Harding v. Wright
| Decision Date | 09 March 1897 |
| Citation | 39 S.W. 456,138 Mo. 11 |
| Parties | Harding et al., Appellants, v. Wright |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Mississippi Circuit Court. -- Hon. H. C. Riley, Judge.
Affirmed.
E. R Lentz for appellants.
(1) The issue being on the equitable answer of the defendant the burden was on the defendant to establish the allegations of his answer, and the case is governed by the rules of equity. Allen v. Logan, 96 Mo. 591. (2) The contract or deed, in this case, is unambiguous in its terms, and as there is no reasonable ground for mistake as to the subject-matter of sale by the party complaining, the contract should not be disturbed. Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 409; Chitwood v Russell, 36 Mo.App. 251. (3) It is well settled in this state that equity will not afford relief in cases of mistake where the party entering into it had the means of knowing the true state of facts, and by gross negligence failed to use such means. Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, pp. 406 and 407; 1 Story's Equity Jur., sec. 148; Snell's Principles of Equity, pp. 373, 374; Brown v. Fagan, 71 Mo. 568; Evans v. Halleck, 83 Mo. 378. (4) It is clear that both parties intended by first deed to convey sixty by one hundred and four feet out of the northwest corner of the lot. The deed is perfectly plain and unambiguous. Parol evidence can not be heard for the purpose of giving the deed a meaning different from that apparent on its face. Harding v Wright (this case), 119 Mo. 1; Jones v. Shepley, 90 Mo. 313; Koehring v. Muemminghoff, 61 Mo. 408; Simonds v. Beauchamp, 1 Mo. 590; Murdock v. Ganahl, 47 Mo. 136; 1 Greenleaf on Ev., sec. 275. (5) Parol evidence can not be admitted to prove that the parties intended something different from that which the language of the deed imparts. Wolf v. Dyer, 95 Mo. 551; Jennings v. Brizeadine, 44 Mo. 334. (6) The land in controversy was conveyed by metes and bounds. These bounds are the measure of defendant's claim, and can not be varied by parol. Bell v. Jamison, 102 Mo. 75. (7) It was settled by the former opinion in this case that plaintiff's deed conveyed all the land between lot then owned by plaintiff and the lot owned by defendant. Harding v. Wright, 119 Mo. 1.
L. D. Grove for respondent.
(1) Here is an equitable title in respondent, arising out of a contract for the sale of land, and is a defense to an action instituted to recover the possession of the land, the subject of the contract when united with possession. Tibeau v. Tibeau, 19 Mo. 81; Hayden v. Stewart, 27 Mo. 286; Baldwin v. Lowe, 22 Iowa 367. (2) Equity assumes jurisdiction to grant relief with respect to written instruments, whether they are executory or executed, such as deeds of conveyance, etc. 2 Pomeroy's Eq. [2 Ed.], sec. 871. (3) And that parol testimony may be resorted to for that purpose is a doctrine so well established as to require no citations of authorities. (4) In all cases of mistake in deeds courts of equity will interfere, as between the original parties, or those claiming under them in privity, with notice of the facts. 1 Story, Eq. Jur., sec. 155; Martin v. Nixon, 92 Mo. 26-35; Miller & Co. v. Tipton, 113 Mo. 373-381.
This suit is ejectment to recover the possession of a lot in Poplar Bluff, described as follows: Commencing one hundred and forty feet west of the northeast corner of lot 102, running thence west to the line of the lot owned by E. W. Wright, a distance of eight feet, more or less; thence south, parallel with Sixth street, one hundred and four feet; thence east, parallel with Poplar street, eight feet, more or less, to the west line of lot now owned by Mary Harding; thence north, parallel with Sixth street, one hundred and four feet to place of beginning.
This is the second appeal, the result of the first being reported in 119 Missouri Reports, page 1.
The facts upon which the case was first tried will be found fully stated in connection with the opinion on the first appeal. For convenience we state again the situation of the lot and the circumstances out of which the conflicting claims of the parties to the land grow.
In October, 1888, plaintiff Harding owned one hundred and forty feet the east part of said lot 102, and one Ferguson owned the west part thereof, supposed to contain sixty-eight feet, upon which there was a dwelling house located fourteen or fifteen feet west from Harding's line. In said month defendant Wright agreed upon the purchase from Ferguson of a portion of his land including the house. The parties went upon the land and marked upon the fence the point to which the purchase was made. This included the house and about six feet of the land east of it, and left about eight feet of Ferguson's land between this mark and the land of plaintiff. Ferguson and defendants supposed that a fence on the lot marked the true boundary, and measuring from this east the distance was sixty feet to the agreed eastern boundary of the lot sold. A deed was thereupon made to sixty feet under this description: "Commencing at the northwest corner of said lot, running thence south one hundred and four feet; thence east sixty feet; thence north one hundred and four feet, thence west sixty feet to the place of beginning."
In a few days thereafter Ferguson sold and conveyed to plaintiff Harding what he supposed remained of his land, describing it in the deed as follows: "A part of lot 102, commencing one hundred and forty feet west of the northeast corner of said lot, running thence west to the line of lot now owned by E. W. Wright, a distance of eight feet, more or less; thence south, parallel with Sixth street, one hundred and four feet, thence east parallel with Poplar street, eight feet, more or less, to the west line of lot now owned by said Mary Harding" [the grantee] "thence north, parallel with Sixth street, one hundred and four feet to beginning."
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