Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Center

• Decision Date: 22 January 1990
• Citation: 784 S.W.2d 921,118 Lab.Cas.P 56
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Parties: Geraldine HARNEY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. MEADOWBROOK NURSING CENTER and Ayers & Associates, Defendants/Appellants. 784 S.W.2d 921, 118 Lab.Cas. P 56,558, 5 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 290

Page 921

784 S.W.2d 921

Geraldine HARNEY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. MEADOWBROOK NURSING CENTER and Ayers & Associates,

Defendants/Appellants.

784 S.W.2d 921, 118 Lab.Cas. P 56,558,

5 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 290

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Nashville.

Jan. 22, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1990.

Shearon S. Weems, Legal Services of South Cent. Tennessee, Inc., Columbia, for plaintiff/appellee.

Charles Hampton White, Cornelius & Collins, Nashville, for defendants/appellants.

OPINION

O'BRIEN, Justice.

This is retaliatory discharge action in which the plaintiff/employee alleges she was discharged from her position as a nurse's aid at the defendants' nursing home as a result of her unfavorable testimony in an administrative hearing regarding an unemployment compensation claim filed by a former co-worker. The complaint charged that the termination of employment violated the public policy of the State of Tennessee as set forth in T.C.A. Sec. 50-7-703 and T.C.A. Title 50, Chapter 5. ¹

Defendants answered that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; affirmatively stated that plaintiff was an at-will employee; that T.C.A. Sec. 50-7-703 affords no protection to a witness for testifying and did not shield plaintiff from disciplinary action based upon perjured testimony in an unemployment compensation proceeding. The answer denied that plaintiff's testimony at the hearing was truthful and averred she had admitted her testimony was false.

Subsequently defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting there was no genuine issue of material fact and they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Two judges participated in this matter in the trial court. The first heard the motion for summary judgment upon depositions in support of the motion, oral arguments and written briefs of counsel. The court concluded that the appellate courts of this State had recognized causes of action for retaliatory discharge from employment at-will under facts similar to those alleged by the plaintiff and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether or not the plaintiff testified truthfully, innocently testified falsely, or intentionally testified falsely. He held that while summary judgment would be appropriate if the facts were undisputed about an intentional misrepresentation of fact by the plaintiff as a witness in an employment compensation case, and possibly even for negligent misrepresentation, it was possible that a cause of action existed for wrongful or retaliatory discharge if plaintiff's testimony in the unemployment compensation hearing was truthful. Since this fact was in dispute the court overruled the motion for summary judgment.

The case came on to be heard approximately a year later, before another judge, on the pleadings, the testimony of witnesses, the exhibits, the argument of counsel and the record in the cause. Upon consideration of the foregoing the Court found that the plaintiff was an employee-at-will and, under existing State law, had no cause of action against the defendant for her dismissal as an employee. The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The intermediate appellate court found that there were sharply disputed issues of fact and the credibility of the witnesses was first to be determined by the trial court. They found the issues to be that although plaintiff was an employee-at-will her insistence was she was wrongfully discharged and her discharge, under the rationale of Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.1984) was actionable. They found her contention to be that she was fired because she gave testimony under subpoena which was allegedly unfavorable to the defendant at an employment compensation hearing. On the other hand, the defense was that she was discharged because she lied under oath and that no cause of action existed to challenge plaintiff's termination as an at-will employee, whatever the reason might be.

The court cited Clanton, supra, for the statement that "an employee is entitled to exercise his rights under the Workers' Compensation Law 'in an unfettered fashion without being subject to reprisal.' " They ruled that this rationale extends to plaintiff's circumstance. Actually, the foregoing statement in Clanton is a citation from the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) which this Court noted as the leading case recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, specifically as it applies under the Workers' Compensation Laws. This Court ruled in Clanton that, "[A] cause of action for retaliatory discharge, although not explicitly created by the statute, [T.C.A. Sec. 50-6-114], is necessary to enforce the duty of the employer, to secure the rights of the employee and to carry out the intention of the legislature. A statute need not expressly state what is necessarily implied in order to render it effectual." (Citations omitted).

The long standing rule in this State is that an employee-at-will may be discharged without breach of contract for good cause, bad cause or no cause at all, without being thereby guilty...