Hardin's Bakeries, Inc. v. Ranager

• Decision Date: 11 May 1953
• Docket Number: No. 38770,38770
• Citation: 217 Miss. 463,64 So.2d 705
• Parties: HARDIN'S BAKERIES, Inc. et al. v. RANAGER.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 705

64 So.2d 705

217 Miss. 463

HARDIN'S BAKERIES, Inc. et al. v. RANAGER.

No. 38770.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 11, 1953.

Lipscomb & Ray, Jackson, for appellants.

Lester E. Wills, Meridian, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

Appellee was employed for three years by Hardin's Bakeries, Inc. He was furnished and required to use a baker's pad or mitten, called Jomac, in handling the hot pans of bread as they came from the oven. While so engaged a rash appeared on his hands which grew worse and extended up onto his arms. Under treatment the rash disappeared and he resumed his work. It appeared again. According to the medical testimony his trouble was diagnosed as contact dermatitis and was caused by something coming in contact with his hands. A skin specialist suspected that appellee was allergic to something with which he had come in contract and tested the mitten on his arm with the result that it produced a definite redness. This specialist testified that this indicated that appellee was allergic to the material in the mitten or to some chemical in it.

The attorney-referee found that appellee's trouble was not due to an occupational disease but was an accidental injury within the meaning of our Workmen's Compensation Law, and he awarded compensation accordingly. His action was affirmed by the entire commission and, on appeal, was also affirmed by the circuit court, and the bakery and its insurer appeal here.

It is here contended that appellee's trouble is an occupational disease and is not due to an accidental injury. Appellants say that an accidental injury is one that results suddenly from the application of some external force but cite no authority to sustain this contention. We shall deal with it first.

Section 2(2) of our compensation law defines 'injury' as an 'accidental injury or accidental death arising out of and in the course of employment'. Laws of 1948, Chap. 354, p. 508, Laws of 1950, Chap. 412, p. 491. Webster's New International Dictionary defines 'accidental' as 'happening by chance or unexpectedly; taking place not according to the usual course of things.'

In 58 Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 196, p. 705, it is said: 'It has been stated that the word 'accident' as used in the phrase 'injury arising by accident', and similar expressions, in compensation statutes, are to be interpreted in the popular and ordinary sense, and as having a wide signification. According to some authorities, it is to be construed liberally in favor of the workman. It is generally construed as meaning an occurrence which is neither expected, designed, nor intentionally caused, by the workman, and so, as to injuries unintentionally resulting from the acts of the latter, is employed in contradistinction to the expression 'wilful misconduct', which is found ordinarily in the same section or paragraph of the statute. It has been stated that an injury is unexpected, so as to bring it within the category of 'accident', in this connection, if the workman did not intend or expect that it would result on the particular occasion from what he was doing. The mere apprehension that an injury such as did occur was likely to occur at some indefinite time in the future does not deprive the occurrence of its accidental character. While the concept of accident is ordinarily understood as embodying a certain degree or element of suddenness in the occurrence of the event, and is frequently so defined, it is not always required that the occurrence be instantaneous.'

In Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co., 218 Ark. 671, 238 S.W.2d 640, 642, 243 S.W.2d 754, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said: 'In the case of Murch-Jarvis Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 209 Ark. 956, 193 S.W.2d 310, 313, this Court said: 'Appellants insist, however, that appellee did not suffer an accidental injury because no definite date or occasion can be fixed as to when the aggravation happened. Schneider, in his Workmen's Compensation Text, Vol. 4, Perm. Ed., page 387, has this to say on the question: 'Diversity of opinion exists as to what constitutes the customarily required definite time and place of an accident. On this question the expressions of the courts vary from the statement that 'accidents do not happen all day' to decisions to the effect that it may require as much as six months for an accident to culminate in a disabling injury. A reasonably definite time is all that is required. A certain fixed and definite event or occurrence is required from which time can be calculated. 'No stated period can be given as sudden as applied to each case, each must naturally depend on its own circumstances'."'

In this case the times when appellee became disabled are certain and definite. After his first disability responded to treatment he returned to work and later began using the mitten again and his trouble returned within a week and as a consequence he was forced to give up his work entirely. The contention that it must result suddenly is not supported by the weight of the authorities on the subject.

In Webb v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 47 N.Mex. 279, 141 P.2d 333, 336, 148 A.L.R. 1002, 1006-1007, the Supreme Court of that state said: 'It is said that appellee did not relate his injury to any specific time or event, a necessary fact to be found, it is asserted, to support his judgment. The New Mexico statutes not only do not define the word accident, but do not undertake to limit its meaning to 'sudden' injuries as do those of a number of the states, nor is its meaning limited by any time test. Our statute is substantially the same as that of North Carolina regarding which the supreme court of that state said in McNeely v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 206 N.C. 568, 174 S.E. 509, 512: 'An examination of the Workmen's Compensation Act of North Carolina discloses many uses of the expression 'injured employee' without the qualifying words 'accident' or 'by accident.' So that, unless we attempt to whittle down or enlarge words or undertake to put big threads through the eyes of little needles, it would seem manifest that our act did not undertake to limit compensation to cases where the injury was begun and completed within narrow limits of time, but that it used the expression 'injury by accident' in its common-sense everyday conception as referring to an injury produced without the design or expectation of the workman.' * * * An injury may be gradual and progressive, and not immediately discoverable; yet certainly and definitely progress to discovery and then to a compensable injury. Such was the injury to appellee. The time did arrive when the appellee's injury totally disabled him so he could not work, and at that time he became entitled to compensation for total disability.'

Appellants' contention that the injury must result from the application of some external force is answered in the case of Andreason v. Industrial Commission, 98 Utah 551, 100 P.2d 202, 204, wherein it is said: 'We are of the opinion that under the section of our law quoted, an injury arising out of an accident is not limited in meaning to the result of the application of physical force to the body of the injured. (Citing many authorities.) In the case of Arquin v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 220, 181 N.E. 613, 614, spinal meningitis was held to be an accidental injury and hence compensable. The court said: '* * * The specific time when the meningitis germs entered the body of the deceased is, of course, unascertainable, but, since he was in constant contact with this dread disease for six days until he himself was stricken, the evidence seems reasonably sufficient to support a finding that he died as a result of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. * * *' The following is found in Hood [& Sons] v. Maryland [Casualty] Company, 206 Mass. 223, 92 N.E. 329, 330, 30 L.R.A.,N.S., 1192, 138 Am.St.Rep. 379: '* * * It is plain that Barry suffered bodily injury in consequence of becoming infected with the glanders; as much so as if he had a leg or an arm broken by a kick from a vicious horse. Indeed it is possible that the bodily injury caused by the glanders was greater and more lasting than that caused by a broken leg or arm would have been. * * *' In Casserly v. City of Oakland, 215 Cal. 600, 12 P.2d 425, the court held that broncho-pneumonia contracted in the course of employment is an accidental injury: '* * * The word 'injury' has reference not to some break in some part of the body or some wound thereon, or the like, but rather to consequences or disability that result therefrom. Courts are practically unanimous in holding that the words should be given a broad and liberal construction in order that the humane purpose of the enactment may be realized. Such legislation should be applied fairly and broadly with a view to confer the benefits intended. * * * 'From the standpoint of pure reason, whether bodily injury which produces a weakening or disintegration of the physician system is caused by flying germs or by flying shrapnel or by a poisoned arrow or by the sting of an insect is only a matter of degree as to the size or quality of the missile or instrumentality inflicting the injury.' Moore v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 203 Cal. 465, 471, 265 P. 207, 209, 56 A.L.R. 860.' Webster defines 'accidental' as 'happening by chance, or unexpectedly', and 'accident'...