U.S. v. Wilson, 04-1918.

• Decision Date: 01 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-1918.,04-1918.
• Citation: 413 F.3d 382
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Esco WILSON, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

413 F.3d 382

UNITED STATES of America v. Esco WILSON, Appellant.

No. 04-1918.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued February 18, 2005.

Filed July 1, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Andrew F. Schneider, Esquire (Argued), Doylestown, PA, Counsel for Appellant.

Thomas A. Marino, United States Attorney, Theodore B. Smith, III (Argued), Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Harrisburg, PA, Counsel for Appellee.

Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge.

Esco Wilson appeals the District Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence taken from a bag in the trunk of his car. We affirm.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

On the morning of September 16, 2001, Trooper Brian Overcash of the Pennsylvania State Police stopped Wilson, who was traveling west on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, for a traffic violation. Wilson concedes that the initial traffic stop was valid.

Wilson gave Overcash a valid driver's license and a car rental agreement. Overcash then returned to his patrol car to prepare a traffic citation. During this process, he examined the rental car agreement and noticed that the car should have been returned a month earlier. Overcash ran a check on Wilson's rental car and found that the car had not been reported stolen.

Overcash then returned to Wilson's car and asked Wilson to exit and stand at its rear. He gave Wilson the citation, returned his documents, and told him that he was free to leave. Wilson took a few steps back toward his car. At the suppression hearing, Overcash first testified that he then began to question Wilson about the rental car agreement. Overcash then testified, when the Pennsylvania state judge presiding over the hearing asked for clarification of the sequence of events, that he asked Wilson if he could question him about the rental car agreement, and Wilson turned around and walked back toward him.

Overcash proceeded to ask Wilson questions about the rental car and Wilson's work and travel plans. Wilson told Overcash that he usually rented cars for a month because he traveled a lot. He also told Overcash that he worked selling master compact discs ("CDs") to music stores for approximately $500 per disc. When asked where he was going, Wilson said that he was on his way to Pittsburgh to deliver the CDs he had with him, and he offered to show these CDs to Overcash.

Overcash then walked toward the two female passengers in Wilson's car and asked them where they were going. The passengers told Overcash that they were on their way to Virginia. Overcash returned to where Wilson was standing at the rear of the car and told Wilson that the women had told him they were going to Virginia, not to Pittsburgh. Wilson appeared a bit nervous and told Overcash that he had not told his passengers where they were going but that nothing unusual was going on. Wilson again offered to show his CDs to Overcash, but Overcash declined and went to his patrol car to request support.

When Overcash returned to Wilson's car, Wilson opened the trunk and showed Overcash a CD with a $12.00 price tag on it. Overcash saw two bags in the trunk— one red and one green. Wilson told Overcash that the red bag belonged to his passengers. The women confirmed this, told Overcash that there was nothing illegal in the bag, and gave Overcash permission to search it. Overcash found clothing and personal items inside.

Wilson told Overcash that the green bag belonged to him and that it also contained clothing. Overcash asked if he could examine the bag's contents, and Wilson consented. Overcash unzipped the bag and found a brick of cocaine inside. When he looked at Wilson, Wilson had already turned around and placed his hands behind his back.

Overcash then arrested Wilson and his passengers and transported them to the police barracks. At the barracks, Overcash read Wilson his Miranda rights and Wilson stated that he did not wish to speak to the police. Later, Wilson changed his mind and, after he was read his rights again, gave both written and oral statements acknowledging that the cocaine belonged to him.

Wilson was charged under Pennsylvania law with one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and one count of exceeding the maximum speed limit. Judge Edward E. Guido, of the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, held a hearing on Wilson's motion to suppress the evidence found in his car. Judge Guido granted Wilson's motion in June 2002, ordering the exclusion of the cocaine and Wilson's post-arrest statements as the fruits of an illegal detention. In September 2002, Pennsylvania entered a nolle prosse.

The federal Government subsequently obtained an indictment against Wilson based on the same incident. Wilson again moved to suppress the cocaine and his post-arrest statements, and the parties agreed that the matter would be submitted based on the notes of testimony from the Pennsylvania suppression hearing. No additional evidence was taken. In October 2003, the District Court denied Wilson's motion, determining, inter alia, that Wilson consented to Overcash's questioning after the conclusion of the traffic stop, that no seizure had occurred, and that Wilson's consent to the search of his bag was voluntary. Wilson entered a conditional guilty plea. He reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, and that issue is now before us.¹

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

As a preliminary matter, we must determine what the appropriate standard of review is for this case given its unique procedural posture. Ordinarily we review a district court's "denial of the motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise[] plenary review as to its legality in light of the [C]ourt's properly found facts." United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir.2003) (internal citations omitted). Our dissenting colleague, however, believes that in this case we should exercise plenary review over both the District Court's factual determinations and its conclusions of law because the District Court relied on the transcript of the Commonwealth suppression hearing in deciding Wilson's motion to suppress in the federal case instead of holding another evidentiary hearing. This position has merit, as there is no obvious need to defer to the District Court's factual determinations when it did not engage in any independent fact-finding, and it is one that we have adopted in our habeas corpus jurisprudence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 254 (3d Cir.2004) ("Because the District Court `d[id] not hold an evidentiary hearing and engage in independent fact-finding, but rather limit[ed] the habeas evidence to that found in the state court record,' our review of its final judgment is plenary." (quoting Scarbrough v. Johnson, 300 F.3d 302, 305 (3d Cir.2002))).

With this in mind, we briefly address Wilson's argument that we should not defer to the District Court's finding that he consented to further questioning by Overcash after the completion of the traffic stop. The District Court, in its recitation of the facts of this case, determined that Overcash asked Wilson for permission to ask him about the rental agreement and that Wilson "acquiesced" to this request. As our dissenting colleague points out, however, the bulk of Overcash's testimony indicates that he began asking Wilson questions about his rental car agreement without first requesting permission to engage in that line of inquiry. In this light, and because the Court of Common Pleas judge who had the opportunity to observe Overcash's testimony explicitly found that Overcash simply began asking Wilson about the rental car agreement, we conclude that the District Court's factual determination to the contrary cannot stand under either clearly erroneous or de novo review.

Because Wilson would prevail on this argument under either standard of review, we reserve for another day decision on whether plenary review is appropriate as to all issues in cases such as this one.² Accordingly, we now turn to Wilson's main argument—that the District Court should be reversed because his interaction with Overcash after the conclusion of the traffic stop was not a mere encounter but rather an unlawful seizure.

B. The District Court's Determination that Wilson was Not Seized

"[A] person is `seized' only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Put another way, no seizure has occurred if "a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, or ultimately whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter...." United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir.1994) (internal citations omitted).

Wilson does not contend that his seizure pursuant to the traffic stop was unlawful.³ As other courts have held, however, "[a] traffic stop may become a consensual encounter, requiring no reasonable suspicion, if the officer returns the license and registration and asks questions without further constraining the driver by an overbearing show of authority." United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir.2000); see also United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir.1998) ("When the [traffic] stop is over and its purpose served, however, mere questioning by officers, without some indicated restraint, does not amount... to ... a seizure under the Fourth Amendment."). We must therefore determine whether the interaction between Wilson and Overcash after the issuance of the traffic citation and return of Wilson's license and rental agreement was a consensual encounter or a second seizure.

The District Court, comparing the facts of this case to those of United States v....