Hardy v. Ford Motor Car

• Decision Date: 24 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 3:96CV290.,Civ. 3:96CV290.
• Citation: 20 F.Supp.2d 339
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Glenn HARDY, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR CAR, et al., Defendants.

20 F.Supp.2d 339

Glenn HARDY, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR CAR, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ. 3:96CV290.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

June 24, 1998.

Vincent M. Musto, Michael A. Stratton, Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, P.C., Bridgeport, CT, for Glenn Hardy, Kristen Hardy.

James M. Campbell, Campbell, Campbell & Edwards, Boston, MA, Holly M. Polglase, Campbell, Campbell & Edwards, East Hartford, CT, for Ford Motor Co, KIA Motors.

Philip S. Walker, Mary Beth Cardin, Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, CT, for Takata Corp.

Robert W. Littleton, Bruce Ainbinder, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, New York City, Patrick J. Filan, James F. Biondo, Rosenblum & Filan, Stamford, CT, for Duck Boo, Inc.

Ruling on Defendant Duck Boo's Motion to Dismiss [doc. # 32]

ARTERTON, District Judge.

The plaintiff Glenn Hardy was injured during a motor vehicle accident while driving his Ford Festiva. He brought suit against Ford, Takata, Kia Motors and Duck Boo, Inc. under Connecticut's product liability 52-240b and 52-572m-r. The Court ruled from the bench, granting the defendant Duck Boo's Motion to Dismiss, on January 14, 1998. This ruling memorializes the reasoning given by the Court orally at that time.

Background

The Ford in question was actually designed and manufactured by Kia Motor Cars, a Korean corporation, on behalf of Ford. Duck Boo is a Korean company that supplies seat belts as a vendor to Kia Motor Cars through Takata Corporation, but has no role in the installation of the safety belts.

The affidavit of Sung Joon Lee, the managing director of Duck Boo International, states that all transactions relating to Duck Boo's sale of safety belts to Kia Motors occurred in Korea and no aspect of the relationship between Duck Boo and Kia took place in the United States. "Duck Boo had no knowledge of what would become of its safety belts after it sold them to Kia Motors, beyond the general knowledge that Duck Boo safety belts would be installed in Kia cars by Kia Motors in the Republic of Korea and some of the Kia manufactured cars would be supplied to Ford Motor Company who would sell them somewhere in the United States under the Ford brand name," (Aff. of Lee, ¶ 29). Paragraph 30 of Mr. Lee's affidavit states, "Duck Boo has no knowledge of the method of delivery of the subject automobile into the United States, and specifically into the State of Connecticut." Further, according to this affidavit, Duck Boo has never had any other contacts with the United States and, thus, with the forum State of Connecticut. Duck Boo is not licensed or registered to do business in any state in the United States; Duck Boo has never entered into any contract in the United States; Duck Boo has never transacted or solicited business in the United States; Duck Boo does not now, and has never, owned, rented, leased any real or personal property located in any of the United States. Duck Boo does not have any distributors in any of the United States. Duck Boo does not do and has not done any advertising in any of the United States. Duck Boo has never initiated litigation in any of the United States. (Aff. of Lee).

Legal Standards

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of showing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Robertson-Ceco Corporation, 84 F.3d, 560, at 566 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Ensign-Bickford v. ICI Explosives USA, Inc., 817 F.Supp. 1018, 1025 (D.Conn.1993)). "To survive the motion, the plaintiff must make `a prima facie showing' through affidavits or other evidence that the defendant's conduct was sufficient for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction", Ensign-Bickford v. ICI Explosives USA, Inc., 817 F.Supp. 1018, 1025 (D.Conn. 1993) (construing the reasonable expectation prong of Connecticut's long-arm statute, Connecticut General Statute 33-411(c)(3)). "After discovery, a plaintiff must submit an averment of facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant." Combustion Engineering Inc. v. NEI International Combustion Limited, 798 F.Supp. 100, 103 (D.Conn.1992).

In this case jurisdiction discovery has already taken place and the results of that discovery have been put before the Court in the form of exhibits that are the responses to such discovery. A district court sitting in diversity must look to the forum state to determine jurisdiction. Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.1963). "The exercise of long-arm jurisdiction in the state requires a two part inquiry; first, whether jurisdiction is permitted by the statute, and second, whether jurisdiction is permitted by the federal constitution." Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 234 Conn. 281, 295, 661 A.2d 595 (1995).

Connecticut General Statute 33-929 governs service of process on foreign corporations and apparently replaces, but does not change the earlier statutory formulation of § 33-411. In pertinent part, that statute provides under (f)(3):

Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows: ... (3) out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be used or consumed in this state, and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers; ...

(emphasis supplied). In Thomason v. Chemical Bank 234 Conn. 281, 295, 661 A.2d 595 (1995) the Connecticut Supreme Court explained that a plaintiff need not show that because of the act of solicitation the defendant was on notice that it might be sued by the plaintiff. A plaintiff similarly need not show that the defendant solicited his or her business in Connecticut. A plaintiff need only demonstrate that the defendant could reasonably have anticipated being hailed into court here by some person who had been solicited in Connecticut and the plaintiff's cause of action was not materially different from an action that might have resulted directly from the solicitation.

With respect to the second part of the inquiry, in order to exercise personal jurisdiction without running afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant must have minimum contacts with the state of Connecticut such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

The constitutional analysis is governed by a line of cases that started with Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), in which the Supreme Court stated that the minimum-contacts standard requires "that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state." This purposeful availment requirement was further articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), where the Court held that the "mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state" is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.

In Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) the Court continued to hold that a defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state...