Harmon v. D.C. & G. R. Co

• Decision Date: 03 April 1888
• Citation: 28 S.C. 401,5 S.E. 835
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Harmon v. Columbia & G. R. Co.

5 S.E. 835

(28 S.C. 401)

Harmon

v.Columbia & G. R. Co.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 3, 1888.

Railroad Companies—Liabilities—Lease to Another Company.

A railroad corporation is not relieved from the obligations imposed by its charter by a lease of its road to another company.¹

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Richland county.

Action for damages on ground of negligence, by Frederick Harmon against the Columbia & Greenville Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

Wallace J. Canefield, for appellant. J. C. Haskell, for respondent.

McIver, J. This was an action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for the alleged killing of certain of his cattle by the negligence of the defendant company in running its trains. There was some testimony, of a very indefinite character, tending to show that the defendant company had leased its road to the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company, which latter company was operating the road at the time of the alleged killing of the plaintiff's cattle. The circuit judge granted a motion for nonsuit, upon the ground that after the lease of the road the defendant could not be held liable; and from this judgment of nonsuit the plaintiff appeals upon the several grounds set out in the record, which need not be repeated here, as the sole question for us to determine is whether the defendant is relieved from liability by its voluntary lease of its road to another company. While the testimony as to the fact of the lease is not very full or clear, yet the counsel for appellant has very properly waived any objection on that ground, for the purpose of presenting squarely the legal question involved. It is not to be denied that there is some conflict of authority in the different states as to this question; but we think that the weight of authority, as well as of reason, is in favor of the view contended for by the appellant. When a railroad company accepts a charter, it assumes the performance of all the duties to the public which are imposed upon it by the charter or the general laws of the state, and it cannot be permitted to escape from the obligations thus imposed upon it by transferring its chartered rights and privileges either to an individual or to another corporation. A corporation must of necessity always act through individuals; and whether such individuals are called its officers or agents, or its lessees, cannot affect the question of its liability to perform the obligations which it has incurred in consideration of the grant of its chartered rights and privileges. It cannot be permitted to enjoy the benefits conferred by its char-ter without incurring the responsibilities incident thereto. As was said in one of the cases, if it were otherwise, a railroad company, by leasing its road to irresponsible persons, might enjoy all the benefits conferred by its charter, and practically leave the public generally, as well as individuals, without any of the protection which the obligations imposed upon the company by its charter, as well as the general law of the state, were designed to afford. Ac-cordingly, we find it laid down by Mr. Justice Davis in the case of Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 450, as "the accepted doctrine in this country that a railroad corporation cannot escape the performance of any duty or obligation imposed by its charter, or the general laws of the state, by a voluntary surrender of its road into the hands of lessees." This doctrine was recognized and affirmed by this court in Bank v. Railway Co. 25 S. C. 222, although the court in that case, not because any doubt was entertained as to the soundness of the doctrine just laid down, did state, merely as an additional reason for the conclusion there reached, that the contract there was made with the lessor and not with the lessee. The cases cited by the counsel for appellant in his argument here show that the courts of many of our sister states have adopted the same view.

The circuit judge seems to rest his conclusion upon the ground that inasmuch as, under the charter of the defendant company, it has power to lease its road, it follows necessarily that when the road is leased the company is released from all its obligations to the public and to individuals, and these obligations then rest solely upon the lessee. We cannot accept this view. It rests upon the idea that inasmuch as the defendant company incurs these obligations in exchange, as it were, for the chartered rights and privileges conferred by the legislature, when such rights and privileges are transferred to another by the consent of the legislature; the corresponding obligations are likewise transferred to such other person or corporation. This, at first view, seems plausible, and is the view adopted in some...