Reuben Martin v. Pittsburg Lake Erie Rallroad Company

• Decision Date: 03 December 1906
• Docket Number: No. 66,66
• Citation: 51 L.Ed. 184,27 S.Ct. 100,203 U.S. 284,8 Ann.Cas. 87
• Parties: REUBEN L. MARTIN, Plff. in Err., v. PITTSBURG & LAKE ERIE RALLROAD COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

203 U.S. 284

27 S.Ct. 100

51 L.Ed. 184

REUBEN L. MARTIN, Plff. in Err.,

v PITTSBURG & LAKE ERIE RALLROAD COMPANY.

No. 66.

Argued October 26, 29, 1906.

Decided December 3, 1906.

Reuben L. Martin brought this action to recover compensation for personal injuries. At the time Martin was injured he was on a train of the railroad company, in the employ of the United States as a railway postal clerk on a route extending from Cleveland, Ohio, to Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. The injuries arose from the derailing in Pennsylvania of the train, by the negligence of the crew of a work train, in permitting a switch leading to a side track to be open. Among other defenses the company pleaded a law of Pennsylvania passed April 4, 1868 (P. L. 58), which, it alleged, was applicable, and relieved from responsibility. In reply the plaintiff denied the existence and applicability of the statute, moreover, and defended on the ground that the statute, if existing and applicable, was void, first, because contrary to the power delegated to Congress to establish postoffices and post roads; second, because repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution; and, third, because in conflict with the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th Amendment, and also the clause prohibiting a state from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.

On trial before a jury the court held the statute in question to be applicable and valid, and hence operative to defeat a recovery. A verdict and judgment in favor of the railroad company was severally affirmed by the circuit court and by the supreme court of the state of Ohio.

Messrs. Charles Koonce, Jr., Robert B. Murray, and William S. Anderson for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 285-290 intentionally omitted] Messrs. James P. Wilson and Arrel, Wilson, & Harrington for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 290-291 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

We quote the Pennsylvania statute of April 4, 1868, upon which the case turns:

'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met: It is hereby enacted by the authority of the same that when any person shall sustain personal injury or loss of life while lawfully engaged or employed on or about the roads, works, depots, and premises of a railroad company, or in or about any train or car therein or thereon, of which company such person is not an employee, the right of action and recovery in all such cases against the company shall be such only as would exist if such person were an employee, provided that this section shall not apply to passengers.'

As the application of the statute, if valid, presents no Federal question, we are unconcerned with that matter, although it may be observed in passing that it is conceded in the argument at bar that under the settled construction given to the statute by the supreme court of Pennsylvania the plaintiff, as a railway postal clerk, was not a passenger, and had no greater rights in the event of being injured in the course of his employment than would have had an employee of the railroad company.

Was the application of the statute thus construed to a railway postal clerk of the United States in conflict with the power of Congress to establish postoffices and post roads?

In Price v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 113 U. S. 221, 28 L. ed. 981, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427, this question was in effect foreclosed against the plaintiff in error. That case was brought to this court from a judgment of the supreme court of Pennsylvania (96 Pa. 258), holding that a railway postal clerk was not a passenger within the meaning of the Pennsylvania act, and hence had no right to recover for injuries suffered by him in consequence of the negligence of an employee of the company. The Federal ground there relied upon was substantially the one here asserted; that is, the power of the government of the United States to establish postoffices and post roads, and the effect of the legislation of Congress and the act of the Postmaster General in appointing mail clerks thereunder. After fully considering the subject the case was dismissed because no substantial Federal ground was involved, the court saying (113 U. S. 221, 28 L. ed. 981, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428):

'The person thus to be carried with the mail matter, without extra charge, is no more a passenger because he is in charge of the mail, nor because no other compensation is made for his transportation, than if he had no such charge; nor does the fact that he is in the employment of the United States, and that defendant is bound, by contract with the government, to carry him, affect the question. It would be just the same if the company had contracted with any other person who had charge of freight on the train to carry him without additional compensation. The statutes of the United States which authorize this employment and direct this service do not, therefore, make the person so...