Harford v. University of Minnesota, C4-92-1187
| Decision Date | 26 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. C4-92-1187,C4-92-1187 |
| Citation | 494 N.W.2d 903 |
| Parties | 80 Ed. Law Rep. 240 Earl R. HARFORD, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A determination by the Board of Regents constitutes a final adjudication because it represents the last step in the University of Minnesota's internal grievance procedure and is reviewable by writ of certiorari.
2. It was not error for the district court to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to issues previously determined by the Board of Regents.
Andrea F. Rubenstein, Miles W. Lord, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Donald M. Lewis, Julie Fleming-Wolfe, Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Ltd., Minneapolis, for respondents.
Considered and decided by DAVIES, P.J., and NORTON and FOLEY, * JJ.
Dissatisfied with a decision arrived at through the University of Minnesota's internal grievance procedure, appellant Earl Harford brought breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation actions in district court. The district court granted the university's motion for summary judgment. Harford contests the district court's application of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Harford also challenges the court's finding that the university did not deny his right to due process. We affirm.
On April 14, 1978, appellant Earl Harford began employment with respondent University of Minnesota ("university") as director of the Audiology Clinic at the University of Minnesota Hospital and Clinic. As a condition to accepting this position, Harford secured a tenured professorship in the department of otolaryngology.
On March 10, 1986, Arndt J. Duvall, M.D., head of the department of otolaryngology, requested that Harford resign from the clinic directorship. Harford complied, making his resignation effective June 30, 1986, but he later filed a grievance contesting what he deemed a constructive discharge. 1
The University of Minnesota Regulations Concerning Faculty Tenure ("tenure code") provide:
15.1 Right to Review. Any faculty member who claims that his or her rights or status under these regulations have been adversely affected without his or her consent may seek review before the Judicial Committee.
The judicial committee agreed with Harford that his resignation from the clinic directorship constituted a constructive discharge. Although finding that Harford "never understood that his indefinite tenure extended to his administrative position [as director]," the committee applied the tenure code's firing "for cause" requirement in reviewing Harford's loss of the directorship. The committee concluded the discharge was "arbitrary, unjustified, and without due process." The committee recommended that he be awarded compensation and be encouraged to continue his work with the clinics.
In support of its conclusion, the committee noted that Duvall had only been department head for some six months before asking Harford to resign and the department head prior to Duvall had been pleased with Harford's performance for the previous 6 1/2 years. According to the committee, Duvall neither adequately apprised Harford of his alleged shortcomings nor gave him an opportunity to improve. The committee sent its recommendation to the university president, as required under the tenure code.
On May 18, 1989, President Nils Hasselmo, after hearing oral presentations and reviewing filed written materials, issued his findings, conclusions, and decisions. Under section 15.5 of the tenure code:
The President may impose the action recommended by the Committee or any action more favorable to the faculty member. The President may impose action less favorable to the faculty member only for important substantive reasons, which must be stated in writing.
In his decision, Hasselmo rejected the committee's recommendations, noting that the committee inappropriately applied standards used for evaluating discharge from a tenured position to loss of "an administrative appointment subject to annual renewal or nonrenewal." In Hasselmo's view, requesting Harford's resignation was reasonable as an administrative matter because of the following improprieties: purchasing hearing aids for the clinic at above-market cost from a corporation partly owned by his wife and designating a clinic he had started near his summer home as a university outreach clinic.
Further, Hasselmo accepted the committee's findings that Harford had "never understood that his indefinite tenure extended to his administrative position" and that Harford's discharge did not stem from "a violation of academic freedom."
Section 14.5 of the tenure code provides for appeal to the Board of Regents where the president "imposes a sanction more severe than that recommended by the Judicial Committee." Harford exercised this right of appeal, obtaining a hearing on July 13, 1989, after which the regents issued findings of fact, conclusions, and a decision upholding President Hasselmo's findings conclusions, and decision. Of particular significance, the regents found:
2. Dr. Harford's appointment [as clinic director] was dated July 22, 1985 and expired June 30, 1986. Dr. Harford had held a series of one year appointments to this position since April 17, 1978.
* * * * * *
5. Dr. Harford's appointment as Director of the Audiology Clinic was an Administrative Appointment which is not subject to the Regulations Concerning Faculty Tenure. There was no agreement or understanding between Dr. Harford and the * * * University which provided any substantive or procedural rights to Dr. Harford to continued tenure in that Appointment.
(Emphasis in original.)
On April 9, 1990, Harford filed suit in district court against the university, alleging breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. On April 7, 1992, the district court entered summary judgment in the university's favor based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Harford appealed to this court, contesting application of those doctrines and challenging the district court's ruling that the university's grievance procedure provided adequate procedural and substantive due process.
I. Did the district court err in determining that res judicata precludes Harford from bringing suit in district court?
II. Did the district court err in collaterally estopping Harford from litigating issues previously ruled upon under the University of Minnesota's internal grievance procedures?
III. Did the district court err in finding that the University of Minnesota's internal grievance procedure did not deny Harford's rights to procedural and substantive due process?
This court owes no deference to the district court's application of the law. County of Lake v. Courtney, 451 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn.App.1990), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1990).
Harford contends the district court erred in barring his actions in breach of contract and in negligent misrepresentation under the doctrine of res judicata (also called "merger and bar").
"A judgment on the merits constitutes an absolute bar to a second suit for the same cause of action, and is conclusive between parties and privies, not only as to every matter which was actually litigated, but also as to every matter which might have been litigated therein."
Hauser v. Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Minn.1978) (quoting The Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 466, 124 N.W.2d 328, 340 (1963)) (emphasis added). The Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently held that res judicata applies to administrative decisions where the agency has acted in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. E.g., Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114, 115-116 (Minn.1991); McKee v. County of Ramsey, 310 Minn. 192, 194 n. 1, 245 N.W.2d 460, 462 n. 1 (Minn.1976) (citing State ex rel. Turnbladh v. District Court, 259 Minn. 228, 231-32, 107 N.W.2d 307, 310 (1960)).
Although the university's grievance procedure was arguably quasi-judicial in nature, res judicata cannot apply to claims that "were not raised and over which the administrative agency did not have jurisdiction." McKee, 310 Minn. at 195, 245 N.W.2d at 462 (citing United States v. R.C.A., 358 U.S. 334, 352, 79 S.Ct. 457, 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 354 (1959)); see also Graham, 472 N.W.2d at 117 ().
In this case, the regents lack jurisdiction to decide breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation claims. We hold, therefore, that res judicata cannot operate as a bar to bringing these actions in district court.
Harford also challenges the district court's decision to estop him from litigating the issues of whether the university breached its employment contract and whether it negligently misrepresented the directorship as a tenured position. The district court decided estoppel precluded Harford from proving essential elements of his claim and compelled the grant of summary judgment against him.
Collateral estoppel is the "issue preclusion" branch of res judicata. Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn.1988) (citing Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 703 (Minn.1982)). Before a court may apply collateral estoppel based on an agency decision:
(1) the issue to be precluded must be identical to the issue raised in the prior agency adjudication;
(2) the issue must have been necessary to the agency adjudication and properly before the agency;
(3) the agency determination must be a final adjudication subject to judicial review;
(4) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior agency determination; and
(5) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.
Graham, 472 N.W.2d at 116 (citations omitted)....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
D.H. Blattner & Sons, Inc. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey
...Judicata The decision to grant or deny res judicata to a prior decision is a matter of judicial discretion. Harford v. University of Minn., 494 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn.App.1993) (citation omitted), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, Firemen's argues that res judicata should prevent relitiga......
-
Zahavy v. University of Minnesota
...S.Ct. 948, 955, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); Ganguli v. University of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn.App.1994); Harford v. University of Minnesota, 494 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Minn.App.1993), review denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 1993)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1. The Board of Regents determined that Za......
-
Chronopoulos v. University of Minnesota
...decision to terminate an employee only if it finds a lack of substantial evidence to support that ruling. Harford v. University of Minnesota, 494 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Minn.App.1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 1993). Academic judgments are afforded great discretion, since decisions re......
-
Villarreal v. Independent School Dist. No. 659, Northfield
...applied collateral estoppel) or to the board's examination of its own conduct for employment law violations. Harford v. University of Minn., 494 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Minn.App.1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 1993). We conclude that Villarreal's claim of racial discrimination under th......