independent review, the Court of Appeal pointed to its interest in...