Harp v. State
Decision Date | 01 February 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 67084,67084 |
Citation | 169 Ga.App. 670,314 S.E.2d 686 |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Parties | HARP v. The STATE. |
J. Alfred Johnson, Mike Treadaway, Marietta, for appellant.
Thomas J. Charron, Dist. Atty., James F. Morris, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Appellant, a probationer, violated the terms of his probation by committing a subsequent offense. A revocation hearing was held, and appellant was ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence at the Cobb Diversion Center. The court's revocation order, which was signed by appellant and by his attorney, expressly required appellant to obey the rules and regulations of the Diversion Center. When appellant entered the Center, he was fully advised as to those rules and regulations, and he signed an acknowledgment that he understood them. Thereafter, appellant violated two of the rules by leaving the Center premises without permission and by possessing alcoholic beverages while at the Center. Another revocation hearing was held, and appellant was ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence in the state prison system. He appeals.
1. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in revoking his probation on the basis of his violating the rules and regulations of the Diversion Center. Appellant contends that he was not properly informed of the conditions of his probation, because he was not apprised of the rules and regulations of the Center when sentence was pronounced at his first revocation hearing.
Shaw v. State, 164 Ga.App. 208, 209, 296 S.E.2d 765 (1982). " ...' Hinton v. State, 127 Ga.App. 853, 854, 195 S.E.2d 472 (1973). In the instant case, however, appellant received adequate notice of the particular conditions of his sentence. The written order of the court, which was issued in appellant's presence at the end of his revocation hearing, expressly provided that appellant shall enter the Cobb Diversion Center and "shall obey their rules and regulations." Appellant's signature on that order, which was preceded by the words "consented to," clearly indicated his acknowledgment of its terms. Even though the order did not itself specify what the rules and regulations of the Diversion Center were, there was other undisputed evidence that appellant was fully apprised of those rules promptly upon his admission to the Center. Moreover, appellant's own conduct in climbing the fence surrounding the Center and in secreting the beer he obtained evidenced his awareness that he was violating the rules. His activities were not illegal in themselves, and if he did not know that his conduct was prohibited by Center regulations, his behavior was unnecessarily surreptitious. Compare Shaw v. State, supra.
Appellant in the instant case was adequately informed of the conditions of his probation, and the trial court did not err in revoking his probation upon his failure to comply therewith. Compare Harrell v. State, 162 Ga.App. 111, 290 S.E.2d 213 (1982), wherein the appellant's probation was not conditioned upon his compliance with the rules and regulations of the Diversion Center.
2. Appellant next enumerates as error the trial court's admission into evidence, over timely objection, of a document comprising the rules and regulations of the Cobb Diversion Center. Appellant contends that no foundation was laid for the admission of the writing, inasmuch as it was not properly authenticated. He further contends that the exhibit in issue was merely a copy, and thus was not the best evidence of the rules and regulations contained therein.
The document was introduced in conjunction with the testimony of Mr. Krusenberry, the assistant director of the Cobb Diversion Center, who identified it as a "copy" of the Center's rules and regulations. He testified that these rules had been in existence since the Diversion Center program began, and that these were the rules which he had read and explained to appellant when ...
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Stephens v. the State.
...defendant's probation for violating a special condition of probation of which the defendant never had notice. See Harp v. State, 169 Ga.App. 670, 670–671, 314 S.E.2d 686 (1984) (“ ‘[T]o expect a probationer to abide by terms and conditions of which he has no knowledge would be an unconstitu......
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Clowers v. Sikes
...executed the waiver form that was presented to him. See McGee v. State, 260 Ga. 178(3), 391 S.E.2d 400 (1990); Harp v. State, 169 Ga.App. 670, 671(2), 314 S.E.2d 686 (1984); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Latimore, 151 Ga. App. 786, 788(1), 261 S.E.2d 735 (1979); Trice v. Adams, 33 Ga......
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Johnson v. State, 71097
...sheets, were admissible as original evidence. Montgomery v. State, 154 Ga.App. 311, 268 S.E.2d 723 (1980); Harp v. State, 169 Ga.App. 670, 672(2), 314 S.E.2d 686 (1984). Judgment DEEN, P.J., and POPE, J., concur. ...
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IN RE BK, No. A99A0850
...the juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency for probation violation as authorized by OCGA § 15-11-2(6)(B). Compare Harp v. State, 169 Ga. App. 670(1), 314 S.E.2d 686. Judgments ANDREWS, P.J., and RUFFIN, J., concur. ...