Hardin, Matter of

• Decision Date: 16 July 1990
• Docket Number: Docket No. 118839
• Citation: 184 Mich.App. 107,457 N.W.2d 347
• Parties: In the Matter of John Michael HARDIN, minor. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Petitioner-Appellee, v. John Michael HARDIN, minor, Respondent-Appellant. 184 Mich.App. 107, 457 N.W.2d 347
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 347

457 N.W.2d 347

In the Matter of John Michael HARDIN, minor.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Petitioner-Appellee, v. John Michael HARDIN, minor, Respondent-Appellant.

Docket No. 118839.

184 Mich.App. 107, 457 N.W.2d 347

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 14, 1990.

Decided June 4, 1990.

Released for Publication July 16, 1990.

[184 MICHAPP 108] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., James R. Samuels, Pros. Atty., and John B. Sullivan, Asst. Pros. Atty., for People.

Susan H. Grant, Big Rapids, for respondent-appellant.

Before MARILYN J. KELLY, P.J., and SAWYER and WEAVER, JJ.

MARILYN J. KELLY, Presiding Judge.

Respondent appeals as of right from the probate court's commitment order entered in delinquency proceedings following a bench trial. Respondent was found guilty of malicious destruction of property over $100. M.C.L. Sec. 750.380; M.S.A. Sec. 28.612. He was made a ward of the state under the Youth Rehabilitation Services Act. M.C.L. Sec. 803.301 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 25.399(51) et seq. We affirm the decision.

Respondent first claims there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of malicious destruction of property. He argues that the court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. We disagree.

There was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found respondent [184 MICHAPP 109] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Petrella, 424 Mich. 221, 268-269, 380 N.W.2d 11 (1985). Respondent's challenge is made, in effect, to the credibility of the two main prosecution witnesses. Credibility issues are for the trier of fact. People v. Sharbnow, 174 Mich.App. 94, 105, 435 N.W.2d 772 (1989), lv. den. 433 Mich. 895 (1989). We give due regard to the special opportunity and ability of the trial judge to determine the credibility of witnesses. MCR 2.613(C). The judge's findings of fact were amply supported by the evidence presented at trial and are not clearly erroneous.

Next, respondent claims that, by moving the proceedings immediately from the adjudication to the dispositional phase, the court denied him procedural due process.

The court rule governing delinquency proceedings provides that the time interval between the trial and disposition is within the court's discretion. MCR 5.943(B).

We hold that an hiatus need not exist between the two phases where, as here, no one objects to moving immediately from one to the other. The record in this case shows, in addition, that respondent was given notice of the dispositional phase and had an opportunity to present his objections and suggestions. Trussell v. Decker, 147 Mich.App. 312, 324, 382 N.W.2d 778 (1985). Moreover, it is apparent that the judge was well acquainted with respondent's case history.

Respondent argues he might have been able to "clean up his act" had disposition been delayed. It is not obvious to us how that could have been accomplished. Respondent's mother was unwilling to allow him return to her home. Respondent, at fifteen years of age, had a history of delinquency. Given his age and family circumstances, some form of protective placement seemed...