Harmon v. Washburn
| Decision Date | 04 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 24551.,24551. |
| Citation | 751 N.W.2d 297,2008 SD 42 |
| Parties | Edith G. HARMON and Joseph Harmon, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Anita M. WASHBURN, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
[¶ 1.] Edith G. Harmon (Edith) and Joseph Harmon (Joseph) (collectively Harmons) brought a negligence action for personal injuries against Anita M. Washburn (Washburn). The trial court denied Harmons' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Washburn's negligence and on the issue of Edith's contributory negligence. The jury returned a general verdict denying Harmons' claim.1 The trial court then denied Harmons' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, for a new trial. Harmons appeal the denial of their motions. We reverse and remand.
[¶ 2.] On December 23, 2001, Washburn was driving the lead vehicle in a caravan of approximately ten vehicles. The caravan traveled south on Highway 34 at approximately ten miles per hour, as it approached a bridge over the Cheyenne River. A line of horseback riders was off to the left of the highway, traveling south, and parallel to the highway. The caravan was traveling in support of the horseback riders. The vehicles in the caravan were separated from each other by a distance of approximately one vehicle length.
[¶ 3.] Edith and her husband, Joseph, were driving separate vehicles south on Highway 34. Joseph was following Edith. Edith saw the caravan from a distance and slowed as she approached it. She noticed the horseback riders to the left of the highway. Edith followed the caravan for a time, then started to pass just before coming to the bridge. Prior to passing, Edith checked for oncoming traffic, checked her mirrors, and used her turn signal to signal her pass. Edith's vehicle was equipped with daytime running lights. The evidence is disputed as to whether or not the drivers in the caravan had activated their emergency flashers. Edith drove thirty to thirty-five miles per hour as she passed the caravan. She was about to overtake the Washburn vehicle as it was nearing the south end of the bridge.
[¶ 4.] As she neared the south end of the bridge, Washburn wanted to turn off the highway to wait for and meet the horseback riders. Washburn considered turning right off the highway, but decided to turn left onto an approach. The approach was lower than the level of the highway and was not visible from a distance. The vehicles driven by Washburn and Edith collided as Washburn was making the left turn. The evidence is disputed as to whether or not Washburn signaled her left turn. The entire incident took place in a legal passing zone with a sixty-five mile per hour speed limit. Visibility was good and there was no oncoming traffic.
[¶ 5.] After the accident, Joseph transported Edith to an emergency room at a Pierre hospital, where she was examined and had glass removed from an abrasion on her arm. Thereafter, Edith was treated for other alleged injuries.
[¶ 6.] Harmons filed a negligence action for personal injuries against Washburn. The action was tried to a jury over two days. Washburn denied her negligence, asserted Edith's contributory negligence, and contested the nature and extent of Harmons' injuries. After all the evidence had been presented, Harmons moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Washburn's negligence and on the issue of Edith's contributory negligence. The trial court denied the motion. The jury returned a general verdict for Washburn. Harmons then renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, for a new trial. The trial court also denied this motion. Harmons appeal.
[¶ 7.] Harmons raise the following issues on appeal:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Harmons' motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Harmons' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, for a new trial.
[¶ 8.] A trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Christenson v. Bergeson, 2004 SD 113, ¶ 10, 688 N.W.2d 421, 425 (). "An abuse of discretion occurs when `no judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Bridge v. Karl's Inc., 538 N.W.2d 521, 523 (S.D.1995) (citations omitted)). This Court's task on appeal, "is to review the record and ascertain whether there is any substantial evidence to allow reasonable minds to differ." Id. ¶ 11 (citations omitted). "If sufficient evidence exists so that reasonable minds could differ, a directed verdict is not appropriate." Id. ¶ 22 (citation omitted).
[¶ 9.] Likewise, the trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Welch v. Haase, 2003 SD 141, ¶ 19, 672 N.W.2d 689, 696 (citation omitted)). The testimony and evidence are reviewed "in a light most favorable to the verdict or to the nonmoving party." Id. (quoting Sabag v. Continental South Dakota, 374 N.W.2d 349, 355 (S.D.1985) (citing Ziebarth v. Schnieders, 342 N.W.2d 234, 236 (S.D. 1984))). "[W]ithout weighing the evidence [this Court] must decide if there is evidence which would have supported or did support a verdict." Id. (quoting Sabag, 374 N.W.2d at 355 (citing Corey v. Kocer, 86 S.D. 221, 226-27, 193 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1972))).
[¶ 10.] In 2006 SDCL 15-6-50(a) and (b) were amended. The substantial changes made by this amendment include referring to a motion for directed verdict as a motion for judgment as a matter of law and denominating a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. These amendments, however, do not change our standard of review — which remains abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion standard is also utilized "when reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial." Christenson, 2004 SD 113, ¶ 13, 688 N.W.2d at 426 (citing Olson v. Judd, 534 N.W.2d 850, 852 (S.D.1995) (citing Treib v. Kern, 513 N.W.2d 908, 911 (S.D.1994))).
[¶ 11.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Harmons' motion for judgment as a matter of law.
[¶ 12.] At the close of the evidence Harmons moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Washburn's negligence and on the issue of Edith's contributory negligence. SDCL 15-6-50(a)(1) provides:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
"Only in exceptional cases may the verdict be directed in favor of the party having the burden of proof." Christenson, 2004 SD 113, ¶ 24, 688 N.W.2d at 428.
"[W]hen the evidence on behalf of the moving party is clear and full, credible and not contradicted, and is so plain and complete that reasonable minds could come to no other conclusion[,]" a motion for directed verdict may be granted. Id. (quoting Langdon v. Reuppel, 81 S.D. 289, 291, 134 N.W.2d 293, 294 (1965)). But if, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is any substantial evidence to sustain the cause of action or defense, it must be submitted to the finder of fact. SDCL 15-6-50(a). Denke v. Mamola, 437 N.W.2d 205, 207 (S.D.1989).
[¶ 13.] Harmons argue that Washburn's driving that day violated at least five different South Dakota statutes and that each such violation "constitutes negligence per se." Alley v. Siepman, 87 S.D. 670, 214 N.W.2d 7, 9 (S.D.1974). Concerning the first alleged violation, SDCL 32-26-18.1 provides in pertinent part:
No person may turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required by §§ 32-26-17 and 32-26-18. A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. ...
The evidence on this point consisted of the testimony of Harmons, Washburn, and Washburn's daughter, Amanda Washburn. Both Harmons testified that Washburn did not use her turn signal. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Washburn, Washburn's daughter testified that her mother signaled the left turn fifteen feet before turning; Washburn testified, in effect, that she signaled the turn at most forty-four feet prior to the turn.2
[¶ 14.] Based on the testimony it is undisputed that Washburn violated the statute and was negligent per se. Therefore, we do not address Harmons' argument regarding the other five statutes violated. It was error for the trial court not to grant a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Washburn's negligence.
[¶ 15.] Harmons also sought a judgment as a matter of law that Edith was not contributorily negligent.
Contributory negligence is a `breach of duty which the law imposes upon persons to protect themselves from injury, and which, concurring and cooperating with actionable negligence for which defendant is responsible, contributes to the injury complained of as a proximate cause.' (quoting ...
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