Hardcastle v. Horn

• Decision Date: 11 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. 01-9006.,01-9006.
• Citation: 368 F.3d 246
• Parties: Donald HARDCASTLE v. Martin HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; George R. White, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh; And Joseph P. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

368 F.3d 246

Donald HARDCASTLE v. Martin HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; George R. White, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at

Pittsburgh; And Joseph P. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview, Appellants.

No. 01-9006.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued on May 20, 2003.

Filed May 11, 2004.

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Thomas W. Dolgenos (Argued), Office of the District Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellants.

Robert B. Dunham (Argued), Defender Association of Philadelphia, Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee.

Before SCIRICA, Chief Judge, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

ROTH, Circuit Judge.

In 1982, Donald Hardcastle was charged by the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office with murder, arson, and burglary. He was tried before a jury in the Court of Common Pleas, convicted on all counts, and sentenced to death. In both his direct appeal and state collateral review proceedings, Hardcastle asserted, inter alia, that the assistant district attorney who conducted the jury selection at his trial exercised her peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, thus violating the constitutional principle recognized by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and made applicable to Hardcastle's then-pending direct appeal by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court twice rejected Hardcastle's Batson claim and affirmed his conviction.

Hardcastle then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the U.S. District Court. The District Court concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling was both contrary to and an unreasonable application of Batson, granted Hardcastle's petition, and ordered a new trial. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rejection of Hardcastle's claim on the record before it was indeed an objectively unreasonable application of Batson. However, because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had requested, and been denied, a chance to present evidence in support of its peremptory strikes of African-Americans from the venire, it is entitled to a hearing to present that evidence. We will, therefore, remand this matter to the District Court to hold such a hearing and to then reexamine the application of Batson to Hardcastle's claim.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

The following material facts are drawn from the opinions issued in this case by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 546 A.2d 1101 (1988) (direct appeal proceedings) (Hardcastle I); Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 549 Pa. 450, 701 A.2d 541 (Pa.1998) (appeal of post-conviction relief proceedings) (Hardcastle II); Hardcastle v. Horn, 2001 WL 722781 (E.D.Pa. June 27, 2001) (federal habeas corpus proceedings) (Hardcastle III). They are not in dispute.

On May 23, 1982, the bodies of Joseph Gregg and Ernestine Dennis were found in Gregg's Philadelphia home. Both had received in excess of thirty stab wounds and Gregg's home had been set on fire. Several neighbors indicated that they had seen Hardcastle near Gregg's home around the time of the murders. An arrest warrant was issued and Hardcastle surrendered to the police on May 25. He was subsequently charged with burglary, two counts of arson, and two counts of murder.

Hardcastle is an African-American. During the course of jury selection at his trial, the prosecutor used her peremptory strikes, of which she had a total of twenty, to remove twelve of the fourteen African-American members of the venire. The jury ultimately empaneled to hear the case contained only one African-American. Hardcastle's trial counsel did not object to the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges during the five-day voir dire, and the trial court therefore did not require the prosecutor to state the bases for her strikes on the record. However, following voir dire, Hardcastle's counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenges violated both the state and federal constitutions. Applying the then-governing standard articulated in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), the trial court denied this motion. The trial court similarly denied the prosecutor's request for permission to state her reasons for the challenged strikes on the record.¹

After trial, Hardcastle was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of arson, and one count of burglary. Post-trial motions were filed, arguing, inter alia, that the prosecutor exercised her peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner, thus violating Hardcastle's constitutional rights. A three-judge en banc panel of the Court of Common Pleas was convened to hear the post-trial motions. At this hearing, counsel for Hardcastle repeatedly requested an evidentiary hearing on the discriminatory strikes. In reply, the Assistant District Attorney stated that, in view of the fact that the trial had occurred six months earlier, she could not offer reasons for her strikes of black jurors and that it was no longer possible to reconstruct the voir dire. An evidentiary hearing was not granted but the panel, by a two to one vote, granted Hardcastle a new trial on the jury selection issue.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the grant of a new trial and affirmed the conviction, holding that Hardcastle failed to make the showing required by the then-governing standard established in Swain. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially granted allocatur but then dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted. On remand, Hardcastle was sentenced to death for the murders of Gregg and Dennis, to 2½ to 5 years for arson, and to 2½ to 5 years for burglary.

Following sentencing, Hardcastle again appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. By the time his case was heard by that court in November 1987, the United States Supreme Court had issued its decision in Batson, thereby lessening the evidentiary burden imposed on defendants in Hardcastle's position. As noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, this change in controlling precedent complicated its task:

The case before us presents a difficult problem for review. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Batson post-dates appellant's judgment of sentence, the defense did not object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges at the time of voir dire, the prosecution did not rebut the objection, and the trial court did not rule on the issue. Defense counsel did, however, preserve the issue by making a motion for a mistrial, subsequent to voir dire and prior to trial, based on the prosecutor's impermissible use of the challenges. Because the issue was preserved appellant is entitled to the protections granted by Batson. Therefore, we must make a post hoc evaluation of the record, examining each of the Commonwealth's fourteen peremptory challenges to determine whether appellant has made out a prima facie case of improper use.

Hardcastle I, 546 A.2d at 1104 (citation and footnote omitted).

However, rather than remanding the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court combed through the record itself in an effort to determine whether race-neutral bases existed for the challenged strikes. After conducting this analysis, it identified the following as potential bases for the dismissal of Venirepersons 1 through 10:² (1) the first had a sister that had been raped several years before Hardcastle's trial; (2) the second admitted during voir dire that she had heard about the case through media reports; (3) the third was questioned in detail by both sides about her work in caring for delinquent children, her education, and her family history; the court noted that this extensive questioning "gave the Commonwealth attorney ample opportunity to observe responses and demeanor"; (4) the fourth had a sister and nephew who had been arrested for drug-related crimes, as well as a father who had been a victim in a separate crime; (5) the fifth "initially testified that she would not follow the judge's instructions if she felt that something else was better law," but later stated after further questioning that she would follow the judge's instructions; (6) the sixth had attended her brother's trial, in which he was convicted on robbery charges; (7) the seventh was a case-worker for the Commonwealth and had a brother who had been a victim of violent crime; (8) the eighth was a registered nurse who had six children, one of whom, a son, had been convicted of rape; (9) the ninth was a twenty-year-old unemployed high school graduate; and (10) the tenth was a thirty-five-year-old single bartender who initially indicated that he would do whatever he thought was right, but later stated that he would follow the judge's instructions. Hardcastle I, 546 A.2d at 1104-05.

In turning next to Venirepersons 11 and 12, the court concluded these strikes were justified by more general "race-neutral" explanations, finding that "the Commonwealth had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their response to questioning prior to exercising the peremptory challenge" and that "although the Commonwealth had ample challenges remaining, there were no challenges offered to two black jurors, one of whom ironically was challenged by the defendant." Id. at 1105. Based on the foregoing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Hardcastle failed to establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory challenges under Batson. Id. The court similarly rejected the remaining claims raised by Hardcastle on direct appeal and affirmed both his conviction and sentence.

When again presented with ...