Harlow v. Ryland
Decision Date | 06 July 1948 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1707. |
Citation | 78 F. Supp. 488 |
Parties | HARLOW v. RYLAND. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Rowell, Rowell & Dickey and Hendrix Rowell, all of Pine Bluff, Ark., for plaintiff.
Bridges, Bridges, Young & Gregory and Henry W. Gregory, Jr., all of Pine Bluff, Ark., for defendant.
It is stipulated by counsel for the parties, that the plaintiff is the aunt of the defendant, related within the third degree of consanguinity, and while riding in a car owned and operated by him on the highway in Arkansas, she was injured in an accident. She was a non-paying guest and the defendant was not a public carrier.
Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint, basing his motion on the provisions of Section 1304 of Pope's Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas. Plaintiff filed a response to this motion, alleging the act unconstitutional as being in violation of Article II, Sections 8 and 13 of the Constitution of Arkansas, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
After providing, with exceptions not material here, that no guest shall have a cause of action for damages, the statute provides:
"and in no event shall any person related by blood or marriage within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to such owner or operator, or the husband, widow, legal representatives, or heirs of such person, have a cause of action for personal injury, including death resulting therefrom, against such owner or operator while in, entering, or leaving such motor vehicle, provided this act shall not apply to public carriers."
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has never passed upon the validity of this provision of Section 1304 of Pope's Digest. In the case of Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d 961, 963, the court said:
From this it is clear that the statement of the court "it might be that Act No. 179 is unconstitutional," and the reasons assigned therefor, are obiter dicta.
Again in Tilghman v. Rightor, 211 Ark. 229, 199 S.W.2d 943, 945, this same statute was under consideration, but not the particular point at issue here. The court there said:
But the provision of the section under consideration here, not being within the purview of that case, and the court not being required to rule thereon, that holding would not be binding on the court here. Therefore, so far as the Supreme Court of Arkansas is concerned the question is an open one.
It is a well settled principle of law followed by all courts, that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. When such questions are presented courts give them the most careful consideration, and never declare a statute void unless its invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt. Such invalidity must appear beyond a mere possibility, or beyond even a strong probability. If there is a doubt in the mind of the court as to its constitutionality, the statute must be held valid. Kelso v. Bush, Judge, 191 Ark. 1044, 89 S.W.2d 594, Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 27 S.Ct. 419, 51 L.Ed. 696, 10 Ann.Cas. 525; 11 Am.Jur. 718, 719, Secs. 91 and 92, Hines v. Hook, 338 Mo. 114, 89 S.W.2d 52, 11 Am.Jur. 1088, 1089; O'Gorman v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 51 S.Ct. 130, 75 L.Ed. 324, 72 A.L.R. 1163.
In the case of Halter v. Nebraska, supra, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the court, said 205 U.S. 34, 27 S.Ct. 421:
Federal courts are slow to hold the statutes of a state in conflict with the state constitution, where there has been no decision of the court of last resort of that state upon that issue. Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the Supreme Court in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 305, 34 S.Ct. 48, 51, 58 L.Ed. 229, said:
The court then held that in that case the argument against the statute was not of that compelling character, declining to hold the act in conflict with the state constitution.
Plaintiff earnestly contends that this statute is in contravention of Article II, Section 13, of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, wherein that section provides:
"Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs he may receive in his person, property or character * * *."
He assumes that a person has some vested property right in the possibility of an injury at some uncertain future date, and that this Section 1304, takes away from the class of persons named, all remedy for "injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person * * *." But a person has no vested property right, no vested interest in any rule of the common law. The common law is no sacred institution, and stands in no stronger position than any other law. Rights of property created by the common law which have vested cannot be taken away without due process. But the law itself being but a rule of conduct may be changed at the will of the legislature. The only limitation to prevent such a change would be a constitutional limitation. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77; Second Employers' Liability Cases, Mondow v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U.S. 51, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L.R.A.,N.S., 44; Martin v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 203 U.S. 284, 294, 27 S.Ct. 100, 51 L.Ed. 184, 8 Ann.Cas. 87; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406, 31 S.Ct. 59, 54 L.Ed. 1088, 36 L.R.A.,N.S., 220, 21 Ann.Cas. 815; Shea v. Olson, 186 Wash. 700, 59 P.2d 1183, 111 A.L.R. 998. In the case of Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122, 50 S.Ct. 57, 58, 74 L.Ed. 221, 65 A.L.R. 939, the Supreme Court said:
And in 12 Am.Jur. 277, Sec. 580 it is said:
"A right of action for a tort to happen in the future is not property, and may be abrogated by the Legislature." Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581, 583, 74 A.L.R. 1189; Steers v. Kinsey, 68 Ark. 360, 58 S.W. 1050.
The legislature of the State has more than once enacted statutes in derogation of and for the outright repeal of common law rules, and the setting aside of common law rights. In the case of State v. Boney, 1922, 156 Ark. 169, 177, 245 S.W. 315, 317, the Supreme Court, in passing upon the validity of an act of the legislature imposing a tax on dower, discusses the legislative power over the right of dower as follows:
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