Hardaway v. Wayne Cnty.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 146646. |
| Parties | HARDAWAY v. WAYNE COUNTY. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Hurticene Hardaway in propria persona.
Dickinson Wright PLLC, Detroit, (by Francis R. Ortiz and K. Scott Hamilton) and Bruce A. Campbell, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Wayne County.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because it improperly applied the last antecedent rule. We reinstate the opinion and order of the Wayne Circuit Court that granted summary disposition in favor of defendant.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. In 1994 plaintiff, Hurticene Hardaway, was appointed to the position of “principal attorney” in the Office of Corporation Counsel for defendant, Wayne County. Importantly, her appointment did not require confirmation by the Wayne County Commission. Plaintiff served in her position for approximately 13 years. After her employment ended in 2003, plaintiff submitted to the Wayne County Director of Human Resources three successive requests for additional life and health insurance benefits. Defendant denied her request. Plaintiff brought the instant suit, seeking a declaratory judgment and claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel.
Plaintiff argues she is entitled to additional benefits under Resolution No. 94–903, adopted by the Wayne County Commission in 1994. The resolution provides in pertinent part:
2. If a person is separated from the County after January 1, 1994, with at least a total of eight years of County service, and has served as an elected Executive Officer, the Deputy Executive Officer, or an Assistant Executive Officer of the County, or as a County Commissioner, or as an appointed department head or deputy department head, or an appointee other than a member of a board or commission who is confirmed by the County Commission pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter, or as an appointed Chief of Staff for an elected official or legislative body pursuant to an organizational plan, or the appointed head of one of the support divisions of the County Commission, that person shall be entitled to the same insurance and health care benefits ... as a retiree from the Defined Benefit Plan 1. [Emphasis added.]
The circuit court granted summary disposition for defendant. The circuit court interpreted the phrase “an appointee other than a member of a board or commission who is confirmed by the County Commission pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter” as covering an appointee who was (1) confirmed by the county commission and (2) not a member of a board or commission. Because plaintiff, a principal attorney, was not confirmed by the county commission, and because she did not otherwise qualify for additional benefits under the resolution, the circuit court determined that plaintiff was not entitled to the “same insurance and health care benefits ... as a retiree from the Defined Benefit Plan 1.”
The Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion.1 The Court found the resolution ambiguous because the phrase “who is confirmed by the County Commission pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter” is equally susceptible of more than one meaning.2 According to the Court of Appeals panel, the phrase could be interpreted as the circuit court read it—as providing benefits to an appointee who was confirmed by the county commission but was not a member of a board or commission—but it could also be interpreted as providing benefits to any appointee, whether confirmed or not, as long as that appointee was not confirmed by the commission to membership of a board or commission. Under the latter interpretation (the “any appointee” construction), plaintiff would be entitled to additional benefits as an appointee who was not a member of a board or commission.
The Court of Appeals resolved this alleged ambiguity by resorting to the last antecedent rule, a rule of statutory construction that provides that “a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.” 3 Applying the last antecedent rule to the resolution, the Court of Appeals determined that the modifying and restrictive clause——applied only to the immediately preceding phrase: “other than a member of a board or commission.” Thus, the Court of Appeals determined that the last antecedent rule favored the “any appointee” construction. We disagree and reverse.
If the language of the resolution is certain and unambiguous, courts must apply the resolution as written.4 Here, the resolution's language is not ambiguous.5 Under the “any appointee” construction, the clause “who is confirmed by the County Commission pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter” modifies the phrase “other than a member of a board or commission.” But the Wayne County Charter already requires that all members of boards and commissions be confirmed by the county commission.6 Thus, the “any appointee” construction takes what is grammatically an essential clause—“who is confirmed ...”—and effectively renders it a nonessential clause. In other words, under the “any appointee” construction, the phrase at issue collapses to “an appointee other than a member of a board or commission.” The alternative reading of the statute that the circuit court adopted does not suffer in this respect.
There are additional indications that the “any appointee” construction should be disfavored. To begin with, all the specific covered positions listed in the resolution are high-level administrative positions. It thus makes sense that the proper reading of the provision concerning appointees at issue here would limit its application to only individuals appointed to positions so significant that they require county commission confirmation. Further, defendant, on whose behalf the resolution was drafted and enacted and which has applied the resolution for nearly 20 years, has never interpreted the language in question as providing benefits to appointees who were not confirmed by the county commission.7
Finally, it bears emphasizing that the last antecedent rule should not be applied blindly. As we have warned before, the last antecedent rule should not be applied if “something in the statute requires a different interpretation” than the one that would result from applying the rule.8 As explained, because the Wayn...
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