Tyler v. Tyler

• Decision Date: 17 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 36164.,36164.
• Citation: 151 Conn.App. 98,93 A.3d 1179
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Jay M. TYLER v. Thomas J. TYLER, et al.

151 Conn.App. 98

93 A.3d 1179

Jay M. TYLER

v.Thomas J. TYLER, et al.

No. 36164.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 5, 2014.

Decided June 17, 2014.

Jay M. Tyler, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Bruce D. Tyler, self-represented, the appellant (defendant and cross complaint plaintiff).

Kathleen Eldergill, with whom, on the brief, was Bruce S. Beck, Manchester, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The self-represented plaintiff, Jay Tyler, and cross claim plaintiff, Bruce Tyler, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting in part the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants Thomas Tyler, Russell Tyler, John Tyler, and Richard Tatoian.¹ There are two claims on appeal. First, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment on several counts asserted against Tatoian. Second, Jay Tyler claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment on his counts seeking to modify the trust on the ground of undue influence. As to the first claim, the decision on the counts relating to Tatoian was not a final judgment, and we therefore dismiss that portion of the appeal. As to the second claim, we agree with Jay Tyler and reverse the judgment of the court.

This appeal pertains to an irrevocable trust executed by Ruth Tyler on October 8, 2004, for the benefit of her sons, John Tyler, Bruce Tyler, Thomas Tyler, Russell Tyler and Jay Tyler. The trust named Tatoian as trustee and provided for the termination of the trust upon Ruth Tyler's death, with the assets of the trust remaining after payment of various expenses to be distributed to her five sons in substantially equal shares. The trust specified, by reference to Ruth Tyler's will, that the shares allotted to the plaintiffs be reduced in accordance with the debt owed by each to Ruth Tyler. On April 1, 2010, Ruth Tyler died. Due to the value of the trust's assets and the amount of debt owed, Jay Tyler was not entitled to receive any money from the trust.²

The lengthy and convoluted procedural history of this appeal began on January 28, 2011, when Jay Tyler commenced an action contesting the trust and alleging, among other things, that Thomas Tyler had exerted undue influence over their mother.³ Bruce Tyler, ostensibly a defendant in Jay Tyler's action, responded by admitting the allegations of undue influence and filing a cross complaint. The defendants denied Jay Tyler's allegations and pleaded several special defenses. After numerous motions, interlocutory rulings, and amendments to the pleadings, the action ultimately consisted of (1) two counts asserted by Jay Tyler seeking to modify the trust on the grounds of undue influence, conspiracy, and what the court characterized as “tortious interference with the expectancy of inheritance,” and (2) several counts asserted by both Jay Tyler and Bruce Tyler against Tatoian for negligence and breach of various duties.

On April 15, 2013, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a joint objection. Both sides submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of their positions. The defendants also moved to strike certain portions of the plaintiffs' affidavits and documentary evidence. In a memorandum of decision dated August 22, 2013, the court granted the defendants' motion to strike some of the evidence.

On the basis of the remaining evidence and memoranda, the court rendered summary judgment on those counts asserted by Jay Tyler seeking to modify the trust, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the claim of undue influence and that the claims of conspiracy and tortious interference necessarily failed without a predicate finding of undue influence. The court also rendered summary judgment on all but one of the counts asserted by the plaintiffs against Tatoian, concluding that General Statutes § 45a–204 and the terms of the trust barred the claims based on Tatoian's failure to provide accountings and his alleged mismanagement of the trust.⁴ The plaintiffs have appealed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

As a threshold matter, we consider whether the ruling from which the plaintiffs appeal constitutes a final judgment for the purposes of determining the subject matter jurisdiction of this court.⁵ After oral argument, we invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing on this issue.⁶ We conclude that the ruling constitutes a final judgment with respect to Thomas Tyler, John Tyler, and Russell Tyler, but not with respect to Tatoian.

“The jurisdiction of the appellate courts is restricted to appeals from judgments that are final. General Statutes §§ 51–197a and 52–263; Practice Book § [61–1].... The policy concerns underlying the final judgment rule are to discourage piecemeal appeals and to facilitate the speedy and orderly disposition of cases at the trial court level.... The appellate courts have a duty to dismiss, even on [their] own initiative, any appeal that [they lack] jurisdiction to hear.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 793–94, 967 A.2d 1 (2009).

“A judgment that disposes of only a part of a complaint is not a final judgment ... unless the partial judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties; see Practice Book § 61–3; or if the trial court makes a written determination regarding the significance of the issues resolved by the judgment and the chief justice or chief judge of the court having appellate jurisdiction concurs. See Practice Book § 61–4(a).” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Harnage v. Commissioner of Correction, 141 Conn.App. 9, 13–14, 60 A.3d 308 (2013).

Here, the ruling from which the plaintiffs appeal was a partial judgment, as it did not dispose of the entire complaint or cross complaint. Nevertheless, the ruling constitutes a final judgment with respect to Thomas Tyler, John Tyler and Russell Tyler, as it disposed of all the counts asserted against them. See Practice Book § 61–3. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Jay Tyler's claim on appeal relating to those defendants.

On the other hand, the court's ruling disposed of only a portion of the plaintiffs' counts asserted against Tatoian.⁷ As the trial court did not make a written determination regarding the significance of the issues resolved by the judgment, neither of our rules of practice conferring final judgment status on a partial judgment applies with respect to Tatoian. Practice Book § 61–4. Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that the court's ruling is an appealable interlocutory order under State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). Accordingly, we dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal with respect to Tatoian for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II

We now consider the merits of Jay Tyler's claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment on his counts seeking to have the trust modified. Jay Tyler argues that the court incorrectly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Thomas Tyler exerted undue influence over Ruth Tyler. We agree.

We begin by setting forth the well established standard of review. “Pursuant to Practice Book § 17–49, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Such questions of law are subject to plenary appellate review.... In deciding whether the trial court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party....

“Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court.... It is frequently stated in Connecticut's case law that, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 17–45 and 17–46, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.... [T]ypically [d]emonstrating a genuine issue requires a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidence outside the pleadings from which material facts alleged in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred.... A material fact is one that will make a difference in the result of the case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marut v. IndyMac Bank, FSB, 132 Conn.App. 763, 767–68, 34 A.3d 439 (2012). Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with respect to any one element that the plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail at trial. See Sherman v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 79 Conn.App. 78, 90–91, 828 A.2d 1260 (2003) (summary judgment appropriate in medical malpractice action where no genuine issue of material fact existed as to essential element of causation); see also Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Machado, 83 Conn.App. 183, 189–90, 850 A.2d 260 (2004) (summary judgment appropriatein fraud action where no genuine issue of material fact existed as to third essential element).

Guiding our analysis is the relevant law of undue influence. “Undue influence is the exercise of sufficient control over a person, whose acts are brought into question, in an attempt to destroy his [or her] free agency and constrain him [or her] to do something other than he [or she]...