Hargis v. Fuller, No. M2003-02691-COA-R3-CV (TN 2/7/2005), M2003-02691-COA-R3-CV.

• Decision Date: 07 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. M2003-02691-COA-R3-CV.,M2003-02691-COA-R3-CV.
• Parties: VALERIE J. HARGIS, ET AL. v. FREDALENE FULLER, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Barney Loyd Fuller, Jr.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

VALERIE J. HARGIS, ET AL. v. FREDALENE FULLER, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Barney Loyd Fuller, Jr.

No. M2003-02691-COA-R3-CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville.

November 2, 2004 Session.

Filed February 7, 2005.

Direct Appeal from the Probate Court for Humphreys County; No. P-1154-99; Anthony L. Sanders, Judge.

Judgment of the Probate Court Affirmed.

James Robin McKinney, Jr., Nashville, TN, for Appellants

John Lee Williams, Waverly, TN, for Appellee

Alan E. Highers, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which David R. Farmer, J., and Holly M. Kirby, J., joined.

OPINION

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE.

This appeal involves the construction of a will. The decedent died owning farmland in excess of twenty acres in size. Wife admitted the decedent's properly executed will, which named her as executrix, into probate. The decedent's children by a prior marriage filed an action in the probate court asking the probate court to construe conflicting provisions in the decedent's will. One section of the decedent's will purported to devise to his children the entire farm subject to the wife's life estate, while the second provision purported to devise to the wife a life estate in the "homeplace." The decedent's children argued the term "homeplace" encompassed something significantly less than the entire farm. The probate court disagreed, interpreting the term "homeplace," as used by the decedent, to mean the entire farm. In addition, the probate court ruled that, pursuant to section 66-1-106 of the Tennessee Code, the decedent's will created in his wife an unlimited power of disposition as to the farm. The decedent's children have appealed the interpretation of the decedent's will reached by the probate court to this Court. We affirm the decision of the probate court in all respects.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

This case presents issues related to the construction of a will. Fredalene Patterson Fuller("Wife") and Barney Loyd Fuller, Jr. ("Decedent") married in 1975. While Wife and Decedent did not have children together, both had children from their prior marriages. Decedent died on September 8, 1999, and Wife filed a petition to probate Decedent's duly executed formal will in the Probate Court of Humphreys County, Tennessee. Decedent's attorney, Charles Griffith ("Mr. Griffith"), drafted Decedent's will which he executed on October 26, 1990, naming Wife as his executrix. On September 16, 1999, the probate court entered an Order for Probate recognizing Wife as the duly appointed executrix.

On January 18, 2000, Valerie J. Hargis ("Ms. Hargis"), Cathy L. Morgan, and Abbie L. Triplett (collectively referred to as "Decedent's Children") filed a Complaint to Construe Will in the probate court. Specifically, Decedent's Children asked the probate court to construe the following provisions in Decedent's will:

ARTICLE II

I hereby will, devise and bequeath as follows:

. . . .

B.) To my children, Mark Ellrie Fuller,¹ Cathy Lynn Fuller, Valerie Joan Fuller and Abbie Lou Fuller (subject to the life estate of my wife) the 35 acre farm at Hustburg, Tennessee. [sic] in equal acreage, per stirpes and not per capita, as shown by sketch on page 3 of this my Will, but any cost of survey or division to [sic] borne by them.

C.) To my wife, Fredalene Fuller, my homeplace for the remainder of her natural life with full powers to consume if necessary for her health care, maintenance or necessary living expenses, the Highway 70 property and all the rest, remainder and residue of my estate, whether real, personal or mixed, and wheresoever situated.

At the time of his death, Decedent died seized of a tract of land (hereinafter referred to as "the Farm") which he acquired from his mother by warranty deed in 1982.² Decedent was raised on the particular parcel of land in question from an early age. In addition to the above provision, Decedent attached a tax map to his will on which he divided the subject property into four sections and labeled each section with one of the names of Decedent's Children.³

Located on the Farm is an old abandoned house previously occupied by Decedent's mother and father, who are deceased.⁴ Around the time they married in 1975, Decedent and Wife had placed on the Farm a trailer which they used as their residence. When Decedent executed his will in 1990, he and Wife were living in the trailer located on the Farm. Decedent and Wife planted crops on the farm, and, at some point, they installed a pavilion on the Farm next to a creek which ran through the property. Later, Decedent and Wife enclosed the pavilion and converted it into a restaurant which they operated on the Farm. According to Wife, she and Decedent borrowed $61,000.00 in January 1989 to convert the pavilion into a restaurant using the Farm as collateral.⁵ When Decedent and Wife purchased another restaurant on Highway 70 in Humphreys County, they converted the restaurant on the Farm into a home (hereinafter referred to as the "Restaurant House"). Apparently, Decedent and Wife planned to renovate the trailer while they were temporarily residing in the Restaurant House. However, a storm subsequently blew a tree onto the trailer, making it uninhabitable. At the time of his death in 1999, Decedent and Wife were living in the Restaurant House.

At a hearing conducted on July 21, 2003, the probate court heard testimony from Wife, Ms. Hargis, Charles Griffith ("Mr. Griffith"),⁶ and Valerie Fuller. Mr. Griffith, Decedent's attorney and scrivener of the will, testified that he and Decedent discussed making a will for several years. Mr. Griffith drew up several drafts, but Decedent would review them and subsequently reject them because he felt they did not convey his desires. Decedent finally signed off on the version presently at issue, but Mr. Griffith could not say that Decedent intended the term "35 acre farm" and "homeplace" to be synonymous.

Wife testified that she and Decedent had numerous conversations during which he expressed his intentions regarding the Farm following his death. Wife offered testimony to the effect that, by using the term "homeplace," Decedent meant the entire Farm. She stated that, being aware of her health problems and lack of adequate health insurance, Decedent intended for her to have a life estate in the entire Farm with the power to dispose of it, if necessary, for her maintenance. Conversely, Ms. Hargis was apparently present for some of these conversations, and she recalled Decedent expressing an entirely different desire regarding the Farm. Ms. Hargis testified that Decedent intended "homeplace" to mean the location where Wife was living at his death, the Restaurant House, and a couple of acres surrounding it. Ms. Hargis stated Decedent intended Decedent's Children to take the remainder of the Farm, as demonstrated on the tax map attached to his will.

The probate court entered a final decree on August 7, 2003, construing Decedent's will, in relevant part, as follows:

9. Barney Loyd Fuller, Jr. intended to devise a life estate in the Farm to Defendant with the remainder in fee simple to Plaintiffs and their brother, Mark Ellery Fuller, by Article II at subparagraphs B and C of the Will. By the term "homeplace" referred to in subparagraph C he [sic] the said Barney Loyd Fuller, Jr. meant the whole of the Farm which he identified as the "35 acre farm at Hustburg, Tennessee." By his devise he conferred on Defendant power to consume the Farm as necessary for her health care, maintenance needs or necessary living expenses. Therefore, by virtue of Section 66-1-106, Tennessee Code Annotated, Defendant was given an unlimited power of disposition and sale thereof during her lifetime without necessity of joinder of the remaindermen.

. . . .

1. By virtue of the devise made in the Will the Defendant is possessed of and vested with an estate in fee simple absolute in and to the Farm with right to sell and dispose of the same without joinder of Plaintiffs. Likewise, such estate exists in her to the extent that during her lifetime her creditors subject the same to the satisfaction of her unpaid debts.

. . . .

3. To the extent a sale or disposition of the Farm, or some part thereof, does not occur by the time of the death of Defendant or to the extent proceeds from any such sale or disposition are not used for the satisfaction of the debts of Defendant during her lifetime or are not otherwise consumed for her necessary health care, maintenance needs and necessary living expenses, the same shall be in trust for Plaintiffs in accordance with their remainder interests as devised under the Will. . . .

Decedent's Children filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the probate court's judgment, which the probate court subsequently denied. Decedent's Children then proceeded to file an appeal to this Court presenting the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the probate court properly construed Decedent's will by interpreting the term "homeplace" to mean the entire Farm; and

II. Whether Decedent's will created in Wife an unlimited power of disposition which converted the subject real estate into a fee simple absolute pursuant to section 66-1-106 of the Tennessee Code.

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decision of the probate court.

II. Standard of Review

While will contests involve factual questions to be resolved by a trier of fact, will constructions involve questions of law left for resolution by the court. In re Estate of Eden, 99 S.W.3d 82, 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, a probate court's construction of a will includes conclusions of law which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Briggs v. Estate of Briggs, 950 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Presley v. Hanks, 782 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).

"Construction suits recognize the testator's right to direct the disposition of his or her property and...