Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1991
• Citation: 815 S.W.2d 519
• Parties: Kimberly Dawn HARMAN and Arthur Daniel Harman, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. MOORE'S QUALITY SNACK FOODS, INC., Defendant/Appellant. 815 S.W.2d 519
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 519

815 S.W.2d 519

Kimberly Dawn HARMAN and Arthur Daniel Harman, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. MOORE'S QUALITY SNACK FOODS, INC., Defendant/Appellant.

815 S.W.2d 519

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Western Section, at

Knoxville.

March 20, 1991.

Application for Permission to Appeal

Denied by Supreme Court

July 29, 1991.

William K. Rogers of Blankenship & Rogers, Kingsport, for plaintiffs/appellees.

Frank Winston and Jack W. Hyder, Jr. of Caldwell, Johnson, Winston & Massengill, Bristol, for defendant/appellant.

TOMLIN, Presiding Judge (Western Section).

Kimberly Dawn Harman and her husband (hereafter "plaintiff" or "plaintiffs" ¹) brought this action in the Chancery Court for Sullivan County against Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc., a Virginia corporation qualified to do business in Tennessee, (hereafter "defendant"). Their complaint alleged that defendant by its unlawful actions had discriminated against plaintiff in violation of the provisions of T.C.A. Sec. 4-21-101, et seq., known as the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"). They further alleged that while she was employed by defendant, plaintiff was continuously sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor. It further stated that the conduct of defendant amounted to outrageous conduct and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The suit was brought pursuant to the Federal Civil Rights Acts as well as the THRA. Plaintiffs sought punitive damages and plaintiff husband sought damages for loss of consortium.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment as to all plaintiffs' claims. Those claims with which we are not concerned on appeal were disposed of by the chancellor's sustaining defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Motion to Dismiss. The principal defense with which this Court is concerned on appeal is the contention of defendant that plaintiffs' remaining claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Act ("TWCA"), codified as T.C.A. Sec. 50-6-108.

The chancellor held that with the passage of the THRA, the exclusive remedy provision of the TWCA was impliedly repealed as to any rights and remedies a party might have under the THRA, and that T.C.A. Sec. 50-6-108 did not bar any claim of plaintiffs under the THRA or any element of damages thereunder. The only issue presented by this appeal is whether or not the chancellor erred in holding that the exclusive remedy provision of TWCA did not bar any claim of plaintiffs under the THRA, or any element of damages claimed under that Act. We hold that the chancellor reached the right result, but for the wrong reason.

Inasmuch as this case comes to us on summary judgment, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Taylor v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 573 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn.App.1978). Plaintiff began working for defendant on or about December 29, 1986. She contends that from that time until shortly before her resignation on or about December 12, 1988, she had been continually subjected to sexual harassment by her supervisor, Jerrell Gilreath, regional sales manager for defendant. Plaintiff contends that Gilreath made repeated sexual innuendos to her; used vulgar and offensive language toward her; propositioned her; repeatedly described his extra-marital sexual conduct with other women; made offensive comments regarding a hysterectomy she was to undergo; and otherwise interfered in her personal and private life.

The complaint alleged that in late August, 1988, plaintiff reported this harassment to Gilreath's immediate supervisor, the zone sales manager, who in turn reported it to his supervisor. The complaint further alleged that the complaints were never acted upon by her superiors, and that the harassment continued, with the most recent occurrence taking place on or about October 14, 1988.

It was further alleged that plaintiff did nothing to incite or encourage the harassment, which was based upon her sex, and affected the terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment, creating an abusive working environment. As noted, it was alleged that defendant took no remedial action after being notified of the harassment.

Plaintiff left defendant's employment in mid-October, 1988 to undergo female surgery. In December, 1988, she resigned because she did not want to return to work under circumstances that would place her in contact with her former supervisor, Gilreath.

Following a hearing on defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Summary Judgment, which was supported by Answers to Interrogatories submitted earlier to plaintiff, the chancellor filed a Memorandum Opinion. He held that the parties' claims of intentional infliction of mental distress, outrageous conduct, common-law assault and personal injury, were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the TWCA. The court further held that plaintiffs were not entitled to proceed under any of the Federal Civil Rights Acts to which they referred in their complaint. No appeal was taken from this ruling.

The chancellor then stated:

Relying on Taff v. Media General Broadcasting Services, Inc., 11 TAM 52-1 (Tenn.App.W.S.1986), the defendant contends the plaintiffs' claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, TCA Sec. 4-21-101 et seq., are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Tennessee Workers Compensation Law, TCA Sec. 50-6-108. The Court, however, believes there is an irreconcilable inconsistency between the holding of Taff and TCA Sec. 50-6-108, and therefore, declines to follow Taff.

In Taff, the Court of Appeals reconciles the Workers Compensation exclusive remedy statute (TCA Sec. 50-6-108) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (TCA Sec. 4-21-101 et seq.) by finding the exclusive remedy statute only bars "personal injury" type damages. The plaintiff contends that this language from Taff is explained by an Opinion of the Attorney General (88-12) rendered January 12, 1988, in which the Attorney General opines that damages for "humiliation and embarrassment, costs and attorney's fees" and "other forms of mental anguish" are not excluded. This Court respectfully disagrees with the Court of Appeals, Western Section, and the Attorney General. First, humiliation, embarrassment and other forms of mental anguish have traditionally been included in damages for personal injury, and thus, under the Taff decision, only attorney fees would remain as damages for a plaintiff. Second, and more important[ly], TCA Sec. 50-6-108 provides in part, "... shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee...." Thus, the exclusive remedy statute does not speak as to damages but as to "rights and remedies ", or in other words, causes of action. Thus, this Court finds TCA Sec. 50-6-108, (Workers Compensation exclusive remedy statute), either completely bars an employee's rights under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, or it bars none.

When passed in 1978, the Tennessee Legislature set forth the purpose and intent of the Tennessee Human Rights Act in TCA Sec. 4-21-101. It would defeat the intent and purpose of the Act to apply the Taff decision reasoning. For instance, one of the major remedies of the act under TCA Sec. 4-21-306, is "back-pay" for the employee. Under the Taff decision, this would be limited to two-thirds of back pay under the Workers Compensation law. Therefore, this Court finds that by passage of the Tennessee Human Rights Act in 1978, the Tennessee Legislature impliedly repealed TCA Sec. 50-6-108 as to any rights and remedies under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, TCA Sec. 4-21-101 et seq.

It is the resulting decision of the Court that TCA Sec. 50-6-108 does not bar any claim of the plaintiffs under the Tennessee Human Rights Act or any element of damages thereunder. To this extent the Motion of the defendant will be denied.

This Court is of the opinion that the chancellor was in error in his "all or none" ruling, and more specifically, in holding that the THRA implicitly repealed T.C.A. Sec. 50-6-108 as to any rights and remedies under the THRA, at the same time drawing the resulting conclusion that T.C.A. Sec. 50-6-108 does not bar any claim of plaintiffs under the THRA or any element of damages thereunder. In considering Taff and the subsequent case of Gifford v. Premier Mfg. Corp., an unreported opinion of this Court filed August 1, 1989 in which we adopted the holding of Taff, we must do so in light of recent decisions and statutory enactment.

First, we must review the "actual damages" question as presented by the provisions of T.C.A. Sec. 4-21-311, which provide in substance that any person deemed to have a claim under the provisions of this chapter has the right to file a civil action in chancery court to enjoin further violations "and to recover the actual damages sustained by him or her." In Taff we concluded that "actual damages" were synonymous with "compensatory damages." In a subsequent opinion styled Belcher v. Sears, Roebuck And Co., 686 F.Supp. 671 (M.D.Tenn.1988), following an analysis of the various Federal Civil Rights Acts and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, that Court concluded that the term "actual damages" in the THRA did not include compensatory damages for injuries, including emotional injuries such as serious embarrassment and humiliation.

The General Assembly of this state, by an amendment to T.C.A. Sec. 4-21-311, effective May 25, 1989, essentially abrogated the rationale of the Belcher court by adding the following language to that Section: "In addition to the remedies set forth in this Section, all remedies described in Sec. 4-21-306 shall be available in any such lawsuit." This statute, being remedial in nature, thus would be applicable to the case at bar. The distinction set forth in Belcher was thus rendered moot.

In addition, our opinion in Taff merits further examination in the light of recent case law development in other jurisdictions. This examination not only strengthens but...