Harbor Chevrolet Corp. v. Machinists Local Union 1484

• Decision Date: 28 August 1959
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 44 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2772, 38 Lab.Cas. P 65,771 HARBOR CHEVROLET CORPORATION, a California corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MACHINISTS LOCAL UNION 1484 et al., Defendants, Machinists Local Union 1484 et al., Respondents. Civ. 23371.

Page 640

343 P.2d 640

173 Cal.App.2d 380, 44 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2772,

38 Lab.Cas. P 65,771

HARBOR CHEVROLET CORPORATION, a California corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MACHINISTS LOCAL UNION 1484 et al., Defendants Machinists Local Union 1484 et al., Respondents.

Civ. 23371.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 28, 1959.

Potruch & Lerten, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Alexander H. Schullman, Rose, Klein & Marias, Los Angeles, for respondents.

WHITE, Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff, Harbor Chevrolet Corporation, hereinafter referred to as 'Harbor', brought the instant action against the Teamsters Union, Machinists Union and the Painters Union, alleging that on April 13, 1957, the defendant Unions entered into an oral agreement with Frederick A. Potruch, attorney for Harbor, that said unions would not picket Harbor in consideration of its said attorney promising to refrain from acting as legal counsel for Freeman McKenzie Ford in connection with the latter's dispute with said unions; that said agreement not to picket was to remain in effect until a majority of all of the employees of Harbor joined any one or any combination of said unions, in which case the said unions would meet with Harbor's attorney, Potruch, in an attempt to work out any problems which might exist before picketing Harbor; that said attorney Potruch fully performed his agreement; but that on July 2, 1957, said unions commenced to picket Harbor without a majority of Harbor's employees having joined any one or any combination of said unions; that the said picketing was causing irreparable injury to Harbor and there was no adequate remedy at law because of the inability of Harbor to carry on its business so long as the said picketing continued.

After hearing on order to show cause why said unions should not be enjoined from such picketing of Harbor, on August 21, 1957, the court found that Harbor was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, and at the same time enjoined said unions from picketing in violation of their said agreement.

On November 27, 1957, the court below found the aforesaid unions and certain of their agents in contempt of the said preliminary injunction. Thereafter a petition for certiorari for review of the order of contempt was denied and on January 13, 1958, a petition for rehearing on said petition for writ of certiorari was also denied. In connection with said proceedings for certiorari, the court below found that Harbor had not violated the National Labor Relations Act.

Upon their written settlement agreement, the preliminary injunction and order in re contempt as to Teamsters Union and its agent were vacated on February 7, 1958.

On March 4, 1958, the trial court vacated the preliminary injunction of August 21, 1957, and set aside its order of November 27, 1957, in re contempt as to the Machinists and Painters Unions and their agents. From that order of March 4, 1958, Harbor has appealed.

Appellant, in its brief, states that the order setting aside and vacating said preliminary injunction was made upon the 'sole ground that the National Labor Relations Act had deprived the court of jurisdiction over this controversy'; and that the sole issue to be determined is 'whether the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.) has given the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction over this controversy and thereby ousted the courts of the State of California of such jurisdiction'.

Respondents, however, urge that the possible lack of jurisdiction was not the 'sole ground' upon which said order of March 4, 1958, was made and should be sustained; and states that 'The order of the court itself recites that it was predicated upon motions, '(1) to vacate, revoke or set aside preliminary injunction, and (2) to reconsider, modify or dismiss preliminary injunction and/or order in re contempt proceedings' ; and further states the order was made after the court had heard the arguments of counsel and had read and fully considered the points and authorities submitted in support of and in opposition to said motions.'

An examination of the record indicates that the court below determined that a court which orders an injunction has the power to modify the injunction and any order in re contempt based thereon whenever the circumstances and situation of the parties make it just and equitable to do so. At the hearing which resulted in the making of the order which is being considered upon the instant appeal, Harbor contended that 'No change of circumstances has been shown which would justify the modification or dissolution of the injunction'.

The trial court, during the proceedings and just before setting aside the preliminary injunction and order in re contempt, said:

'Now, we have two additional factors, one the question of delay, second, the fact that negotiations apparently are impossible * * *.

'* * * The preserving of the status quo in this case for the purpose of negotiating, for the purpose of the original contract is nil. It is of no value. They apparently aren't going to negotiate the way it looks now. That isn't the exact wording of the contract. The wording of the contract is that we won't picket until we get a majority. But that imports first an attempt to get a majority, and it imports that there isn't going to be a stalemate here. I cannot help but read common sense into it that there were and the...