Harmon v State, 98-1354

• Decision Date: 06 January 2000
• Docket Number: 98-1354
• Citation: 8 S.W.3d 472
• Parties: Trent HARMON v. STATE of Arkansas CR 98-1354 ___ S.W.3d ___ Opinion delivered
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Trent HARMON v STATE of Arkansas

CR 98-1354 ___ S.W.3d ___

Opinion delivered January 6, 2000

Supreme Court of Arkansas

1. Evidence -- sufficiency of -- test for determining. -- The test for determining sufficient proof is whether there is substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the verdict; on appeal, the supreme court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and sustains the conviction if there is any substantial evidence to support it.

2. Evidence -- substantial evidence -- determination of. -- Evidence is substantial if it is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture; in determining whether there is substantial evidence, the appellate court considers only that evidence tending to support the verdict; the court does not weigh the evidence presented at trial as that is a matter for the factfinder; where the trial is before the bench, the trial judge sits as factfinder.

3. Witnesses -- credibility -- supreme court bound by factfinder's determination. -- The supreme court does not attempt to weigh the evidence or to assess the credibility of witnesses; that function lies within the province of the trier of fact; the supreme court is bound by the factfinder's determination on the credibility of witnesses.

4. Witnesses -- testimony -- trier of fact free to believe all or part of. --The trier of fact is free to believe all or part of a witness's testimony.

5. Witnesses -- inconsistent testimony -- proof not rendered insufficient by. -- Inconsistent testimony does not render proof insufficient as a matter of law; one eyewitness's testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

6. Evidence -- identification -- substantial evidence linking appellant to crime existed. -- The accuracy of eyewitness identifications and any alleged weaknesses were matters of credibility for the trial court to resolve; where appellant presented the supreme court with no valid reason to disregard the trial judge's assessment of the witnesses's credibility, the court held that substantial evidence linking appellant to the crime existed.

7. Criminal law -- serious physical injury -- issue for factfinder. --Whether a victim has sustained a serious physical injury, as defined at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(19) (Repl. 1997), is an issue for the jury or the trial judge sitting as factfinder; likewise, the question whether injuries constitute a temporary or protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member or organ is for the factfinder to decide.

8. Criminal law -- serious physical injury -- substantial evidence supported finding of. -- Where the victim's testimony about the injuries he sustained during a beating was corroborated by his doctor's testimony as well as a photograph of his face after the beating, the supreme court could not say that the factfinder could not reasonably infer from this evidence that the victim had sustained a serious physical injury as a result of the beating, and particularly that he suffered a protracted impairment of the function of bodily organs or members; the supreme court therefore concluded that substantial evidence existed to support the finding of serious physical injury.

9. Criminal law -- intent -- presumption regarding. -- Because of the obvious difficulty in ascertaining the actor's intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.

10. Criminal law -- intent -- factfinder may draw upon common knowledge to infer. -- The factfinder may draw upon common knowledge and experience to infer the defendant's intent from the circumstances.

11. Criminal law -- intent -- evidence supported trial court's conclusion that appellant acted with purpose of causing serious physical injury. -- The trial court's conclusion that appellant acted with the purpose of causing serious physical injury was supported by one witness's testimony that appellant approached the victim's head as a field-goal kicker approaches a football and by another witness's testimony that appellant was the last to leave the scene, doing so only after delivering several more kicks at the victim's head; repeated blows to the head by kicking or "stomping" when a person is down exhibit purposeful action to inflict serious physical injury, whether it be risk of death or protracted disfigurement or impairment.

12. Criminal law -- first-degree battery -- mental state evidenced by. -- There was substantial evidence to support a finding that appellant acted "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life," pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201(3); the plain meaning of the statutory phrase "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life" [Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201(3) (Repl. 1997)] demonstrates that the circumstances must by necessity be dire and formidable in terms of affecting human life; first-degree battery involves actions that create at least some risk of death, which, therefore, evidence a mental state on the part of the accused to engage in some life-threatening activity against the victim.

13. Criminal law -- intent -- evidence supported conclusion that appellant engaged in life-threatening conduct against victim. -- Where the evidence showed that appellant, along with five or six other assailants, kicked the victim in the face and head multiple times while the victim was on the ground, it supported the conclusion that appellant engaged in life-threatening conduct against the victim.

14. Criminal law -- intent -- substantial evidence of appellant's purposeful action. -- The supreme court concluded that there was substantial evidence from which the trial judge, sitting as factfinder, could have reasonably determined that appellant acted with the purpose to cause serious physical injury to the victim under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

15. Evidence -- competent-evidence presumption -- how overcome. -- There is a presumption that a trial judge will consider only competent evidence, and this presumption is overcome only when there is an indication that the trial judge gave some consideration to inadmissible evidence.

16. Evidence -- competent-evidence presumption -- appellant failed to overcome. -- Where there was no indication from the record that the trial was truncated or shortened in any fashion or that the trial judge considered any evidence other than what was presented to him during appellant's trial, and where appellant did not point to any specific evidence considered by the trial judge that prejudiced him, appellant failed to overcome the presumption that a trial judge will consider only competent evidence; moreover, the trial judge appeared to acknowledge that he could not consider the testimony he had heard at the previous trial.

17. Evidence -- appellant opened door to alleged hearsay testimony -- trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting. -- Regarding appellant's confrontation argument, the supreme court noted that appellant failed to show that he was prejudiced by alleged hearsay evidence because he had opened the door to such testimony in the first place; furthermore, the challenged evidence was admissible for the same reason that the trial court allowed similar evidence during defense counsel's questioning of a police officer; it was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show other information the officer relied on in preparing the affidavit; matters pertaining to the admissibility of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court; the supreme court will not reverse such a ruling absent an abuse of that discretion; nor will the court reverse absent a showing of prejudice, as prejudice is not presumed; accordingly, the supreme court could not say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.

18. Statutes -- challenge to constitutionality -- appellant failed to demonstrate prejudicial impact. -- Before a person can challenge the constitutionality of a statute, he or she must demonstrate that the challenged statute had a prejudicial impact upon him; because appellant failed to demonstrate that the act in question had a prejudicial impact on him, the supreme court did not reach the merits of his constitutional challenge.

19. Appeal & error -- cumulative error -- objections to individual errors must be shown. -- For a cumulative-error argument to be upheld on appeal, the appellant must show that there were objections to the alleged errors individually and that a cumulative-error objection was made to the trial court and a ruling obtained; having considered the remaining assertions of error, the supreme court concluded that no reversible error occurred in appellant's trial; the supreme court does not recognize the doctrine of cumulative error where there is no error to accumulate.

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; John B. Plegge, Judge; affirmed.

Bowden & Kendel, by: David O. Bowden; William H. Craig; andDavid R. Cannon, for appellant.

Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: Michael C. Angel, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.

Appellant Trent Harmon, Jr., appeals the judgment of the Pulaski County Circuit Court convicting him of battery in the first degree and sentencing him to ten years' imprisonment. This case was certified to us from the Arkansas Court of Appeals because it presents issues involving constitutional interpretation. Our jurisdiction is thus pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(1) and (b)(3). Mr. Harmon raises five points for reversal. We find no error and affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

For his first point for reversal, Mr. Harmon argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of battery in the first degree. Particularly, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate (1) tha...