Harold MacQuinn, Inc. v. Halperin

• Decision Date: 11 June 1980
• Citation: 415 A.2d 818
• Parties: HAROLD MacQUINN, INCORPORATED v. R. L. HALPERIN, in his capacity as State Tax Assessor of the Bureau of Taxation.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 818

415 A.2d 818

HAROLD MacQUINN, INCORPORATED v. R. L. HALPERIN, in his capacity as State Tax Assessor of the Bureau of Taxation.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 4, 1980.

Decided June 11, 1980.

Rudman, Winchell, Carter & Buckley, Clark P. Thompson (orally), Bangor, for plaintiff.

Jerome S. Matus (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Bureau of Taxation, Augusta, for defendant.

Before WERNICK, GODFREY and GLASSMAN, JJ. and DUFRESNE, A. R. J.

GODFREY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court Hancock County, which upheld a decision of the State Tax Assessor, defendant R. L. Halperin, making a deficiency assessment against appellant, Harold MacQuinn, Inc., for a use tax under 36 M.R.S.A. § 1861 (1978). We affirm the judgment.

The appeal was brought on a stipulation of facts, which can be summarized briefly, as follows: On June 20, 1977, appellant corporation purchased a portable asphalt-mixing plant from Stansteel Corporation of California, with certain accessory equipment from other companies, at a total cost of $516,142.89. The portable plant was used in the production of bituminous concrete, or "hot mix". The portable plant was first put into service at Hancock, Maine, and used by Ronald P. MacQuinn, Inc., a different corporation, not owned by Harold MacQuinn, the owner of appellant corporation. During the period from July 28, 1977, to August 8, 1977, hot mix produced from the portable plant was sold by Ronald P. MacQuinn, Inc., to Harold MacQuinn, Inc., for resale by the latter, with the exception of sales by Ronald P. MacQuinn, Inc., directly to two other customers.

Sometime in August, 1977, the portable plant was moved to Blue Hill, Maine, and used by Harold MacQuinn, Inc., until September 28, 1977, when it was returned to Hancock. From October, 1977, to November 1977, the hot mix produced from the portable plant was again sold by Ronald P. MacQuinn, Inc., to Harold MacQuinn, Inc., for resale by the latter. During the year 1978, all use of the portable plant was by Ronald P. MacQuinn, Inc.

MacQuinn argues that the mixer is exempted from the use tax by 36 M.R.S.A. § 1760(31) (1978), which exempts from sales and use tax

(s)ales of new machinery and equipment for use by the purchaser directly and primarily in the production of tangible personal property, which property is intended to be sold or leased ultimately for final use or consumption.

This statute must be read in the light of the following provisions of 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752 (1978), defining terms used throughout the Maine legislation governing sales and use taxes:

2-A. Directly. 'Directly,' when used in relation to production of tangible personal property, refers to those activities or operations which constitute an integral and essential part of production, as contrasted with and distinguished from those activities or operations which are simply incidental, convenient or remote to production.

9-A. Primarily. 'Primarily,' when used in relation to production of tangible personal property means the use of a unit of property more than 50% of the time directly in production.

21. Use. 'Use' includes the exercise in this State of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to its ownership when purchased by the user at retail sale, including the derivation of income, whether received in money or in the form of other benefits, by a lessor from the rental of tangible personal property located in this State. ¹

The Superior Court held that the Assessor had correctly ruled that lending the mixer to another company was "use" under the definition in § 1752(21) but was not "use by the purchaser directly and primarily in the production of tangible personal property," for the purpose of exemption under § 1760(31). In its opinion, the Superior Court stated:

Read together, the statutes clearly indicate an intent that where a purchaser uses new equipment for more than one purpose, he may obtain a tax exemption only if he uses it more than 50% of the time for the single purpose of producing tangible personal property for resale. In the present case, plaintiff used the mixer for production purposes for only one out of four months; the rest of this time, plaintiff used the mixer for the purpose of loaning it out for use by others. ²

Appellant contends that the Superior Court erroneously construed the phrase "for use by the purchaser directly and primarily in the production of tangible personal property" in subsection 31 of section 1760. Appellant argues that "directly and primarily" in this phrase does not mean "for use directly and primarily by the purchaser" but means only that the use must be "directly and primarily in the production of tangible personal property." If the other language of subsection 31 is disregarded, the word "use" encompasses a loan of the equipment in view of the statutory definition of "use" in § 1752(21), set forth above. If we assume, arguendo, that appellant's explanation of "directly and primarily" is correct, we must nevertheless determine whether a loan of the equipment by the purchaser for use by the borrower in the production of tangible personal property is to be considered a "use by the purchaser . . . in the production of tangible personal property . . . ." In effect, this is the interpretation advocated by appellant.

The Assessor observes that the words "by the purchaser" were not included in the initial draft of the bill which became § 1760(31) and argues that the insertion of "by the purchaser" was intended to exclude from exemption any machinery which is leased or lent for more than 50 percent of the time even though the lessee's or borrower's use would otherwise qualify for exemption. In effect, the Assessor argues that the statute has the same meaning as if it read: "for use . . . in production by the purchaser . . . ." The Bureau of Taxation has officially adopted that construction in subsection (1)(a) of Regulation No. 3 of its sales tax regulations. ³

It is the Assessor's position that subsection 31 of section 1760 is unambiguous and should be interpreted according to its plain meaning; i. e., that "use by the purchaser . . . in the production" has essentially the same meaning as "use in production by the purchaser." We think the matter is not that simple for two reasons. First, "use", as the term is employed throughout the sales and use tax law, includes leasing as a form of exercising a "right or power . . . incident to . . . ownership." 39 M.R.S.A. § 1752(21), quoted above. It is certainly arguable that lending, like leasing, is a form of exercising a right or power incident to ownership. It is not absurd to suggest that if lending qualifies as a kind of "use" that is subject to use taxation, it qualifies also as a use within the scope of the exemption provisions.

Second, the general purpose of the exemption afforded by section 1760(31) is to encourage manufacturers in Maine to re-equip, modernize and expand their plants. At least a priori, that purpose would seem to be equally well served whether the purchaser employs the equipment himself in the manner prescribed for the exemption or lends it to a bailee who employs it in the same manner.

In view of the possibility, suggested by the foregoing considerations, that the Assessor's interpretation may run counter to the basic purpose of the exemption, it is not appropriate for us to dispose of the case, as the Assessor suggests, by resort to the "plain-meaning" rule applicable to unambiguous language. However, certain other considerations lead us to conclude that the exemption was properly denied.

We begin with the general principle, well established in Maine law, that an exemption from taxation, while entitled to reasonable interpretation in accordance with its purpose, is not to be extended by application to situations not clearly coming within the scope of the exemption provisions. Pentecostal Assembly of Bangor v. Maidlow, Me., 414 A.2d 891 (1980); Nature Conservancy v. Town of Bristol, Me., 385 A.2d 39, 42 (1978); Hurricane Island Outward Bound v. Town of Vinalhaven, Me., 372 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1977); Howard D. Johnson Co. v. King, Me., 351 A.2d 524, 532 (1976). Technically speaking, the appellant is asking for an extension of the meaning of the words "use by the purchaser . . . in the production . . ." to include "loan by the purchaser to a bailee for use by the...