Valentine v. Bonneville Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1997
• Citation: 691 So.2d 665
• Parties: 96-1382 La
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 665

691 So.2d 665

96-1382 La. 3/17/97

Gary L. VALENTINE v. BONNEVILLE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.

No. 96-C-1382.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 17, 1997.

Dissenting Opinion of

Chief Justice Calogero,

March 19, 1997.

Rehearing Denied May 9, 1997.

Brian Allen Homza, Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, Shreveport, for applicant.

James M. Johnson, Campbell, Campbell & Johnson, Minden, Graydon Kellyl Kitchens, III, Edward O. Kernaghan, Kitchens, Benton, Kitchens & Warren, Shreveport, for Respondent.

[96-1382 La. 1] VICTORY, Justice. ^*

We granted writs in this case to determine (1) whether a deputy sheriff is included within the Uninsured Motorist ("UM") coverage provided by a Business Auto Policy where the named insured is the Webster Parish Sheriff's Department and (2) whether the deputy sheriff was occupying his vehicle such that he would be eligible for coverage under the provisions of the UM policy providing coverage for anyone "occupying" a covered auto. For the reasons that follow we reverse the court of appeal's finding that a sheriff's deputy is a named insured under the Business Auto Policy issued to the Webster Parish Sheriff's Department. Furthermore, we find that Deputy Valentine was not "occupying" his vehicle as that term is defined in the Business Auto Policy.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While on duty, Webster Parish Sheriff's Deputy Gary L. Valentine observed a suspected DWI driver at approximately 6:30 p.m. on March 16, 1991 within the city limits of Minden, Louisiana. As was the custom when observing a traffic offense within city limits, Deputy Valentine radioed the Minden City Police Department for assistance. Officer Keith Banta of the Minden City Police Department arrived shortly thereafter and together with Deputy Valentine, the two officers stopped the suspect. After a brief discussion between Banta and Valentine, the [96-1382 La. 2] officers decided that Officer Banta would investigate the suspect and Deputy Valentine would direct traffic to prevent any accidents.

With the overhead lights of both Officer Banta's and Deputy Valentine's vehicles for illumination, Deputy Valentine proceeded to the middle of Lewisville Road and began directing traffic. Deputy Valentine directed traffic using arm signals and a flashlight for approximately five to ten minutes when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Winnie S. Hall, an uninsured motorist.

Deputy Valentine filed suit against Mrs. Hall, her husband and their liability insurer, his personal uninsured motorist carrier, and Commercial Union Insurance Company ("Commercial Union"), the insurer of the Webster Parish Sheriff's Department.

Deputy Valentine and Commercial Union filed motions for summary judgment to determine if Deputy Valentine was covered under the underinsured motorist provisions of the Webster Parish Sheriff's Department's policy. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted Deputy Valentine's motion for summary judgment, determining not only was Deputy Valentine an insured under the Commercial Union policy, but he was also "occupying" a covered automobile and thus entitled to coverage under the policy. Commercial Union's motion for summary judgment was denied. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that Deputy Valentine was an insured under the policy, but pretermitted any discussion of whether Deputy Valentine was also covered under the policy by virtue of "occupying" a covered auto. Valentine v. Bonneville Insurance Company, 28,109 (La.App. 2d Cir. 4/8/96); 672 So.2d 461. We granted writs to review the correctness of this ruling.

DISCUSSION

The Commercial Union policy in question is a Business Automobile policy designed to provide liability and UM coverage to certain persons under limited circumstances. The relevant provisions of the policy are:

A. Coverage

1. We [Commercial Union] will pay all sums the 'insured' is legally entitled to recover as damage [96-1382 La. 3] from the owner or driver of an 'uninsured motor vehicle....'

* * * * * *

B. Who is an Insured

1. You

2. If you are an individual, any 'family member.'

3. Anyone else 'occupying' a covered 'auto' or a temporary substitute for a covered 'auto.'

According to the policy, the word "you" refers to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations. The relevant portion of the declaration page that identifies who is the named insured reads as follows:

Named Insured & Mailing Address

Webster Parish Sheriff's Department

P.O. Box 877

Minden, LA 71055

The above policy language affords Deputy Valentine two opportunities to fall within the ambit of coverage provided. First, he may qualify for coverage as "you," that is, the named insured. Second, coverage is provided for anyone else "occupying" a covered auto.

An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the civil code. Lewis v. Hamilton, 94-2204 (La. 4/10/95); 652 So.2d 1327. If the wording of the policy at issue is clear and expresses the intent of the parties, the agreement must be enforced as written. Ledbetter v. Concord General Corp., 95-0809 (La. 1/6/96); 665 So.2d 1166. The parties' intent, as reflected by the words of the policy, determines the extent of coverage and such intent is to be determined in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain, and popular meaning of words used in the policy, unless the words have acquired a technical meaning. Id. at 1169. An insurance policy should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or strained manner so as to enlarge or to restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve absurd conclusions. Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 93-1480 (La. 4/11/94); 634 So.2d 1180. If ambiguity still remains after applying other general rules of construction, ambiguous provisions are to be construed against the [96-1382 La. 4] insurer and in favor of the insured. Crabtree v. State Farm Ins. Co., 93-0509 (La. 2/28/94); 632 So.2d 736.

I. Is Deputy Valentine covered as a named insured?

Relying on the First Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Dryden, 422 So.2d 1243 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982), the court of appeal determined that "the instant policy, issued to the Webster Parish Sheriff's Department, includes Dep. Valentine as a named Insured." Valentine v. Bonneville Insurance Company, 28,109 (La.App. 2d Cir. 4/8/96); 672 So.2d 461, 465.

In Dryden, Wausau's UM policy was issued to the "Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office." Similar to the instant case, the policy not only extended coverage to "the named insured," but also "to any other person while occupying an insured highway vehicle." Dryden, 422 So.2d at 1245. Dryden, a captain with the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office, filed suit against Wausau after he was injured, claiming that he was both a named insured under the policy and that he was "occupying" a covered vehicle. The court of appeal agreed that Dryden was a named insured under the policy:

The policy gives "Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office" as Named Insured. The Named Insured is an Insured under clause (a). Obviously, "Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office" includes not only the Sheriff, but all Deputies as well, as, had the policy been intended to designate the Sheriff alone as Named Insured, the Named Insured would have been the Sheriff. By using the broader term, the policy makes the Sheriff and all Deputies the Named Insured. Id. at 1245.

After determining that the Wausau policy included the Sheriff as a named insured when the named insured was designated as the "Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office," the court of appeal found no reason to exclude the Sheriff's deputies from also being included as named insureds.

It is well settled in the lower courts that a Sheriff's Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued. Ferguson v. Stephens, 623 So.2d 711 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993); Garner v. Avoyelles Parish Sheriff's Dept., 511 So.2d 8 (La.App. 3d Cir.1987); Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 385 So.2d 578 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980). It is the elected Sheriff, not the [96-1382 La. 5] "Parish Sheriff's Office," that is the constitutionally designated chief law enforcement officer of the Parish. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish Sheriff's Department, 350 So.2d 236 (La.App. 3d Cir.1977). The law of Louisiana affords no legal status to the "Parish Sheriff's Department" so that the department can sue or be sued, such status being reserved for the Sheriff. Id. at 238.

However, regardless of whether the policy issued to the "Webster Parish Sheriff's Department" includes as a named insured the Sheriff in his individual capacity, ² we disagree with the Dryden court and the court of appeal in the instant case that the Sheriff's deputies are included as named insureds under a policy issued to the "Webster Parish Sheriff's Department."

The Named Insured under the Commercial Union policy is the Webster Parish Sheriff's Department, not the individual deputies. Under the policy, a named insured is provided UM coverage wherever he is, whatever he is doing, and regardless of whether he is on the job or merely tending to his private affairs. Thus, if the Sheriff's deputies are covered as named insureds, coverage would follow them regardless of where they were or what they were doing, thus negating the need for the deputies to obtain UM coverage for themselves. Because the Sheriff, as the employer of the deputies, has no obligation to supply the deputies with UM coverage at all, there is no reason to believe that the Sheriff intended to provide them with UM coverage at all times, all places and under all conditions. In addition, because there is no indication that the sheriff's deputies paid for UM coverage through the Sheriff's Department, it is much more reasonable to conclude that the Sheriff merely intended to cover his deputies when they were most at...