Hardiman v. Chief of Indianapolis Metro. Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 11 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:18-cv-00348-MJD-TWP,1:18-cv-00348-MJD-TWP |
| Parties | DAMON HARDIMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHIEF OF THE INDIANAPOLIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment, [Dkt. 68], and Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, [Dkt. 71]. The motions are fully briefed and the Court, being duly advised, GRANTS Defendants' motion and DENIES Plaintiffs' motion with regard to Plaintiffs' federal claims.1 The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims and REMANDS those claims to the Marion Superior Court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant isentitled to judgment as a matter of law." In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor." Pack v. Middlebury Cmty. Sch., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing McAllister v. Innovation Ventures, 983 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2020)).
Summary judgment is a critical moment for a non-moving party. It must "respond to the moving party's properly-supported motion by identifying specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial." Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). Inferences supported only by speculation or conjecture will not suffice. Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 721-22 (7th Cir. 2018). Neither will the mere scintilla of evidence. Grant, 870 F.3d at 571.
Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2018). Finally, the non-moving party bears the burden of specifically identifying the relevant evidence of record, "as it is not the court's job to 'scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment.'" Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 429 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1527 (2021) (quoting Harney v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The material facts of record relevant to that claim, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, are as follow.
Defendants Nickolas Smith, Michael McWhorter, and Paul Bellows were, at all relevant times, officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD"). On August 28, 2017, Defendants were working their usual beat. [Dkt. 69-1 at 1, Dkt. 69-4 at 1, Dkt. 69-5 at 1.]2
While on patrol, Smith noticed a white Cadillac that was parked facing the wrong way and within thirty feet of a stop sign in violation of local ordinances. [Dkt. 69-1 at 1.] While he waited for McWhorter and Bellows to arrive at the scene, Smith "walked to the car to see if [it] looked operable, checked the plate to see if it matched the car, and prepared information for a parking citation, making sure I had a ticket book on scene." Id. at 2. The license plate check revealed that the car was registered to Plaintiff Bobby Lee Houston, Jr. Id. Smith did not know Houston, and Houston was not present. Id.
IMPD General Order 7.3 governs the towing and impounding of vehicles at the direction of IMPD officers. See [Dkt. 69-6]. General Order 7.3 cites to Section 611-203 of the Revised Code of the Consolidated City and County Indianapolis/Marion, Indiana as providing that a vehicle may be declared a public nuisance if it is "parked . . . upon any street or public place in the city in violation of any of the provisions of this Code or of any statute of the state." Id. at 1. Section 611-204 of the Revised Code provides that an officer "upon discovering a vehicle constituting a public nuisance, may cause the vehicle to be impounded as authorized by this article." https://library.municode.com/in/indianapolis_-_marion_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TITIIIPUHEWE_CH611MOVE (last visited June 10, 2021). General Order 7.3 further provides that a vehicle may be towed and impounded for a variety of reasons, including "[v]iolating parking or other special restrictions." [Dkt. 69-6 at 2.] Indiana Code Section 9-21-16-5 prohibits parking within thirty feet of a stop sign. Indiana Code Section 9-21-16-7 provides that "a vehicle stopped or parked upon a roadway where there is an adjacentcurb must be stopped or parked with the right-hand wheels of the vehicle parallel with and within twelve (12) inches of the right-hand curb." It is undisputed that the Cadillac was violating both of these provisions.
Smith decided to have the Cadillac towed and impounded "because it violated ordinances, prevented vehicles from properly stopping at the stop sign, and blocked the flow of traffic."3 [Dkt. 69-1 at 2.] Smith "knew that [IMPD's] General Orders allow [him] to impound a vehicle when it violates ordinances and that police officers have community caretaking responsibilities." Id. at 1. Accordingly, he radioed for a tow truck.
Once McWhorter and Bellows arrived, Smith wrote a ticket, placed it on the windshield, and began to conduct an inventory search of the Cadillac.4
The Cadillac was parked in front of the home of Plaintiff Damon Hardiman and his godmother, Leticia Styles. A neighbor called Styles to tell her that police officers were outside her home going through the Cadillac. [Dkt. 69-3 at 21.] Styles, in turn, called Hardiman, whowas driving home from school at the time. Id. at 17. Hardiman arrived on the scene with a friend, Chris Robinson. At that time, the tow truck had not yet arrived.
When he arrived, Hardiman saw Defendant Smith rummaging through the driver's side of the Cadillac. Hardiman's possessions, which included school supplies, books, papers, and clothing, were on the ground outside of the vehicle. Hardiman informed Smith that the Cadillac was his and asked that he or Robinson be permitted to move the vehicle so that it would not need to be towed. Id. at 47-49. Robinson told Smith that he would move the vehicle and offered to show him his driver's license. [Dkt. 73-10 at 1.] However Smith told Hardiman that only the owner of the vehicle could move it. [Dkt. 69-3 at 47-48.] Hardiman called the registered owner of the car, Houston, who is Hardiman's brother, but Smith refused to allow Houston to come to the scene to move the car. Id. at 48-49. Therefore, the car was towed to IMPD's impound lot, where Hardiman had to pay to retrieve it.5
Plaintiffs argue that the towing and impounding of their vehicle constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because the seizure of the vehicle did not violate any clearly established right.
"'Public officials are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they have "violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct."'" Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 518 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Dix v. Edelman Fin., No. 20-1247, 2021 WL 1952074 (quoting City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (in turn quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014))). In addressing the question of qualified immunity in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the Court must "evaluate '(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[ ], show that the defendants violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.'" Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 545 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009)). "The latter inquiry is often dispositive and may be addressed first." Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). The Court will do so here.
"To be 'clearly established,' a constitutional right 'must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.'" Id. (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)).
An officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in his shoes would have understood that he was violating it, meaning that existing precedent placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. . . . Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.
Dix, 978 F.3d at 518 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because "[t]he principle of fair notice pervades the doctrine" of qualified immunity, "clearly established law cannot be framed at a 'high level of generality.'" Campbell, 936 F.3d at 545 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).
A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct does not follow immediately from the conclusion that the rule was firmly established. Existing caselaw must dictate the resolution of the parties' dispute, so while a case directly on point isn't required, precedent must have placed the constitutional question beyond debate. Put slightly differently, a right is clearly established only if every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.
Id. at 545-46 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
"The plaintiff carries the burden of defeating the qualified immunity defense." Chasensky v. Walker, 740 F.3d 1088, 1095 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
To meet his burden on the second prong, a plaintiff must "show either a reasonably analogous case that has both articulated the right at...
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