Harnage v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 19 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 34291.,34291.
• Citation: 60 A.3d 308,141 Conn.App. 9
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: James A. HARNAGE et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION et al.

141 Conn.App. 9

60 A.3d 308

James A. HARNAGE et al.

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION et al.

No. 34291.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 7, 2012.

Decided Feb. 19, 2013.

James A. Harnage, pro se, the appellant (named plaintiff).

Madeline A. Melchionne, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Terrence M. O'Neil, assistant attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BEAR and ESPINOSA, Js.

PER CURIAM.

The self-represented plaintiff James A. Harnage ¹ appeals from the decision of the trial court denying his motion for partial summary judgment and granting, in part, the defendants' ² cross motion for partial summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff raised several claims. ³ We do not reach the merits of any of these claims because the decision from which the plaintiff appeals was not a final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The following brief procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On March 9, 2010, the plaintiff filed a seven count complaint against the defendants seeking monetary and injunctive relief. In count one, the plaintiff alleged that, in June, 2008, while housed as an inmate at Corrigan–Radgowski Correctional Center, he was subject to “an unreasonable policy of [correctional officers] performing blanket strip body cavity searches ... despite any consideration for [his] charges and absent any suspicion that [he was] carrying contraband” and without any effort to conduct the searches in a private setting. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In count two, the plaintiff alleged that the blanket policy of performing strip body cavity searches was unconstitutional, went beyond admissions processing procedures and was conducted in a location and manner that allowed other inmates and correctional officers to view them.

In count three, the plaintiff alleged that he improperly was forced to eat all of his meals in his cell. In count four, the plaintiff alleged that he was not given enough time to eat his meals in contradiction of the department of correction's administrative directives that set forth the minimum time that inmates must be given to eat their meals. In count five, the plaintiff made allegations against the former claims commissioner, James R. Smith, which have since been dismissed from this action. In count six, the plaintiff alleged that Officer Wales retaliated against him for filing the present action by issuing a disciplinary report for the plaintiff's possession of a “stinger.” ⁴ In count seven, the plaintiff alleged that the strip search conducted after the officers found the “stinger” was unlawful.

On May 6, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment claiming that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the alleged unconstitutional strip searches conducted by the defendants as described in counts one and two of the complaint. On October 3, 2011, the defendants filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion and filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment.

In a January 23, 2012 memorandum of decision, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety, finding there to be genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's claims. In the same memorandum, the court granted, in part, the defendants' cross motion, on the ground of sovereign immunity, as it related to the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages. The court denied the remaining portion of the defendants' cross motion that related to the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief. Because the parties did not brief the issues raised in counts three through seven of the plaintiff's complaint, the court declined to address their merits in its decision. The present appeal followed.

As noted previously, we do not reach the merits of the plaintiff's claims because, as the defendants correctly argue, the decision from which the plaintiff appeals was not a final judgment. “The lack of [a] final judgment ... implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of this court.... If there is no final judgment, we cannot reach the merits of the appeal.... Under Connecticut law, [t]he denial of a motion for summary judgment ordinarily is an interlocutory ruling and, accordingly, not a final judgment for purposes of appeal.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Singhaviroj v. Board of Education, 124 Conn.App. 228, 231–32, 4 A.3d 851 (2010). “An otherwise interlocutory order is appealable in two circumstances: (1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). “A judgment that disposes of only a part of a complaint is not a final judgment”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Psaki v. Karlton, 97 Conn.App. 64, 69, 903 A.2d 224 (2006); unless “the partial judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties; see Practice Book § 61–3; or if the trial court makes a written determination regarding the significance of the issues resolved by the judgment and the chief justice or chief judge of the court...