Harker v. Neyhart
| Decision Date | 31 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:20-cv-03530-SKC |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER B. HARKER, Plaintiff, v. W. NEYHART, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
On October 22, 2020, Plaintiff Christopher Harker, a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff), and other inmates were singing together from their cells. [#10.][1] Defendant Neyhart was working as a guard at the time, and upon hearing the singing said loudly in the pod, “I knew you guys were gay.” [Id. at p.4.][2] According to the Amended Complaint (hereinafter “Complaint”), Defendant directed this statement toward Mr. Harker's cell and, in doing so exposed Harker's sexuality. [Id. at ¶7.] Following Defendant's statements, Harker was moved to a different pod because his cellmates began treating him differently by intimidating him and telling him to stay on his bunk. [Id.]
Following this incident, Harker filed a grievance regarding Defendant's behavior. [Id.] The Sheriff investigated the claims and determined Defendant did make the statement. [Id.] But the Sheriff concluded it had been made in a joking manner. [Id.] Following the grievance proceedings, Defendant refused to give Harker any toilet paper, and Harker was forced to use his own underwear to clean himself. [Id.]
Harker filed this case seeking monetary damages for violations of his constitutional rights. [Id. at p.6.][3] Defendant seeks dismissal and argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. [#21.] The Court has reviewed the Motion and related briefing, the Complaint, and the relevant law. No. hearing is necessary. For the following reasons the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova, 595 F.3d v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). The Court is not, however, “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard requires courts take a two-prong approach to evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. Id. at 678-79. The first prong requires the court to identify which allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” because, for example, they state legal conclusions or merely recite the elements of a claim. Id. at 678. The second prong requires the court to assume the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations “and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Accordingly, in examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), [courts] will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012). The standard is a liberal one, however, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009).
Qualified immunity shields “government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation omitted). Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability [and] it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is a legal question. Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 2007).
When the qualified immunity defense is raised, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing, with particularity, facts and law establishing the inference that the defendant violated a clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right. Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1994). If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The court has the discretion to consider these prongs in any order. Leverington v. City of Colorado Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 732 (10th Cir. 2011).
In his Complaint, Harker contends Defendant violated his constitutional rights when Defendant labeled him gay and thereby, put his health and safety at risk. He also contends Defendant unlawfully retaliated against him for filing a grievance regarding the incident.
“The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, including adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and reasonable safety from bodily harm.” Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). This encompasses a duty “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, (1994). “A prison official's deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 828.
A claim for deliberate indifference involves both an objective and a subjective component. Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005). “[T]o establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff ‘must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,' the objective component, and that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to his safety, the subjective component.” Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834)). In his Motion, Defendant argues dismissal is warranted because his alleged statement, “I knew you guys were gay, ” was akin to name calling, which is not actionable under the constitution. The Court disagrees with Defendant's characterization of his statement as simple name calling.[5]
In Benefield, a prisoner plaintiff brought a claim under the Eighth Amendment arguing a guard put the plaintiff in physical danger at the hands of other inmates when he labeled the plaintiff a “snitch.” 241 F.3d at 1269-70. The Tenth Circuit recognized that labeling a prisoner a snitch had the potential for great harm and could violate the constitution. Id. at 1271. “While a different incendiary badge of prison infamy was used here, the [Court believes the] same principles apply.” Brown v. Narvais, 265 Fed.Appx. 734 (10th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff established a serious risk of bodily injury where a guard labeled plaintiff a “pedophile” thus placing him in a class of inmates subject to serious bodily harm); see also Moore v. Mann, 823 Fed.Appx. 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2020) (); Thomas v. District of Columbia, 887 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1995) ().
To be sure, Congress, in enacting the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), recognized an inmate's sexuality (or the perception of their sexuality) could put them at risk for being sexually abused by other inmates. 28 C.F.R. § 115.241(d)(7). And both the Colorado Department of Corrections and the Arapahoe County Sheriff have acknowledged the PREA's application to “all federal, state, and local prisons, jails, police lock-ups, private facilities, and community settings such as residential facilities.”[6] For these reasons, labeling an inmate as gay is no joke in the lock-up environment, as Defendant suggests. Like a prison guard tagging an inmate as a snitch or a pedophile, labeling an inmate as gay could indeed raise a serious risk of harm.[7]
Nevertheless, the Court finds Harker's allegations fail to establish the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis. First, the Complaint fails to plausibly allege Defendant's comment singled Harker out such that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Harker's safety. Specifically, although the Complaint alleges Defendant's statement was “directed at” Harker's cell, it alleges the statement was made generally in the pod where Harker's cell was located. Further, the alleged statement itself was, “I knew you guys were gay” (emphasis added). Because the statement referred to multiple individuals and was shouted in a common area, the Complaint fails to plausibly allege Defendant knew he was specifically exposing Harker's sexuality.
Similarly there are no factual allegations in the Complaint to plausibly allege Defendant's subjective knowledge of any risks associated with being known as gay in prison, or in generally referring to a group of male inmates as gay. Because the...
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