Harbor Cruises LLC v. Rhode Island Dept. of Labor
| Decision Date | 10 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | P.C. 05–5076 |
| Parties | HARBOR CRUISES LLC, v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and DAVID CATE |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
Before this Court is an appeal from a decision of the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (the "Department") finding that David Cate ("Cate"), a former employee of appellant Harbor Cruises LLC ("Harbor"), is entitled to overtime payments pursuant to R.I.G.L. 1956 §42-14-4.1 For the reasons set forth in this Decision this Court affirms the Department's decision.
Harbor also known as "Boston Harbor Cruises," is a Massachusetts company headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts. Among other services, Harbor provides passenger ferry service from Providence to Newport.[1] Harbor employed Cate, a resident of Johnston, Rhode Island, as a senior deckhand and engineer on its Providence-Newport ferry route from at least July 20 2002 to November 2, 2002. Cate's rate of pay was $12 per hour.
At some point following Cate's employment with Harbor, the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) investigated Harbor for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). On January 22, 2004, Richard D. Sansone, Assistant District Director of the USDOL, sent Cate a letter informing him that under the FLSA, Harbor owed him $1,137 in back wages. The letter stated that the USDOL had asked Harbor to pay these wages but that Harbor had not done so. As to remedies, the letter, which does not indicate that it was copied to Harbor, informed Cate that the USDOL had chosen not to take legal action against Harbor, though he was free to take legal action on his own behalf.
The letter made no reference to overtime wages. Nevertheless Cate recognized or became aware that the letter referred to overtime compensation for the hours he worked in excess of forty hours per week during his period of employment at Harbor. On February 5, 2004, Cate filed a complaint with the Department's Division of Labor Standards seeking payment of $1,137 in overtime wages.[2] Because Cate filed his claim with the Department, a Rhode Island agency, rather than in a forum with authority to enforce federal law, the claim was treated pursuant to R.I.G.L. 1956 §28-2-4.1, Rhode Island's overtime wage law, rather than the FLSA.
The Division of Labor Standards was unable to resolve the matter. On June 16, 2005, at the request of Cate and Harbor, the Department conducted a hearing on the matter, as is permitted by R.I.G.L. 1956 §28-14-19.[3] At the hearing, the Department determined, using information provided by the USDOL, that Cate worked approximately 189.5 hours in excess of forty hours per week, for which Harbor compensated him at his regular rate of $12 per hour. The Department calculated that, assuming Rhode Island law applied, Cate indeed would be owed $1,137, or an extra $6 per hour, as overtime compensation.
Harbor did not dispute that Cate worked 189.5 overtime hours or that he would be entitled to $1,137 if Rhode Island labor law were found to apply. Nonetheless, Harbor contended that Rhode Island overtime wage law should not apply to Cate. The reason, Harbor argued, is that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) does not permit states to require payment of overtime wages to an employee who the Act classifies as a "seaman."
Cate never presented any argument as to whether he would be classified as a "seaman" under the FLSA. The only information he provided in his testimony about his job responsibilities was that he had been a "senior deckhand and engineer." See Transcript of June 16, 2005 Hearing at 7. Harbor, represented by Frederick L. Noland, its managing member, contended that Cate met the requirements of a "seaman" under the FLSA because Cate was a senior deckhand and engineer working aboard a federally-documented vessel.[4] Noland stated:
So the bottom line is that the vessel that David worked upon was a federally documented vessel engaged in water transportation. David was a senior deckhand/engineer on the vessel as he testified to. By virtue of that testimony, Mr. Cate has indeed supported our position that he is indeed a seaman aboard a vessel that's documented in the United States.
Id. at 20. Essentially, Harbor's position was that regardless of Cate's job responsibilities, he would be considered a "seaman" under the FLSA because all employees on Harbor's vessels qualified as such. Noland stated at the hearing: "So our position has been and always will be, until we are told that it shouldn't be, is that the exemption applies to people working aboard our vessels." Id. at 21.
On August 30, 2005, the Department issued its decision on the matter. The Department found that the FLSA does not bar Rhode Island from requiring that seamen be paid overtime wages and that Cate was therefore entitled, pursuant to R.I.G.L. 1956 §28-2-4.1, to the payment he sought. The Department did not analyze whether Cate would be considered a "seaman" under the FLSA. Nonetheless, apparently the Department concluded that Cate would qualify as a "seaman" when, focusing on the preemption issue, it stated: "Although the petitioner is a seamen [sic], he is performing duties in Rhode Island, and his labor rights must be governed by Rhode Island law." .Decision at 6.[5]
On September 29, 2005, Harbor filed a timely appeal to this Court pursuant to R.I.G.L. 1956 §42-35-15(b), seeking reversal of the Department's decision on grounds of preemption. Cate and the Department each were served with a summons and Harbor's complaint on October 4, 2005. The Department filed a timely answer on October 20, 2005; Cate did not answer the complaint. Harbor and the Department, but not Cate, have submitted memoranda to this Court. The case was assigned for decision in October 2007.
In its role as an appellate court reviewing a final agency decision, the Superior Court is governed by R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g). That section provides, in relevant part, as follows:
As this statutory provision indicates, the Superior Court's review of agency decisions is limited to "'an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision.'" Nickerson v. Reitsma, 853 A.2d 1202, 1205 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Barrington School Comm. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1138 (R.I. 1992)) . "Questions of law, however, are not binding upon the court and may be reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts." Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 607, 376 A.2d 1, 6 (R.I. 1977).
Federal law providing for a minimum wage and overtime pay is contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C §§201 et seq. As to overtime wages, the FLSA requires employers engaged in "commerce" to pay employees wages "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate" for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. See 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(2).
The FLSA exempts from its overtime wage requirements "any employee employed as a seaman." See 29 U.S.C. §213(b)(6). USDOL regulations define a "seaman" under the FLSA as a person who works "primarily as an aid in the operation of [a] vessel as a means of transportation, provided he performs no substantial amount of work of a different character." See 29 C.F.R. §783.31 (2008). One rationale for the exemption is that "at sea, with a normal life impossible, working more than 40 hours a week is an appropriate work norm, as distinct from the situation in most ordinary employments . . . ." Harkins v. Riverboat Servs., 385 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir. 2004).
Rhode Island law governing overtime wages is similar to the FLSA. Under R.I.G.L §28-12-4.1(a), entitled "Overtime pay," employers must compensate employees at a rate of at least one and one-half times the regular rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Like the FLSA, Rhode law provides exemptions to the overtime wage requirement for certain classes of employees. See R.I.G.L. §28-12-4.3 (entitled "Exemptions"). Although §28-12-4.3 provides exemptions for summer camp employees, police officers, and firefighters, the provision contains no exemption for seamen. Cf. R.I.G.L. § 28-12-4.3 () with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1A (10) (containing an exemption to overtime pay requirements for "any employee who is employed as a seaman"). Thus, under Rhode Island law, unlike the FLSA, a seaman must be paid overtime wages.
Generally, the FLSA does not prevent states from enacting their own overtime wage provisions. The Act contains a "savings clause" which expressly permits states to establish a lower maximum workweek, thereby triggering the award of overtime pay:
(a) No provision of this Act or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher...
To continue reading
Request your trial