Hardy v. Pier 99 Motor Inn

• Decision Date: 08 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-3713,93-3713
• Parties: 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2681 Christopher Lee HARDY, Appellant, v. PIER 99 MOTOR INN, Michael Lee Duncan and David Stallings, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1095

664 So.2d 1095

20 Fla. L. Weekly D2681

Christopher Lee HARDY, Appellant, v. PIER 99 MOTOR INN, Michael Lee Duncan and David Stallings, Appellees.

No. 93-3713.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Dec. 8, 1995.

Timothy M. Warner of Burke & Blue, P.A., Panama City, for Appellant.

James B. Fensom of Barron, Redding, Hughes, Fite, Bassett & Fensom, P.A., Panama City, for Appellees Pier 99 Motor Inn and Michael Lee Duncan.

VAN NORTWICK, Judge.

Christopher Lee Hardy seeks reversal of a final summary judgment rendered in his negligence suit against Pier 99 Motor Inn, Michael Lee Duncan and David Stallings for injuries sustained when Hardy was stabbed by Stallings in the parking lot of Pier 99, while Duncan was on duty as a security guard. Because we conclude that issues of material fact remain concerning whether the stabbing incident was foreseeable, we reverse the summary judgment as to Pier 99. We affirm the summary judgment as to Duncan.

In March 1991, Hardy, a Georgia resident, travelled to Panama City with his sister to spend spring break with some friends who had arrived at the Pier 99 Motor Inn earlier. Hardy was returning to the hotel parking lot from his room when, according to his complaint, he happened into an altercation between his friend and a stranger. After the stranger, David Stallings, stabbed appellant's friend, Hardy and Stallings brawled. Hardy sustained a serious stab wound; his friend suffered fatal injuries.

Hardy, and his sister who witnessed the attack, later brought suit against Stallings, Pier 99, and Michael Lee Duncan, the security guard on duty at the time of the attack. ¹ The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages for negligence, alleging in part that Pier 99 hired poorly trained security personnel and failed to provide adequate security when it knew or should have known of dangerous conditions. Hardy added further in the complaint that "numerous criminal offenses and criminal activities occurred on [Pier 99's] premises previously."

As for Duncan in particular, Hardy sought damages on the ground that Pier 99, Duncan's employer, "hired or acquiesced in the hiring of a poorly trained and totally inadequate security guard" who in turn "ignored the explosive situation which he could have stopped at any time by asserting his authority."

Pier 99 and Duncan moved for summary judgment arguing that the pleadings, affidavits and other record documents indicated the existence of no genuine issue of material fact and that, because neither Pier 99 or Duncan had any knowledge of similar criminal activity in the past on Pier 99 property, these defendants could not be liable as a matter of law. Following a hearing, the lower court granted the motion for summary judgment as to both Pier 99 and Duncan finding:

the entire incident in question began [and] was completed within two minutes and was the result of an unprovoked and unanticipated criminal act by David Stallings. Further, the court finds that the defendant, PIER 99 MOTOR INN and its employee, MICHAEL LEE DUNCAN, had not previously experienced any prior violent assaults on the premises, and the incident in question was not foreseeable.

Thereafter, final judgment was entered in favor of Pier 99 and Duncan.

Hardy makes no specific argument on appeal that summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of Duncan. We therefore affirm as to Duncan without further discussion.

As for the summary judgment in favor of Pier 99, Hardy argues that evidence of so-called "911 calls" from Pier 99 and an adjoining business, a bar named Pineapple Willies, indicates a history of violent and criminal episodes on the property during the two years prior to the stabbing so that the attack on Hardy was reasonably foreseeable to Pier 99. ²

A motel operator is under a continuing legal duty to its patrons to use ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and protect them from harm due to reasonably foreseeable risks of injury. Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So.2d 8 (Fla.1986). Nevertheless, while a hotel operator has the duty to use reasonable care for the protection of patrons, the hotel is not the insurer of the safety of its patrons. Nor is the hotel liable for the conduct of a third party on the premises which causes injury, unless the injurious conduct is reasonably foreseeable to the hotel; that is, unless the hotel has knowledge of the danger involved and has had an opportunity to protect against it, the hotel may not be held liable. Highlands Insurance Co. v. Gilday, 398 So.2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 411 So.2d 382 (Fla.1981). The question of foreseeability in a negligence action is generally a question for the trier of fact. Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So.2d 491 (Fla.1983). ³

The lower court's finding that the attack on Hardy was "unprovoked and unanticipated" and was accomplished "within two minutes" is not a sufficient basis for granting summary judgment, for such a finding does not address the question of whether the attack on Hardy was foreseeable. While knowledge of a particular person's propensity for violence has been considered competent evidence of foreseeability, the supreme court in Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.1983), rejected the argument that "proof of foreseeability should be limited by law to evidence of actual or constructive knowledge of a particular assailant's propensity for violence." The supreme court added, "[a] tavern owner's actual or constructive knowledge, based upon past experience, that there is a likelihood of disorderly conduct by third persons in general which may endanger the safety of his patrons is also sufficient to establish foreseeability." Id. (emphasis added). We find that this rationale applies with equal force to the owner of a hotel. See, Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So.2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), rev. dismissed, 589 So.2d 291 (Fla.1991). Unquestionably, appellant's injuries were caused by the intervening act of Stallings. But Pier 99 is not relieved of liability by this intervening act as a matter of law unless Stallings' criminal attack was unforeseeable. Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So.2d at 1217.

Also, the lower court's finding that Pier 99 "had not previously experienced any prior violent assaults on the premises" does not resolve the question of whether the attack on Hardy...