Harding v. Harding

• Decision Date: 05 March 1906
• Citation: 85 P. 423,36 Colo. 106
• Parties: HARDING v. HARDING.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

85 P. 423

36 Colo. 106

HARDING v. HARDING.

Supreme Court of Colorado

March 5, 1906

Appeal from Weld County Court; Chas. E. Southard, Judge.

Action by Jessie Harding against Walter J. Harding for divorce. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

L. R. Rhodes and P. W. Lee, for appellant.

Charles F. Tew, for appellee.

CAMPBELL J.

Action for divorce by the appellee, Jessie Harding, against Walter J. Harding, the appellant, on the ground of extreme cruelty. The jury found defendant guilty, as charged whereupon the court rendered a decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony, and awarded the plaintiff $600 permanent alimony and the custody of their minor child. Defendant appeals.

The fifth subdivision of section 1 of our divorce act of 1893 (Sess. Laws 1893, p. 236, c. 80) provides that the injured party to the marriage relation may obtain a divorce if the other party thereto has been guilty of extreme or repeated acts of cruelty, which may consist as well in the infliction of mental suffering as of bodily violence. This is a legislative affirmation of the doctrine previously in force in this jurisdiction, announced in Sylvis v. Sylvis, 11 Colo 319, 17 P. 912, and followed in Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 21 Colo. 16, 40 P. 49. The only grounds relied on for reversal are that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict and decree, but if so, the plaintiff, by condonation, is estopped to claim a divorce. No fault is found with the sufficiency of the complaint. It charges generally a course of cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant, and this general averment is followed by six specifications of particular acts of cruelty which are alleged to have occurred at different times. No physical violence was inflicted upon the plaintiff, the evidence being confined to acts and conduct of defendant which caused her great mental suffering, impaired her health, and endangered her life. The particular objection to the evidence is that it does not sufficiently show that plaintiff's mental suffering in any wise impaired her health, or endangered her life.

1. It would serve no useful purpose to detail the disgusting facts which the record discloses. It is sufficient merely to say that there is evidence tending to show persistent and continuous ill treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant consisting of inattention and neglect during her pregnancy the use of profane, obscene, and filthy language towards her, and the denial of the paternity of one of the children born to the plaintiff during the marriage relation. There is also some evidence, though not very satisfactory, that defendant refused to provide medical treatment and care for the plaintiff during an illness; but if that were the only evidence of extreme cruelty, it would, of itself be insufficient to warrant a dissolution of the marriage relation because of its uncertainty. If defendant was guilty of the conduct and ill treatment to which plaintiff testifies, there can hardly be a reasonable doubt that it caused her great mental...