Harleysville Preferred Ins. Co. v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 14 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:20CV002 (RCY) |
| Parties | HARLEYSVILLE PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53). The Motion for Summary Judgment has been fully briefed, and the Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before it adequately present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 7(J). For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Harleysville Preferred Insurance Company (“Harleysville” or “Plaintiff”) is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Harleysville, Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1.) Laura Wells (“Defendant Wells” or “Wells”) is an individual who is a Virginia resident. (Id. ¶ 4.) Advanced Systems Solutions (“Advanced” or “Defendant Advanced”) is a Virginia corporation co-owned by Thomas Wells who is Laura Wells' husband. (Id. ¶ 5; Wells' Resp. at 2, ECF No. 57.)[1] Maureen O'Brien (“O'Brien” or “Defendant O'Brien”) is an individual who is a Virginia resident.[2] (Compl. ¶ 6.) Geico General Insurance Corporation (“Geico” or “Defendant Geico”) is an organization with its principal office located in Chevy Chase, Maryland. (Id. ¶ 7.) Geico purportedly provided insurance coverage to Defendant Wells related to the underlying accident. (Id.)
On March 21, 2018, Wells was driving her vehicle, a 2014 Volkswagen Jetta (“Jetta”), when she and O'Brien were involved in a motor vehicle accident. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 14; Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 15, ECF No. 54.) As a result of the accident, Wells filed a personal injury suit against O'Brien and John Doe. Within the personal injury complaint, Wells claimed that she was entitled to coverage under a policy issued to Advanced by Harleysville. (Compl. ¶ 19; Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 5, 22.)
Harleysville issued an insurance policy with Policy Number BA00000042413U to Advanced for policy period January 7, 2018 to January 7, 2019 (“the Policy”). [3] The Policy includes a business auto coverage form, and provisions governing uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage. (Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 1, 7.) The Policy's uninsured motorist endorsement is derived from Commercial Auto Policy Form CA 21 2111 02 (“Commercial UM/UIM Form”), a form required for use in Virginia pursuant to the Virginia State Corporation Commission, Bureau of Insurance, Administrative Order No. 12048.[4] (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) The Commercial UM/UIM Form in the Policy provides the following regarding payment under the Policy:
“We” will pay in accordance with the Virginia Uninsured Motorist Law, all sums the “insured” is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an “uninsured motor vehicle”.
(ECF No. 54-2 at 53.) The Policy defines “Who Is Insured” as:
(ECF No. 54-2 at 53; Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 10.) The Policy defines “You” and “your” as “the person or organization shown as the named insured in ITEM ONE of the declarations.” (ECF No. 54-2 at 52; Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 12.) Advanced Systems Solutions, Inc. is the named insured in ITEM ONE of the Policy's declarations. (ECF No. 54-2 at 20; Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 13.) The Policy goes on to define “family member” as “a person related to ‘you' by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of ‘your' household, including a ward or foster child.” (ECF No. 54-2 at 52; Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 14.)
Wells argues that she is entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the Policy for injuries that she sustained in the March 21, 2018 accident because the language of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement is ambiguous and should be interpreted in favor of coverage to the injured party. (Wells' Resp. at 5.) Harleysville asserts that Wells is not entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the Policy, arguing that she was not an insured under the Policy and was not occupying a covered auto under the Policy at the time of the accident. (Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. ¶ 32.)
Harleysville filed a Complaint on January 2, 2020, (ECF No. 1) for declaratory judgment against Wells, Advanced, O'Brien, and Geico. On April 21, 2021, Harleysville filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a brief in support (ECF Nos. 53, 54). On April 22, 2021, Defendant O'Brien filed a Response (ECF No. 55), stating that she had no facts or legal argument as to whether Harleysville should provide coverage for the injuries associated with the underlying automobile accident. On April 26, 2021, Defendant Advanced filed a Response (ECF No. 56), stating that it does not dispute the statement of undisputed facts set forth by Harleysville in its brief in support and that it takes no position on Harleysville's motion. On May 4, 2021, Defendant Wells filed a Response in Opposition (ECF No. 57). On May 11, 2021, Harleysville filed a Reply (ECF No. 58).
Summary judgement is appropriately granted when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” DiSciullo v. Griggs & Co. Homes, 2015 WL 6393813, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 22, 2015). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there are genuine issues of material fact.” Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). “Summary judgment is particularly well-suited for resolution of insurance coverage disputes because the construction of insurance contracts is a legal question.” Grossberg v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 825 F.Supp.2d 717, 721 (E.D. Va. 2011) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F.Supp. 155, 157 (E.D.Va.1993)).
The Fourth Circuit notes that Virginia has adopted the Eight Corners Rule under which the court may “look primarily at the underlying complaints and the insurance policy to determine if there is a potential for coverage.” CACI Int'l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2009); Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F.Supp.2d 459, 465 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“the ‘eight corners rule' requires review of ‘(1) the policy language to ascertain the terms of the coverage and (2) the underlying complaint to determine whether any claims alleged therein are covered by the policy.'”). Furthermore, “[a] federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.” Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Associated Univs., Inc., No. 3:20-CV-47, 2021 WL 4484556, at *5 (W.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2021) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)). Here, the forum state is Virginia, and “[i]n insurance coverage disputes, the general rule in Virginia is that ‘the law of the place where an insurance contract is written and delivered controls issues as to its coverage.'” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the Policy was formed and issued in Virginia, and the parties do not dispute the application of Virginia law. (Pl.'s Br. Supp. ¶ 6.) As such, the Court shall apply Virginia law.
Harleysville argues that Wells is not entitled to coverage under the Policy because she was not an insured under the Policy and was not occupying a covered auto under the Policy at the time of the accident. (Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. ¶ 32.) Harleysville further argues that courts must construe insurance contracts in accordance with their plain unambiguous terms and in this case, the terms of the Policy clearly define who is an insured for the purpose of UM/UIM coverage. (Id. ¶¶ 33-35.) According to Harleysville, Wells does not fit into any of the “insured” categories. (Id. ¶ 36.) Wells is not Advanced, the named insured, and she is not a family member of Advanced as required for coverage under the Policy because Advanced is a corporation, and corporations cannot have family members. (Id. ¶ 37-40.) Additionally, Wells was driving her own personal vehicle, the Jetta, at the time of the accident, and her Jetta is not a “covered auto” as defined by the Policy. (Id. ¶¶ 41-43.) Finally, Harleysville avers that Wells was never employed by, an agent of, nor engaged in furthering Advance's business activity. (Id. ¶ 44.) As such, Harleysville concludes that “according to the clear and unambiguous, state-mandated, terms of the Policy, ” Wells is not entitled to coverage under the Policy. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.)
Wells argues that she is entitled to coverage under the Policy because the language of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement is ambiguous and should be interpreted in favor of coverage to the injured party. (Wells' Resp. at 5.) Specifically Wells argues that the use of the term “family member” creates ambiguity because of the language defining “Who is Insured.” (Id.) The Policy defines “You” and “your...
To continue reading
Request your trial