Harland v. Anderson Ranch Co.
| Decision Date | 21 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-650,02-650 |
| Citation | 2004 MT 132,92 P.3d 1160 |
| Parties | GERALD R. HARLAND, DON G. HARLAND, and KATHY L. HARLAND, d/b/a HARLAND RANCH PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ANDERSON RANCH CO., a Montana corporation, Defendant, Respondent and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellants: Ward E. Taleff, Alexander, Baucus, Taleff, Paul & Young, PLLC, Great Falls, Montana.
For Respondent: Robert J. Emmons, Emmons & Sullivan, Great Falls, Montana.
¶1 Gerald Harland, Don Harland and Kathy L. Harland, d/b/a/ Harland Ranch Partnership (hereinafter, the Harlands) appeal, and Anderson Ranch Company (hereinafter, Anderson Ranch) cross-appeals, from an order entered by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, granting summary judgment to Anderson Ranch based upon the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
¶2 The parties raise the following issues on appeal:
¶3 1. Did the District Court err in looking beyond the plain language of the 1983 amended judgment?
¶4 2. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Anderson Ranch?
¶5 3. Did the District Court have jurisdiction to consider the effect of the 1983 amended judgment?
¶6 4. Was the Harlands' easement over the Anderson Ranch property extinguished by way of abandonment and waiver?
¶7 5. Is Anderson Ranch entitled to attorney fees?
¶8 On January 25, 1972, Gerald R. Harland commenced litigation in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, seeking to establish a right-of-way across property owned by Roy and Lottie Anderson (the Andersons) and the Anderson Ranch. The complaint in that action alleged that an easement existed by way of prescription and sought damages against the Andersons for wrongful interference. In the alternative, Harland asked the court to condemn an easement across the Andersons' property for his use.
¶9 The District Court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Andersons on Harland's claims for a prescriptive easement and related damages. Harland appealed from the District Court's ruling, and we affirmed. See Harland v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613.
¶10 Following remand, the District Court resumed proceedings on Harland's claim for an easement by condemnation. On January 5, 1983, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that Harland's use of his land for stock grazing was a public use and that, under the power of eminent domain, he was entitled to a non-exclusive easement over the Andersons' property.
¶11 On January 7, 1983, the District Court entered judgment awarding the Andersons $1,700 as just compensation for the taking of the easement granted to Harland, as well as attorney fees and costs. However, the order failed to account for the grant of an easement to Harland, and on January 10, 1983, the District Court issued an amended judgment, which expressly set aside the January 7 judgment and granted Harland an unrestricted easement over the Andersons' property.
¶12 The Andersons thereafter filed a motion to alter or amend the District Court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, asserting that the judgment "amounts to the taking of an easement amounting to the total use of the road involved," and requesting that they be granted $6,500 as just compensation for the taking of the easement. The District Court denied the Andersons' motion.
¶13 On March 17, 1983, Harland and the Andersons entered a stipulation agreeing that $7,500 should be awarded to the Andersons for attorney fees and costs. The parties further agreed not to appeal from the amended judgment. On March 23, 1983, the District Court entered an order approving the stipulation.
¶14 For nearly twenty years thereafter, the Harlands utilized the right-of-way easement across the Anderson Ranch for the purposes of inspecting their property, building roads, logging, recreation, and other non-agricultural uses, including guided hunting. However, around May 2000, Anderson Ranch initiated efforts to restrict the Harlands' use of the easement by attempting to block access to the road crossing its property.
¶15 On April 26, 2001, the Harlands commenced litigation in District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that the January 10, 1983 amended judgment granted them a non-restrictive easement across the Anderson Ranch. The Harlands additionally claimed they were entitled to damages for Anderson Ranch's wrongful interference with the use of the easement and requested attorney fees.
¶16 Anderson Ranch responded by denying the Harlands' allegations that it had impeded the use of the easement and argued that the right-of-way granted under the January 10, 1983 amended judgment was limited to agricultural and grazing purposes. The Ranch additionally asserted the affirmative defenses of res judicata, judicial estoppel, abandonment, laches, and waiver.
¶17 On January 17, 2002, Anderson Ranch brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the lawsuit on the basis of res judicata and its other asserted affirmative defenses. The Harlands cross-moved for summary judgment on the basis that the amended judgment clearly and unambiguously granted them an unrestricted easement across the Anderson Ranch, and argued that the District Court was not permitted to go beyond the four corners of the amended judgment in making its determination.
¶18 Following hearing on the motions, the District Court concluded that the language of the amended judgment, which had vacated the prior judgment for failing to comply with the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, implied that the court's findings and conclusions were "necessary thereto," and therefore reviewed the court's 1983 findings of fact and conclusions of law in construing the amended judgment. In so doing, the District Court concluded that the easement was restricted to agricultural and grazing purposes and granted summary judgment to Anderson Ranch on the basis of res judicata.
¶19 On September 13, 2002, the District Court entered judgment formally granting Anderson Ranch's motion for summary judgment, denying Harlands' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Harlands' claim with prejudice. Harlands appeal from this judgment and Anderson Ranch cross-appeals from the District Court's denial of summary judgment as to its affirmative defenses of abandonment and waiver.
¶20 We review a district court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Spain-Morrow Ranch, Inc. v. West (1994), 264 Mont. 441, 444, 872 P.2d 330, 331. In this case, summary judgment was granted based upon the court's interpretation of a written judgment. Interpretation of judgments presents a question of law for the court. See Gans & Klein Inv. Co v. Sanford (1932), 91 Mont. 512, 522, 8 P.2d 808, 811. We review a court's conclusions of law to determine whether its interpretation is correct. Madrid v. Zenchiku Land and Livestock, 2002 MT 172, ¶ 5, 310 Mont. 491, ¶ 5, 51 P.3d 1137, ¶ 5.
¶21 Did the District Court err in looking beyond the plain language of the 1983 amended judgment?
¶22 The Harlands contend the District Court erred in considering the findings of fact and conclusions of law in construing the 1983 amended judgment. They maintain that, where the decree is clear and unambiguous, reference cannot be made beyond the face of the decree. We agree.
¶23 We have long since recognized that a district court may refer to the pleadings, judgment roll, and the entire record in the original case when construing a decree which is lacking in certain elements or obscure and uncertain in meaning. Quigley v. McIntosh (1940), 110 Mont. 495, 510, 103 P.2d 1067, 1074. Quigley concerned a district court's interpretation of a 1913 decree adjudicating water rights to Three Mile Creek, an adjudicated stream in Powell County. The decree only addressed the acreage of land the senior appropriators could irrigate and the flow rate that could be applied. When senior appropriators began using a greater amount of water from the creek than the decree allowed by diverting water to new acreage, junior appropriators brought suit. After making extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the historical distribution of waters and ditches, the district court concluded that the junior users had been injured by the increased water usage and enjoined the senior appropriators' expanded use. On appeal, the senior users asserted the district court had erred by looking beyond the face of the 1913 decree. We affirmed the district court, stating in pertinent part:
If the decree were complete in all details relating to the actual amounts of water to be used under the various appropriations there would be no occasion, in construing it, to resort to pleadings or evidence. But in construing a decree which is lacking in certain elements or obscure or uncertain in meaning, reference may be made to the pleadings, judgment roll, or entire record of the case.
Quigley, 110 Mont. at 510-11, 103 P.2d at 1074. Thus, Quigley established that a district court may refer to the record in the original case when construing a decree which is obscure or ambiguous. However, where the language of a court's decree is plain, there is no need, "in construing it, to resort to pleadings or evidence." Quigley, 110 Mont. at 510, 103 P.2d at 1074.
¶24 This ruling—that the effect of the decree must be declared in light of the literal meaning of the language used when the decree is clear and unambiguous—is consistent with the general rule for construing judgments. In American Jurisprudence 2d, it is stated:
As a general rule, where a court's decree is clear and unambiguous, neither pleadings, findings nor matters outside the record may be used to change its...
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