Hargrove v. Hargrove

• Decision Date: 09 August 1993
• Citation: 196 A.D.2d 541,601 N.Y.S.2d 157
• Parties: In the Matter of Cherry HARGROVE, Respondent, v. Lamont HARGROVE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 157

601 N.Y.S.2d 157

196 A.D.2d 541

In the Matter of Cherry HARGROVE, Respondent, v. Lamont HARGROVE, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Aug. 9, 1993.

Tarshis & Hammerman, Forest Hills (Mark L. Nearenberg, of counsel), for appellant.

Before THOMPSON, J.P., and BALLETTA, RITTER and PIZZUTO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4 for an upward modification of child support established in the parties' judgment of divorce, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Lubow, J.), dated May 1, 1991, which denied his objections to an order of the same court (Rood, H.E.), dated March 1, 1991, which, after a hearing, increased his weekly child support obligation from the sum of $90 to the sum of $264 per week for his two sons retroactive to May 8, 1990, and directed him to pay an additional $15 per week to satisfy arrears.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the appellant's objections to the order of the Hearing Examiner are sustained, and the proceeding for upward modification of child support is dismissed.

We find that the petitioner mother failed to demonstrate an unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances or that the agreement entered into by the parties was unfair when entered into (see, Matter of Boden v. Boden, 42 N.Y.2d 210, 397 N.Y.S.2d 701, 366 N.E.2d 791), or that her income and the amount of the original child support agreed to were insufficient to meet the children's present needs (see, Matter of Brescia v. Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132, 451 N.Y.S.2d 68, 436 N.E.2d 518). The petitioner's income had risen from approximately $14,500 at the time the 1987 judgment of divorce was entered to approximately $27,500 at the time of the hearing in 1991. Moreover, the increased expenses claimed were attributable either to the petitioner's own schooling and other personal expenses or to the normal growth of the children ( see, Brevetti v. Brevetti, 182 A.D.2d 606, 581 N.Y.S.2d 859; Matter of Bernstein v. Goldman, 180 A.D.2d 735, 580 N.Y.S.2d 371; May May Cheng v. McManus, 178 A.D.2d 906, 577 N.Y.S.2d 944). Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Family Court and dismiss the petition.