Harlan County Bd. of Ed. v. Stagnolia

Decision Date09 September 1977
PartiesHARLAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Mildred Rowland, Individually and as Superintendent of the Harlan County School District, Appellants, v. Reecie STAGNOLIA, Appellee.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

J. K. Beasley, Harlan, for appellants.

Charles R. DiSalvo, Appalachian Research and Defense Fund of Kentucky, Inc., Barbourville, for appellee.

Before HOGGE, HOWARD and LESTER, JJ.

LESTER, Judge.

The Harlan County school authorities appeal from an adverse judgment of the court below which reinstated appellee to the position of assistant principal after his termination as such by the board of education. The circuit judge heard this cause without the intervention of a jury and after making findings of fact and conclusions of law, rendered judgment as aforesaid. In addition, Judge Brock further rendered a written opinion and because of the determinations made therein, we shall treat the same as part of the findings and conclusions.

In litigation such as this, the function of this Court is set forth in CR 52.01 which limits us to a determination of whether the findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous. 7 W. Clay, Kentucky Practice, CR 52.01, Comment 8 (3rd ed. 1974).

Reecie Stagnolia was hired as an assistant principal for the academic year 1971-1972 and continued in that position through 1974-1975. Even though there was some variation of duties during the last mentioned year, the evidence of the appellant and its principal support the finding that appellee was in fact assistant principal until the end of the 1974-1975 school year thus eliminating any clear error in that determination by the court. Moreover, appellee had administrative tenure within the provisions of KRS 161.765.

1974 was a campaign year for the Harlan County Board of Education and appellee and appellant, Superintendent Rowland, openly supported opposing candidates with appellant's incumbent being successful. On May 5th of the following year, appellee received a form letter from Rowland to the effect that since federal funds had been reduced and that average daily attendance loss would eliminate teachers paid out of state funds (minimum foundation) then he would not be reemployed. To some extent, this letter was misleading because the evidence of student attendance loss was approximately twenty per year for each of the last five years while the pupil population which would enter the school where Stagnolia worked would soon increase. Furthermore, the testimony of the appropriate state department of education official in charge of minimum foundation funds reflected that Harlan County's share had consistently increased from 1972 through the first half of 1976. Since appellee was not paid out of the federal funds, we find no error in the trial court's findings as to average daily attendance and available funds as they relate to the issues of this case.

We are unable to label the circuit court's findings as to the superintendent's and the assistant principal's political activities as erroneous. Judge Brock determined that appellee "was dismissed in 1975 along with thirty-five other teachers. Thereafter, he was rehired at his assistant principal's salary at Green Hill Elementary School as an elementary teacher". Of the thirty-five teachers mentioned by the court, twenty-six were Title I funded while the balance were paid out of state or local revenues. In spite of the trial court's conclusion that Stagnolia was "dismissed", appellants continue to argue that he was "suspended" pursuant to KRS 161.800 but regardless of what word is used, appellee had no employment. It should be remembered that it was not until after he filed his complaint in this matter that he was offered and accepted the position of elementary teacher and it cannot be said that a litigant should be taxed for attempting to sustain himself. Moreover, Stagnolia had a contract for personal services and this made it incumbent upon him to minimize his damages by seeking similar employment in the locality. Abrams v. Jackson County Board of Education,230 Ky....

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Wicker v. Board of Educ. of Knott County, Ky.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 14 d5 Agosto d5 1987
    ...under Kentucky law a "mere inference" of arbitrariness is sufficient to void an adverse employment decision. Harlan County Bd. of Educ. v. Stagnolia, 555 S.W.2d 828 (Ky.App.1977). If a "mere inference" is enough, it is hard to believe that the state trial court not only reached a negative c......
  • Hager v. Pike County Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 29 d5 Março d5 2002
    ...political "vendettas" for supporting candidates opposed to Superintendent in race for office); see also Harlan County Bd. of Educ. v. Stagnolia, 555 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky.Ct.App.1977) ("Political reprisals by superintendents and a majority of board members brought about the enactment of KRS 1......
  • Justice v. Pike County Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 4 d2 Novembro d2 2003
    ...political "vendettas" for supporting candidates opposed to Superintendent in race for office); see also Harlan County Bd. of Educ. v. Stagnolia, 555 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky.Ct.App. 1977) ("Political reprisals by superintendents and a majority of board members brought about the enactment of KRS ......
  • Hardin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2016-CA-001331-MR
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 10 d5 Agosto d5 2018
    ...KRS 161.765. " KRS 161.765(2) is one of the most strongly worded statutes enacted by the legislature[.]" Harlan County Bd. of Ed. v. Stagnolia , 555 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Ky. App. 1977). It reads, pertinent to this appeal:(1) A superintendent may demote an administrator who has not completed thr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT