Harden v. Field Memorial Community Hosp.

• Decision Date: 17 April 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 5:06cv158-DCB-JMR.
• Citation: 516 F.Supp.2d 600
• Parties: Olivia HARDEN, Plaintiff v. FIELD MEMORIAL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Quorum Health Resources, LLC, and John Does, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

516 F.Supp.2d 600

Olivia HARDEN, Plaintiff v. FIELD MEMORIAL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Quorum Health Resources, LLC, and John Does, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:06cv158-DCB-JMR.

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Western Division.

April 17, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Albert B. White, Albert Bozeman White, Esq., Madison, MS, for Plaintiff.

H. Wesley Williams, III, Markow Walker, P.A., William W. McKinley, Jr., Currie, Johnson, Griffin, Gaines & Myers, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID BRAMLETTE, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the plaintiff's Motion to Remand [docket entry no. 5], Field Memorial Community Hospital's Motion to Dismiss [docket entry no. 9], the plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss [docket entry no. 12], and the plaintiff's Response to the Court's Order to Show Cause [docket entry no. 17]. Having reviewed the Motions, briefs, applicable statutory and case law and being otherwise fully advised as to the premises, the Court finds and orders as follows:

FACTS

This medical malpractice action was filed by Olivia Harden against Field Memorial Community Hospital in the Circuit Court of Wilkinson County, Mississippi on August 18, 2006. The state court complaint was amended on August 29, 2006 to add Quorum Health Resources, LLC as a defendant. Harden is a resident of Wilkinson County, Mississippi. Field Memorial is a county owned community hospital located in Wilkinson County. Quorum Health is a Tennessee Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Plano, Texas. Inasmuch as Field Memorial is a governmental entity of Wilkinson County, Mississippi, the notice requirements of Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11 apply to any tort action filed against it.¹

On November 22, 2006, the defendants removed this action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Western Division. The defendants claim that Field Memorial was improperly joined because there is "no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against" Field Memorial. Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir.2004). The defendants argue that the plaintiff has no possibility of recovering from Field Memorial because (1) the plaintiff's action against Field Memorial is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, and (2) the plaintiff allegedly failed to comply with the notice requirement of Section 11-46-11 as interpreted by South Central Regional Medical Center v. Guffy, 930 So.2d 1252, ¶ 20 (Miss.2006) (requiring dismissal where plaintiff's MTCA notice did not contain information about each of the "seven required categories" of the MTCA notice statute). Specifically, the defendants argue that "it is undisputed that the claimant's notice of claim wholly failed to include three items required by statute: (1) the amount of damages sought, (2) the claimant's residence at the time of the injury, and (3) the claimant's residence at the time of the notice being filed." (Mem. Resp. to M. to Remand, 4.)

On December 21, 2006, the plaintiff filed her Motion to Remand [docket entry no. 5], wherein the plaintiff argued that (1) the defendants' removal was untimely, see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and (2) the plaintiff has a reasonable basis for recovery against the instate defendant. Quorum responded on January 8, 2007 [docket entry no. 7], and argued that the removal was timely because the notice of removal was filed within thirty days of its receipt of an "other paper" which first showed the action to be removable.² See 28 U.S.C. § 1446. On January 23, 2007, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause [docket entry no. 8] wherein the Court ordered the plaintiff to show how Guffy was distinguishable from the case at bar.³ On February 26, 2007, Field Memorial filed a Motion to Dismiss [docket entry no. 9]. On March 5, 2007,⁴ Harden filed a Motion to Dismiss [docket entry no. 12], in which she seeks to dismiss Quorum, the non-resident defendant, from the suit. Quorum joined in the plaintiff's motion.

I. Priority of Motions

The first issue confronting the Court is which motion should be ruled on first. Harden has filed both a Motion to Remand and a Motion to Dismiss, while Field Memorial has filed its own Motion to Dismiss. The plaintiff urges that her Motion to Dismiss Quorum Health (the nonresident defendant) should be ruled on first and granted, thereby destroying diversity jurisdiction and requiring remand. (Pl. M. to Dismiss, 2.) Field Memorial, however, opposes Harden's motion. Field Memorial asserts that the plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss cannot be addressed until the Court determines that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. (Field Memorial's Resp. M. to Dismiss, 3.) In other words, Field Memorial argues that the Court must rule on the plaintiff's Motion to Remand before it can accept the plaintiff's dismissal of Quorum.

This lawsuit emanates from the alleged malpractice committed by the emergency room staff of Field Memorial. The original state court complaint listed Field Memorial as the sole defendant. In the early stages of discovery, Harden amended her state court complaint to include Quorum. Harden asserts that she added Quorum because at that time it was unclear whether Field Memorial or Quorum controlled (and would therefore be vicariously liable for) the emergency room staff. Through subsequent discovery requests, Harden obtained a copy of the Management Advisory Services Agreement which was entered into between Field Memorial and Quorum. In the management agreement, Field Memorial "retained the authority and responsibility for the long-term and day-to-day management of the business of the Hospital, and that all medical and professional matters are [Field Memorial's] sole responsibility." (Plaintiff's M. to Dismiss, at 2.) In light of the management agreement, Harden determined that her "cause of action is against the hospital only, and Quorum should not be a party to this matter"; accordingly, Harden filed her current motion to dismiss, and Quorum joined in the motion. Id.

Harden's position must be considered together with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. This rule provides for the voluntary dismissal of claims both with and without an order of the district court. Rule 41(a)(1) states that "an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action." Rule 41(a)(1), which grants the plaintiff an "absolute right"⁵ to dismiss a claim, should not be confused with Rule 41(a)(2), which states, "Except, as provided in paragraph (1) ... an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems appropriate."

Harden is correct in her assertion that if her Motion to Dismiss had been brought pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), the claim against Quorum would be dismissed and this action would be remanded. Where the plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss a claim under Rule 41(a)(1) is implicated, "voluntary dismissal ... may precede any analysis of subject matter jurisdiction because it is self-executing and moots all pending motions, obviating the need for the district court to exercise its jurisdiction." Univ. S. Ala. v. The American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir.1999) (citing Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 452 F.2d 794, 797-98 (5th Cir.1971)).⁶ Where Rule 41(a)(2) is involved, however, the Court must consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before ruling on the plaintiff's motion to dismiss.⁷ See Short v. Richlands Mall Associates, Inc., 922 F.2d 836, 1990 WL 207354, *4 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) before first determining whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy), cited in Walter Kidde Portable Equip., Inc. v. Universal Sec. Inst., Inc., 479 F.3d 1330, 1342 (Fed. Cir.2007).

Harden's Motion to Dismiss does not fall within Rule 41(a)(1); therefore, the absolute right to dismissal is not implicated. First, Rule 41(a)(1)(i) does not apply because Quorum answered the complaint in state court before removing the action. Second, Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) is inapplicable because Field Memorial has refused to stipulate to Quorum's dismissal. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion must be construed under Rule 41(a)(2); thus, the Court is bound to first determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

II. Motion to Remand

The defendants assert in their Notice of Removal [docket entry no. 1] that the instate defendant, Field Memorial, was fraudulently joined in the state court action; therefore, the Court should dismiss Field Memorial and retain jurisdiction over this matter. The defendants argue that in light of Gully,⁸ Harden has no possibility of recovery against Field Memorial because Harden allegedly submitted a defective MTCA Notice of Claim to Field Memorial. The plaintiff maintains that this case should be remanded because (1) the removal was filed untimely, and (2) Guffy is distinguishable from the case at bar.

A. Timeliness of Removal

Removal is a statutory right, and as such, its procedural requirements must be construed strictly in favor of state court jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 872, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941); McManus v. Glassman's Wynnefield, Inc., 710 F.Supp. 1043, 1045 (E.D.Pa.1989). District courts have no power to overlook procedural errors relating to the notice of removal; instead, a district court must remand a case which was removed pursuant to a procedurally defective notice. Shamrock Oil & Gas, 313 U.S. at 108-09...