Harding v. City of Des Moines
| Decision Date | 09 May 1922 |
| Docket Number | 34071 |
| Citation | 188 N.W. 135,193 Iowa 885 |
| Parties | CLARA HARDING, Appellee, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Polk District Court.--J. D. WALLINGFORD, Judge.
APPEAL from judgment of the district court in favor of policemen who sued to recover salaries they did not receive between January 23, 1915, the date of their dismissal from the force, under orders of the civil service commission, and July 1, 1917, the date of their reinstatement on the force, by decree of court the amount of the judgment being $ 3,072.40.
Reversed.
Charles W. Lyon, Edwin J. Frisk, Chauncey A. Weaver, and Russell Jordan, for appellant.
Parsons & Mills, for appellee.
I.
Under the terms of a stipulation, two actions. Tyler Harding v. City of Des Moines and A. J. Butin v. City of Des Moines, presenting identical issues of fact and law, were tried as one case in the district court, and on this appeal are to be so considered as one action, and for convenience the title is "Clara Harding, Executrix, v. City of Des Moines."
Two Civil War veterans, Tyler Harding and A. J. Butin, prior to January 23, 1915, for several years were police officers in the city of Des Moines. The chief of police of the city of Des Moines filed complaint against these two policemen, charging incompetency for service, and upon such complaint a hearing was had before the civil service commission, resulting in the general finding that the hardships of past years and the infirmities of old age had incapacitated these men for further efficient service as police officers, and an order was entered dismissing them from the police department.
Harding became a member of the police force in 1900. Butin became a member of such force in 1895. Each continued to discharge his duties as a member of such force until January 23, 1915, when each was discharged by the order above mentioned. Each appealed from the order of discharge, and a writ of certiorari was sued out, and the findings and orders of the civil service commission were reviewed in the Polk district court, and were annulled by said court; and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, each case was affirmed. Butin v. Civil Service Com., 179 Iowa 1048, 162 N.W. 565. The Harding case was affirmed on stipulation June 18, 1917, following the Butin decision. On July 1, 1917, Harding and Butin were restored to their places on the Des Moines police force. Two years, five months, and eight days intervened between their discharge and reinstatement. On the 23d day of January, 1915, the date of their discharge, and continuously thereafter until the 1st day of April, 1917, the compensation of a policeman of the grade of Harding and Butin was $ 82.50 per month, payable semimonthly; and on the 1st day of April, 1917, up until after the 15th day of June, 1917, the pay of such police officers was $ 91 per month, paid semimonthly. At the time of the discharge of Harding and Butin, the police force of the city of Des Moines consisted of about 105 men, and it has since said time been no less. The force has been kept up to practically the full quota of men during all of the time since the 23d day of January, 1917; and immediately following the discharge of Harding and Butin, other men were appointed and served and were paid by the city for their services as policemen, to keep up the force to the full quota provided for by the police department. Following their reinstatement, Harding and Butin made demands upon the city council of the city of Des Moines, in writing, for the payment of their salaries during the time they were deprived of their offices, which claims were denied by the city council. On August 17, 1917, Harding and Butin instituted these suits against the city of Des Moines for the recovery of their salaries alleged to be due them during the periods of their suspension from the police force, which suits were consolidated, as above mentioned, and tried in the Polk district court, to the court without a jury, and judgment entered in their favor in the sum of $ 3,072.40, with interest and costs, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
Errors relied upon for reversal in the entering of judgment against the city are:
(1) The civil service commission is a distinct and independent branch or department of local government, carried on under and authorized by special legislative act, and the city is not liable for acts of the commission performed while within the scope of its authority.
(2) Policemen are public officers or state officers, and are not entitled to salaries or compensation not earned.
(3) Harding and Butin were de-jure officers, while defacto officers acted and were paid for their services.
(4) There is no showing in the record that Harding and Butin ever made any effort to or did at any time engage in any other employment during the period of their suspension.
(5) If Harding and Butin have any cause of action, it is founded in tort, and not upon contract.
Counsel for the city concede that appellees were honorably discharged soldiers of the Civil War, and were entitled to the benefit of the preference statutes enacted for their protection. It must be further conceded (it was so found by the trial court) that the discharge of appellees from service was wrongful. It was, therefore, an invasion of their rights. Appellant's position, stated briefly, is that it did nothing to cause the invasion of appellees' rights, and was powerless to control it, and consequently that it cannot be made to respond in damages. Counsel for the city argue that the city did not discharge Officers Harding and Butin from the police department; that the city was shorn of that power when the local police department became a part of the classified civil service regime, under legislative acts in Code Supplement, 1913, Sections 1056-a15, 1056-a16, and 1056-a32(b).
Appellees urge that:
(1) Being honorably discharged soldiers of the Union Army of the Civil War, they were entitled to protection of the statutes Sections 1056-a15, 1056-a16, and 1056-a32(b).
(2) The order of the civil service commission discharging appellees was annulled on certiorari hearing provided by statute.
(3) Appellees' rights to the offices carried the right to compensation of the offices during the time they were suspended.
Appellees say that, the action of the civil service commission discharging them from service having been adjudged void and annulled, they never ceased to be policemen: that is to say that, the order of discharge being annulled, they were legally all the time members of the police force, but their compensation was not paid.
It may be stated as the general rule that the right to the possession of an office carries with it the right to the emoluments of such office. McCue v. County of Wapello, 56 Iowa 698, 10 N.W. 248. See, also, Code Sections 1222, 1223. Many cases from other jurisdictions might be cited, holding to the same effect.
II. Ordinarily, a de-jure officer may sue a de-facto incumbent who has deprived him of his rights, and recover the salary of the office for the period during which he has been deprived of the office by the de-facto incumbent. McCue v. County of Wapello, supra, Code Sections 1222, 1223.
In most cases where the salary pertaining to an office has been involved, the issue has been between an officer de jure and an officer de facto, following a controversy as to which party was entitled to the lawful possession of the office. The instant case is not such a suit.
As excuse, perhaps, for not bringing suit against policemen who were appointed when appellees were discharged, for the salaries as de-facto officers, counsel for appellees present the situation with good logic, in substance that the nature of the office was such that, although the quota of 105 policemen was filled when appellees were discharged, no particular appointees were or could be singled out as de-facto successors of appellees; that, in the instant case where the police force consisted of a number of men, the men...
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