Harold D. Southards v. Dir. Of Revenue

• Decision Date: 26 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. SD 30258.,SD 30258.
• Citation: 321 S.W.3d 458
• Parties: Harold D. SOUTHARDS, Petitioner-Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

321 S.W.3d 458

Harold D. SOUTHARDS, Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Respondent-Appellant.

No. SD 30258.

Missouri Court of Appeals,Southern District,Division One.

Aug. 26, 2010.

321 S.W.3d 459

Chris Koster, Attorney General, and Jonathan H. Hale, Special Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Appellant.

No appearance by Respondent.

GARY W. LYNCH, Judge.

Director of Revenue (“Director”) revoked the driving privileges of Harold

321 S.W.3d 460

Southards (“Southards”) for one year after he refused to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol content, pursuant to section 577.041. ¹ Following a postrevocation hearing in the circuit court, the trial judge determined there was not probable cause to arrest Southards because the arresting officer lacked “sufficient indicia of intoxication to determine it was more likely than not [Southards] was intoxicated.” Accordingly, the trial court set aside the administrative revocation and ordered the reinstatement of Southards' driving privileges. On appeal, the Director contends the trial court's decision resulted from a misapplication of the law. We agree. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand with directions to reinstate the Director's one-year revocation of Southards' driving privileges.

Facts

On February 28, 2009, at 1:30 a.m., Missouri State Highway Trooper Kyle Wilmont (“Trooper Wilmont”) was patrolling in Dent County, Missouri, and observed Southards driving a Chevrolet pickup truck without rear license plate lamps. For this reason, Trooper Wilmont activated his emergency equipment and conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle. During the stop, Trooper Wilmont observed that Southards' eyes were glassy and bloodshot, his speech was slurred, there was a “strong odor” of alcohol emanating from his person, and an unopened six-pack of beer was in the passenger side of the truck.

Trooper Wilmont explained the reason for the stop and asked Southards if he had been drinking, to which Southards replied he had consumed one beer. The officer then asked Southards to perform field sobriety tests, but Southards refused. Based on these observations, Trooper Wilmont placed Southards under arrest for driving while intoxicated and transported him to the Dent County Jail. Trooper Wilmont testified that at the start of their interaction, Southards was “mouthy” and “disrespectful”-a point that Southards admitted-but this ceased once they arrived at the jail, and Southards apologized. Trooper Wilmont advised Southards of his Miranda rights at the time of the arrest. ² At the jail, Trooper Wilmont read to Southards Missouri's implied consent law and then requested that he take a breath analysis test, but Southards refused to take it.

Director notified Southards that his driving privileges would be revoked for one year because he refused to submit to a blood alcohol test by a law enforcement officer. Southards filed a petition for review pursuant to section 577.041.4.

At the hearing on his petition, Southards' testimony concerning the relevant facts did not contradict Trooper Wilmont's. Furthermore, in its judgment, the trial court made factual findings that included the officer's “clearly articulated” observations of the unopened six-pack of beer in the passenger floorboard of Southards' vehicle, Southards' slurred speech, bloodshot and glassy eyes, alcohol-scented breath, admission of drinking, and refusal to perform field sobriety tests. Nevertheless, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Southards and ordered the Director to remove the revocation, holding that Trooper Wilmont lacked probable cause to arrest Southards for driving while intoxicated. The trial court reached this conclusion because, according to its judgment, while Trooper Wilmont's observations were sufficient to give him “reasonable suspicion” that Southards was intoxicated, they were insufficient to prove that the probability of

321 S.W.3d 461

his intoxication was “more likely than not.” The Director now appeals.

Standard of Review

We will affirm the trial court's judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support the decision, the decision is against the weight of the evidence, or the court has erroneously declared or applied the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). If the evidence is uncontested or admitted so that the real issue is a legal one as to the legal effect of the evidence, then there is no need to defer to the trial court's judgment. Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Mo. banc 2002); see also City of St. Joseph v. Vill. of Country Club, 163 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Mo. banc 2005) (questions of law are reviewed de novo ). Evidence is uncontested when a party “has admitted in its pleadings, by counsel, or through the [party's] individual testimony the basic facts of the [other party's] case.” White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 308 (Mo. banc 2010). Here, the relevant historical facts underlying the question of probable cause are uncontested. Thus, our review is de novo. Id. at 310.

Discussion

Under Missouri's implied consent law, any person who drives on the public highways is deemed to have consented to a “chemical test” to determine the alcohol or drug content of the...