Harlan v. Rand
| Decision Date | 01 January 1856 |
| Parties | Harlan versus Rand. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Thos. S. Smith, for plaintiff in error.
H. T. King, for defendant in error.
There are several cases that show that the materialman cannot justly charge the building for all the materials that he may choose to furnish on its credit, without reference to the quantity or quality needed. He must, in his supplies, regard the size and apparent character of the building; and his lien cannot go beyond what these show to be reasonable: 24 State R. 510. This principle is identical with that which sometimes allows strangers to supply necessaries to the members of a family on the credit of its head. The allowance is not measured by the mere will of the supplier, nor by the financial ability of the head; but by the necessity of the case, regard being had to the style in which the family is accustomed to live, of which the supplier must inform himself.
And no one would think of saying that a material-man shall have a lien for materials furnished for a particular purpose, and which are unfit for it. His occupation requires him to know whether his materials are fit for the purpose for which they are provided. If they are furnished on the order of the owner of the house, of course this rule does not apply; for a man may pledge his own property for any kind of materials. But it is involved in the very fact of furnishing them to a contractor of the building on its credit, that he should know its character, and that they must, at least apparently, be adapted to it. To furnish to a contractor at his pleasure, and without regard to the size and character of the building, is really to furnish on his credit, and not on the credit of the building — at least so far as the materials are unfit or manifestly excessive. It is like supplying without stint the wants of a spendthrift son, with the expectation of compelling the father to foot the bill.
This principle would apply to Leeds's contract with the contractor of the building for this warming and ventilating apparatus, and exclude it from being the subject of a lien, even without the condition expressed in his contract, that he was not to be paid if his work did not answer its purpose. And the same principle excludes the lien claimed by Rand, whom he engaged to put up the principal part of the work for him. The plan was Leeds's, and neither the contractor nor the owner is responsible for its failure. Its construction was the business of Leeds and Rand, and they ought to have understood it; and having executed it in such a way that the danger of fire from it was so great as to prevent insurance of the house, it is simple justice that neither of them can have a lien for it. It could be granted on no principle except on one that assumes that artisans do not understand their business, and are not required to understand it, and that the owner is responsible for their work if he does not correct them as they proceed. Rand, if he was not a mere journeyman, cannot shelter himself behind the errors of Leeds so as to charge the house, for he ought to have understood his own share of the business. If he was a mere journeyman, the law considers him as working on the credit of his employer, and not of the building.
On referring to the contract of Leeds, we understand the first point of the defendant below as meaning by the term "movable heater," this warming and ventilating apparatus that was to be removed if it did not answer its purpose. This condition prevented it from being regarded as part of the building in favour of Leeds, or of Rand claiming under him, until it should be ascertained to answer its purpose. It was removed because it did not, and therefore there is no lien. This point ought to have been affirmed, and left to the jury with the evidence upon it.
But there is another point in this case. Harlan was the owner, Singerly the contractor for the...
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Weathered v. Garrett
...division of the structure, so that a right of lien could be conferred upon the plaintiffs as sub-contractors or material-men: Harlan v. Rand, 27 Pa. 511; Singerly v. Doerr, 62 Pa. 9; Duff Hoffman, 63 Pa. 192; Schenck v. Uber, 81 Pa. 31; Tilford v. Wallace, 3 W. 141; Best v. Baumgardner, 122......
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Langenheim v. Anschutz-Bradberry Co.
... ... respect, so that liens might be filed for work and material ... furnished to such contractors: Harlan v. Rand, 27 ... Pa. 511; Duff v. Hoffman, supra. It was also intended for the ... benefit and protection of the owners: College v. Church, ... 1 ... ...
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Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co.
...law. The courts had given judicial construction to the acts of 1836 and 1845 in a series of well considered cases, beginning with Harlan v. Rand, 27 Pa. 511. They had uniformly that to entitle a mechanic or a material man to a lien upon a building for work done or materials furnished, it wa......
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Horn & Brannen Mfg. Co. v. Steelman
...the owner of the estate sought to be charged. The lien law of 1836 provides only for 'debts contracted' for work and materials:" Harlan v. Rand, 27 Pa. 511. This is reaffirmed Owen v. Johnson, 174 Pa. 99. The rights of these parties were fixed by their contract, made prior to the passage of......