Harley v. Harley
| Decision Date | 16 March 1959 |
| Citation | 185 N.Y.S.2d 893,19 Misc.2d 74 |
| Parties | Edgar Richard HARLEY v. Helen Beatrice HARLEY. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Jacob I. Horowitz, New York City, for plaintiff.
Reinach & Lehrer, New York City, for defendant.
Heretofore a motion for alimony and counsel fees came before this court. On the basis of the papers then submitted, as well as some exhibits which showed the financial status of the husband, the motion was granted and an allowance of $25 per week was made for the plaintiff, and she was also granted counsel fees totaling $500. This included counsel fees for defending this action which had been brought against her for an annulment of marriage, as well as counsel fees which became necessary to defend her status as a resident of the United States.
Plaintiff and defendant were married in the State of New Jersey. At that time, defendant was a citizen of the Dominican Republic. She had met the plaintiff in 1956, while she was here on a student's visa. After his proposal of marriage in September of 1957, she consented to marry him, but advised the plaintiff that under the provisions of her student's visa, it was necessary that she return to the Dominican Republic, and there reapply for entry into the United States. The parties planned to marry on September 21, 1957, but those plans were not carried out. On September 24, 1957, the defendant returned to the Dominican Republic, after which there was constant mail communication between the two parties. Defendant then applied for a visa to come to the United States, but since she was not yet the wife of an American citizen, she was able to get only a visitor's visa, on the basis of which she returned to this country. The parties were thereafter married on September 20, 1958. Defendant immediately attempted to change her immigration status, but was advised that it would be necessary that she return to the Dominican Republic in compliance with the provisions of a visitor's visa, and then apply for re-entry to the United States as the wife of an American citizen. Defendant made plans to do so, and it was just a few days before her departure from the United States, that she was served with a summons and complaint in this action in which plaintiff demands an annulment on the ground of alleged fraud.
Upon the argument of this motion, the court was not impressed with the merits of plaintiff's cause. Rather did the court feel that defendant would undoubtedly succeed upon the trial. Since it appeared upon the argument that defendant was in need of alimony and counsel fees, the court made the award hereinbefore indicated. $150 of the counsel fees was allowed for the purpose of defending defendant's immigration status in the United States, under the theory that it was necessary that she do so in order to defend this action; that she was in the United States by reason of arrangements made between her and her husband; and that it was necessary that she be here in order to defend the action brought against her. In that respect, the counsel fees awarded for the defense of defendant's immigration status were so awarded either under the theory that they were necessaries for the wife, or that they were counsel fees which were necessary to enable her to remain in the United States so as to interpose her defense in this action.
Although in his papers in opposition to the original motion, plaintiff set forth his alleged inability to make any payments, an affidavit which was submitted to the court, signed by the plaintiff when he sponsored defendant's application for a visitor's visa, was exhibited to the court. This affidavit revealed that at that time plaintiff set forth that he was possessed of adequate means to support the plaintiff and to pay the counsel fees which were awarded.
Following the court's decision, a motion has now been made by the plaintiff for leave to discontinue the action brought by him. Plaintiff now admits frankly in his moving papers that since defendant is to interpose a defense to this action, he, the...
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