Harden v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 20148
Citation | 221 S.E.2d 851,266 S.C. 119 |
Decision Date | 20 January 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 20148,20148 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | William G. HARDEN, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT et al., Appellants. |
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Deputy Atty. Gen. Joseph C. Coleman and Staff Atty. Paul S. League, Columbia, for appellants.
Daniel A. Speights, Glenn, Porter & Sullivan, Columbia, for respondent.
Respondent brought this action pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Section 10--2001 et seq., South Carolina Code of Laws 1962, and for temporary and permanent injunctive relief. The named defendants are the South Carolina State Highway Department; E. P. Austin, Jr., Director of the Motor Vehicle Division; Captain J. A. Spell and Lieutenant Earl Bennett, Officers of the State Highway Patrol, Divisions of the Department. Appellants are here on appeal from an order of the Richland County Court permanently enjoining appellants from conducting an administrative hearing and changing respondent's driving status pursuant to Section 46--344 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962 as amended, for failure to take the chemical (breathalyzer) test provided for therein. The trial judge granted relief by concluding that Section 46--344, supra, under which the appellant, South Carolina Highway Department, purported to suspend respondent's driving license did not afford him an adequate remedy to contest the suspension and that said statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 3, of the Amended Constitution of the State of South Carolina.
Section 46--344, supra, provides in pertinent part as follows:
'(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of his breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . .
The record shows that respondent was arrested by a South Carolina Highway Patrolman for allegedly violating Section 46--343 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962 as amended, prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. He was offered and refused a breathalyzer test pursuant to Section 46--344, supra. Upon receiving a report of refusal, appellants suspended respondent's license to drive. Respondent requested a hearing pursuant to Section 46--344, Subsection (e), supra, specifically reserving the right to seek an injunction against the holding of said hearing. His license was then re-instated as required by Section 46--344, Subsection (d), supra. By rule to show cause and order, dated February 13, 1975, the Richland County Court restrained appellants from holding the hearing. Served with the rule to show cause and order was respondent's verified complaint, alleging the unconstitutionality of the provision for an administrative hearing in Section 46--344, supra. Appellants filed a demurrer to respondent's complaint. Argument was had March 13, 1975 on the rule to show cause, which incidentally sought only temporary relief, restraining order and demurrer, at which time the judge overruled appellants' demurrer and concluded the matter on the merits without according appellants an opportunity to answer. By order dated March 31, 1975, the Richland County Court ruled that Section 46--344, supra, did not afford respondent an adequate remedy to contest the suspension of his driver's license and permanently enjoined appellants from conducting a hearing and from changing respondent's driving status.
Appellants have presented numerous questions on appeal. However, we decline to pass on the exceptions raised as we have determined Ex mero motu that the Richland County Court lacks jurisdiction. State v. Gorie, 256 S.C. 539, 183 S.E.2d 334 (1971); McGlohon v. Harlan, 254 S.C. 207, 174 S.E.2d 753 (1970); Foster v. Nordman, 244 S.C. 489, 137 S.E.2d 600 (1964); McCullough v. McCullough, 242 S.C. 108, 130 S.E.2d 77 (1963). 'A Court of competent jurisdiction is one having power and authority of law at the time of acting to do a particular act; one that has jurisdiction both of the person and of the subject matter; one provided for in the constitution or created by legislature and which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person; . . .' 21 C.J.S. Courts § 22, p. 35.
The jurisdiction of a court or of a particular judge over the subject matter of a proceeding depends upon the authority granted by the Constitution and laws of the state and is fundamental. Lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be waived even by consent...
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