Hardge v. Dubosq

• Decision Date: 04 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-1721.,00-1721.
• Citation: 797 So.2d 84
• Parties: Dianne M. HARDGE v. Jean Pierre DUBOSQ, et al.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

797 So.2d 84

Dianne M. HARDGE v. Jean Pierre DUBOSQ, et al.

No. 00-1721.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

April 4, 2001.

Opinions on Rehearing September 19, 2001.

Rehearing Denied October 24, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James E. Blazek, Adams and Reese, Richard Bouligny Eason, II, Adams and Reese, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants, Aig Europe, Insurance Company of The State of Pennsylvania.

Howard Daigle, Jr., John Michael Dubreuil, James Louis Bradford, III, Seale, Daigle & Ross, Covington, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Jean Pierre Dubosq.

David W. Groner, Attorney at Law, New Iberia, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Dianne M. Hardge.

Richard Joseph Pitre, Jr., Onebane, Bernard, Torian, Lafayette, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Allstate Insurance Company.

Court composed of DOUCET, C.J., THIBODEAUX, and WOODARD, Judges.

WOODARD, Judge.

Ms. Dianne M. Hardge sued Mr. Jean Pierre Dubosq, a resident of France, for damages he caused in an August 17, 1996 automobile accident while he was driving an Avis Rent A Car (Avis). She also sued AIG Europe, Mr. Dubosq's travel insurance company; Pathfinder Insurance Company (Pathfinder), Avis' limited coverage insurer; and Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), her UM insurer. All parties moved for summary judgment on the question of whether the AIG Europe policy provided coverage to Mr. Dubosq for Ms. Hardge's damages. The trial court found such coverage and granted the judgment.

AIG Europe appeals, contending that the automobile policy exclusion provisions preclude coverage. We agree and reverse. As our decision creates a dispute of material fact as to which version of the AIG Europe policy is applicable, we remand the matter for a trial on the merits.

* * * * *

Residents of Linxe, France, Mr. Dubosq and his wife visited Louisiana as tourists. While driving a rental car in New Iberia, Louisiana, he caused the accident with Ms. Hardge, a Florida resident.

Prior to coming to Louisiana, he purchased a three-week travel insurance policy, named AV Assist, from his French travel agent, Mr. Francois Guchan. MG Europe provided the policy. He paid 1160.00 French Francs or about $200.00 for the policy.

Ms. Hardge filed suit against Mr. Dubosq, Pathfinder, MG Europe, and Allstate, her UM insurer. All parties filed motions for partial summary judgment concerning whether the AIG Europe policy provided Mr. Dubosq with liability coverage. The trial court heard these motions on August 18, 2000. It denied AIG Europe's motion that the automobile exclusion precluded coverage but granted the other motions, finding that the automobile exclusion did not apply and that the AIG Europe policy did provide coverage to Mr. Dubosq for Mr. Hardge's accident. AIG Europe appeals.

The issue before the court is whether the AIG Europe policy excludes coverage for damages which Ms. Hardge suffered. AIG Europe contends that it unambiguously does exclude coverage for damages resulting from the insured's use of an automobile.

* * * * *

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that governed the trial court's consideration of whether or not summary judgment was appropriate.¹ Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.²

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966, charges the moving party with the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. In doing so, the moving party's supporting documentation must be sufficient to establish that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be decided.³ Once the mover makes a prima facie showing to this effect and that summary judgment should be granted, the burden shifts to the nonmover.⁴ Furthermore, La.Code Civ.P. art. 967 provides, in pertinent part:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided above, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his responses by affidavits or otherwise provided above, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him.

In summary, the threshold question in reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment is whether a genuine issue of material fact remains.⁵ After which, we must determine whether reasonable minds could conclude, based on the facts presented, that the mover is entitled to judgment.⁶ Thus, summary judgment is apropos when all relevant facts are brought before the court, the relevant facts are undisputed, and the sole remaining issue relates to the legal conclusion to be drawn from the facts.⁷

Facts are material if they determine the outcome of the legal dispute.⁸ The determination of the materiality of a particular fact must be made in light of the relevant substantive law.⁹

In reviewing the appropriateness of the trial court's decision, we are initially concerned with the law regarding insurance contract interpretation. Bernard v. Chrysler Ins. Co.¹⁰ states:

The law relevant to the case sub judice is well settled. As a general rule, an insurance policy is by nature contractual; hence, it is construed according to the general rules governing the interpretation of contracts. Valentine v. Bonneville Ins. Co., 96-1382 (La.3/17/97); 691 So.2d 665. When interpreting contracts, we must determine the parties' common intent. La.Civ. Code art. 2045. Such a determination is not necessary when the words of the contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences. La.Civ. Code art. 2046. Words must be given their general, plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, unless they have acquired a technical meaning. La.Civ.Code art. 2047; Valentine, 691 So.2d 665; Jones v. Doe, 95-1298 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/24/96); 673 So.2d 1163.

When we are asked to ascertain the meaning of an insurance policy and its specific sections and subsections, we are required to read it as a whole. Crabtree v. State Farm Ins. Co., 93-509 (La.2/28/94); 632 So.2d 736; Armand v. Rhodes, 96-15 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/96); 685 So.2d 546, writ denied, 97-6 (La.3/21/9[7]); 691 So.2d 81. Hence, we may not read a part of the contract separately at the expense of overlooking another part. Id. Nevertheless, when a pertinent provision of the policy, which is viewed in light of the entire contract, can be reasonably interpreted in two different ways, that provision is treated as being ambiguous. McCarthy v. Berman, 95-1456 (La.2/28/96); 668 So.2d 721; Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So.2d 417 (La. 1988). When an ambiguity exists, it is resolved in favor of coverage and against the insurer. Valentine, 691 So.2d 665, Pareti, 536 So.2d 417. However, the mere fact that an insurance policy is a complex instrument, requiring analysis to understand it, does not make it ambiguous. Louisiana Ins. Guar. v. Interstate Fire, 93-911 (La.1/14/94); 630 So.2d 759. Furthermore, we should not interpret a policy in an unreasonable or strange fashion such as to enlarge or restrict its various provisions beyond what was reasonably contemplated and achieve absurd conclusions. Valentine, 691 So.2d 665. Indeed, "courts have no authority to alter the terms of policies under the guise of contractual interpretation when the policy provisions are couched in unambiguous language." Pareti, 536 So.2d at 420.

The policy, upon which AIG Europe relies, provided first-party coverage for certain damages which Mr. Dubosq might sustain for incidents such as lost luggage, airplane delay, medical fees during the trip, etc. It also provided third-party coverage in Chapter 11, titled, "The Civil Liability Coverage Abroad," which contained certain exclusions and in Chapter 12, "Coverage for Physical Damages to Rented Vehicles." The relevant provisions of this policy are below, in French:

CHAPITRE 11-LA GARANTIE RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE À L'ÉTRANGER

Crete garantie vows couvre contre les consequences de la Responsabilité Civile que vous pouvez encourir en raison des Dommages Corporels ou Matériels causés à des Tiers au cours du voyage.

Even though everyone probably understood the above, the English translation follows:

CHAPTER 11-CIVIL LIABILITY ABROAD

This coverage is provided in the event of liability for accidental bodily injury or material damages caused to third parties during the course of your trip.

The Chapter 11 exclusion, in French, states:

Les Accidents survenus lors de l'utilisation d'automobiles ou engins à moteur, d'embarcations à voile ou à moteur, d'aéronefs, d'animaux de selle dont l'Assuré ou les personnes dont it est civilement responsable ont la propriété, la conduite ou la garde.

In English:

Accidents arising from the use of automobiles or engine propelled machines, motor boats or sailing boats, aircraft and saddled animals the insured or the people he is responsible for, may own, drive, or have garde of.

Chapter 2, in French, states:

CHAPITRE 2-DÉFINITIONS CONTRACTUELLES ACCIDENT

Toute atteinte corporelle non intentionnelle de votre part provenant de l'action soudaine d'une cause extérieure dont vous êtes victime après la date d'effet du contrat.

Which, in English, states:

CHAPTER 2-CONTRACT DEFINITIONS ACCIDENT

Any unintentional bodily injury resulting from the sudden action of an exterior cause you may sustain after the effective date of coverage.

We have read this entire policy in French and carefully examined the translation. Allstate and Ms. Hardge suggest that because the term "accident" is defined to include only incidents of which "you-the insured" are a victim, then, the exclusion in Chapter 11 is inapplicable to damages for Ms. Hardge because she, not the insured, is the victim. We reject this strained policy interpretation.

While Chapter 11 of AIG Europe's policy provides coverage...